Military Intelligence

April–June 1980



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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan captured the cover of our Strategic Intelligence issue. In addition to articles considering our strategic intelligence effort, three articles explore implications of the Soviet takeover.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.
APR 1980

from the Commander

The Forgotten INT

The intelligence capabilities of the US Army can constitute one of our main equalizers for off-setting the odds when facing a larger force with greater fire power. The first step in winning any battle is helping the commander to "see the battlefield." After determining the area where we will fight, we then prepare all intelligence collection efforts based on our knowledge of the enemy and how the weather and terrain will affect his probable courses of action. When we think IPB or ASAS it is extremely important to consider all the collection capabilities available and plan accordingly. With the attention given today's vast array of technical collection systems at all echelons from the forward line of troops to the national systems, I am concerned that there is not enough emphasis given to the preparation of HUMINT activities and planning for their use as an integral part of the overall collection effort. Recognizing that the enemy is directing its collection effort to see the battlefield, we must remember that HUMINT is both an offensive and defensive discipline. It allows us to know the enemy, and also to see our units as the enemy sees them. Defensively, our intelligence must provide an assessment of the friendly command security posture, thereby allowing development of collective measures to counteract vulnerabilities. Offensively, HUMINT must provide critical information for updating the IPB data bases as well as feed into each echelon's all-source analysis centers. Corps and EAC HUMINT planning actions, to be in accord with the principles of good intelligence management, must include these areas:

- Pre-position agents throughout the Corps area of influence/interest to provide indications and warnings that might not be detected by other means.
- Plan for the use of stay-behind agents, assuming the US posture will remain defensive. These agents must be identified, trained and equipped prior to the initiation of hostilities.
- Use OPSEC methods to accurately see our posture, and to know the enemy's collection capabilities targeted against us.
- Plan CI operations to neutralize the enemy's collection efforts.
- Train the frontline Soldier to be observant and, above all, to report significant information promptly. Then provide the communications links necessary to get the job done.
- Coordinate between echelons above Corps and tactical unit intelligence officers. Tactical intelligence officers must know who they will deal with during contingency situations.

This is a brief outline of what I believe we, as intelligence managers, must do to optimize the use of all our collection capabilities. This effort naturally will have to be carefully orchestrated with theater intelligence personnel, INSCOM and national producers.

Properly planned and managed, HUMINT will prove to be the most reliable system capable of establishing intent; the only system able to understand the enemy—the enemy that technical systems only can see.

Feedback

Editor,

In general the magazine is most professional, and your choice of theme (The Reserve Component) for the January–March 80 issue deserves periodic repetition.

A detailed reading prompts me to comment on the contents of two of the articles. The comments are intended to clarify or elaborate rather than detract from the basic thrust.

With respect to the article, *EW/SIGINT Training for Reservists* on pages 10 and 11, the following comments are offered. Instead of those listed, the actual projection for RC-CEWI unit activations are eight battalions (division), 10 companies (separate brigade/ACR), one battalion (aerial exploitation), and two companies (aerial surveillance) in the time frame from FY 82 through FY 85. In addition, nine companies (separate brigade/ACR) have been included in the unmanned component. No CEWI group is programmed for the RC. These differences impact the projections in Figure 1. The references to Phase I, Phase II, and an additional group exist in an OCAR sponsored study done at USAICS, but they are not reflected in Total Army Analysis 86. The article fails to mention that training and training materials for EW/SIGINT specialties generally require access to SCIF and SCI for possession and use. The article fails to address whether a meaningful correlation of course effectiveness exists between the abbreviated RC training and the significantly longer courses used for AC training. Finally, the article fails to indicate that the overwhelming preponderance of students have attended the COMSEC Custodian course as opposed to the alleged MOS producing courses.

Further comment is offered concerning the article, *Reserve Military Intelligence in the Total Army* on pages 37 through 39. In particular, I address that portion dealing with SIGINT/EW units on page 38. In general, the article fails to distinguish between that capability which would exist if the units were equipped and significantly populated with MOS qualified personnel and the actual condition of the units. The multichannel communications collection capability indicated does not exist in any of the units' MTOEs. Is the in-depth capability of the 99th C&P Co real or theoretical? REDTRAIN IAW AR 350-3 originally specifically excluded the RC. In revision it added applicability to the RC as well as the other intelligence disciplines. The training in Puerto Rico for the summer of 1980 has been cancelled for lack of funding. Much but certainly not all of the RC intelligence force structure will be reorganized under CEWI, numerous units in support of EAC requirements will remain outside the CEWI structure.

Ray W. Chamberlain
LTC, GS
USAR Advisor, ODCSI, FORSCOM

Editor,

I read with interest the articles in the January–March 80 edition of ***Military Intelligence*** that dealt with the Reserve Component (RC). As noted in one of the articles, RC military intelligence units and personnel represent more than one-half of the assets required for mobilization in the event of conflict. Devoting an issue of ***Military Intelligence*** to military intelligence reserve component serves to recognize the significant role of these forces.

However, I feel the picture of the RC units would have been more complete if you had profiled a reserve MI unit. While your contributing authors did not present an erroneous picture, only one commented: "The difficulties that beset the Reserves have not been emphasized. There are many, some of grim aspect." A bit more emphasis by ***Military Intelligence*** on the "difficulties" of "grim aspect" would have offered your readers a more balanced view.

Also, I was a little chagrined that none of the articles mentioned the role of the MI/EW Assistors (or Assistance Teams) assigned to selected Readiness Groups or Army Readiness Regions. The MI/EW Assistors are active duty MI personnel whose primary mission is to assist RC MI units located in their geographic areas to establish, achieve and sustain individual and unit readiness. Assistance is provided on weekends (when RC units meet and train); and ranges from classroom instruction to technical guidance in one of the MI/EW disciplines to development of yearly training programs to ***whatever*** the MI unit commander feels his unit needs. The MI/EW assistors provide the first and (I think) the most crucial level of interface between the active and reserve MI components. In addition to the 15 US Army Reserve (USAR) MI units assisted in the Readiness Group Meade area, our MI/EW team assists four USAR Psychological Operations units (which have a high percentage of MI-related specialties), and the G2/S2 sections of National Guard combat units located in a six state area. Along with the MI Coordinator at Readiness Region Headquarters, our assistance effort encompasses all MI disciplines including tactical, SIGINT/EW, strategic, aerial surveillance, counterintelligence, HUMINT and interrogation.

Keep up the good work!

Ronald L. Jerome
MAJ, MI
Chief, Branch Assistance Team

Our quarterly themes are intended to provide as comprehensive a study as possible of an area of the intelligence effort. This requires the support of an audience which can bring to bear an enormous amount of training and work experience in the consideration of any theme. To give our audience every opportunity to support our themes, we have published them in our July–September issues for the past two years. Announcing themes for the following calendar year, we give our readers from three to 12 months to plan and write articles. (It remains our policy to consider and publish articles not specifically addressed to a quarterly theme so that we can cover as many aspects of intelligence as possible with each issue.)

In light of the above, the chagrin of a reader who found one area of the intelligence effort overlooked is only exceeded by the chagrin of a staff that the subject was deemed worthy of mention only in a letter to the editor **after** *the publication of an issue and not in an article submitted to the magazine for the issue.*

The staff of ***Military Intelligence*** *does not have the benefit of the thousands of years of intelligence training and work experience collectively held by its audience. Nor does the staff have the time to devote to a full understanding of every aspect of the intelligence effort, both active duty and reserve, in the production of each issue. The staff must rely on its audience for the "complete" picture, the audience must rely on itself.*

Editor

Authors

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Major (P) David T. Twining is a strategic studies instructor in the Department of Strategy and Theater Operations, US Army Command and General Staff College. He received a B.S. from Michigan State University, an M.P.A. from Syracuse University, an M.A. in Russian area studies from Georgetown University and graduated CGSC in 1978. He is a Soviet foreign area officer and has served with the 4th Battalion, 18th US Infantry in West Berlin and the 525th MI Group in Vietnam. His most recent assignment was as Executive Officer of the National Military Intelligence Center, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC.

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LTC Foley is assigned to MILPERCEN. Previous assignments include: Commander of the CI&SIGSEC Support Battalion, Fort Meade; Staff and Faculty of both the USAICS and USAISD; Indications and Warning Analyst, J2, USEUCOM; Battalion S2 and Assistant G2, 1st Infantry Division, RVN; duty with the USA Special Security Group in Hawaii and the RVN; and, Plans and Training Officer, Ft. Hamilton. A graduate of the CGSC, holds a BBA from LaMoyne College and an MA in international relations from the University of Southern California.

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MAJ Correll was commissioned in Infantry from OCS in 1967. He is a graduate of IOAC, MIOAC and CGSC. He holds a BS degree from Columbus College. He has been a brigade and battalion S2 in Europe, has commanded two companies and a Special Forces A-Detachment and was assigned to Command and Control North, 5th Special Forces Group in RVN. MAJ Correll is currently serving as an Infantry Assistor in Readiness Group Meade, Fort Meade, Maryland.

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

Major Collard enlisted in the Signal Corps in 1963 and was commissioned through ROTC at the University of Washington with a bachelor's degree in communications. He has attended the Field Artillery Advanced Course, Command and General Staff College and the Electronic Warfare course at Fort Leavenworth. In addition to commanding a signal company and field artillery battery, he has some seven years experience as a brigade and battalion signal officer in the Far East, CONUS and Europe. Major Collard is currently an Assistant Professor of Military Science at Wofford College in Spartanburg, SC.

22

Captain Martin H. Joyce, III is currently assigned as an intelligence analyst with the General Intelligence Production Division, US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. His previous assignment was with the 2d Battalion 13th Infantry, in Mannheim, Germany. Captain Joyce graduated from the US Military Academy in 1974 and is a 1979 graduate of the Post-Graduate Intelligence Course, Defense Intelligence School.

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CPT Peter V. Huisking received his commission in 1971 through the ROTC Program at Pomona College in California. He has served as an artillery battery executive officer and commander and as an intelligence officer on the staff of a Field Artillery Group. Following a branch transfer to Military Intelligence, he served with the 502d CBTI Company and as a company commander in the 2d Armored Division's 522d MI Battalion (CEWI). A recent graduate of the Post-graduate Intelligence Curriculum of the Defense Intelligence School, CPT Huisking is currently assigned to the school's Staff and Faculty.

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Specialist Arpin graduated from Basic Training on September 21st, 1978, at Fort Knox, Kentucky. On December 15th of that year, he graduated from the Defense Information School (DINFOS) Information Specialist Journalist Course, at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. The following month he was sent overseas as a journalist working in the Public Affairs Office of the 1st Infantry Division (Forward) in Goeppingen, West Germany. Since writing this article he has been temporarily attached to the Public Affairs Office, Boeblingen-Sindelfingen Military Community. SP4 Arpin's photos and articles have appeared in **The DARCOM News** and **EURArmy Magazine,** and some civilian publications.

34

CPT David L. Cooper is a graduate of the MI Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer Course (35A) and the Tactical Surveillance Officer Course (35C). He is currently attending the Defense Sensor Interpretation and Application Course at Offutt AFB. He has served as platoon leader, Battalion S2, and Field Artillery Intelligence Officer in the 1st Armored Division. He holds a BA in German and Linguistics from Princeton University, and an MA in International Relations from the University of Southern California. Contents of his article are a result of his experience as a targeting officer in 1st Armored Division, research for MIOAC, and work completed in conjunction with the US Army Field Artillery School in Fort Sill. A more technical version, including further material for interdiction fire planning and specific staffing requirements integrated into a Central European scenario, has been completed at Fort Sill, and was formally presented to GEN Starry in April for subsequent TRADOC publication and dissemination.

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Jim Hansen served in the US Air Force from 1965–1968 with a reconnaissance unit in northeast Thailand. He then obtained a BA in Russian studies and an MA in international relations from the University of Michigan. He worked for the CIA from 1971 to 1978 as an operations officer at headquarters and overseas, an analyst in the Office of Strategic Research and as a current intelligence specialist. He subsequently joined the BDM Corporation and has participated in numerous research projects commissioned by agencies and departments of the US government and concerning the military capabilities of the USSR and its allies. His first book, **Certain Thunder ... International Conflict in the 1980s and 1990s,** is awaiting publication. In recent months, Mr. Hansen has also prepared articles on Soviet theater forces in Central Europe and on Soviet "external" military operations in the Third World.

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55

1LT Kop is an MI reserve officer currently assigned to the 99 ASA Company (Control & Processing), Fort Meade, MD. A graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, LT Kop has served as an Area Intelligence Officer with the OPFOR/EW Division, DTD and the Exploitation Division, Department of Human Intelligence, DOT, USAICS; OACSI; and in Japan. A graduate of the University of Hawaii, with a BA in Psychology and a minor in Korean, LT Kop holds an MA in Counseling Psychology from the University of Northern Colorado and an MA in Education from Michigan State University. He is currently a doctoral student in Clinical Psychology at United States International University.

ENERGY FUTURE: Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School

by R. Stombaugh & D. Yergin. Published by Random House, New York, 1979. Hardcover 353 pages. Price $12.95.

Energy Future is an excellent primer for anyone trying to sort out this nation's energy picture. Stombaugh and Yergin discuss all energy sources: oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear, conservation and solar.

The authors conclude that oil and natural gas are limited fuel sources and that even with higher oil company profits and new technology, these sources will grow little. Instability in the Middle East could disrupt the flow of oil at any time.

Coal and nuclear energy are also limited fuel sources. Both raise serious environmental concerns: coal—pollution; nuclear energy—radioactive waste disposal. These concerns must be addressed and solutions provided before these sources can expand to meet increased energy needs.

An energy source not recognized as such is conservation. The authors feel it is unrecognized because it lacks strong supporters and must compete against the advertising budgets of major oil companies and established utilities. They feel it is not in the economic self interest of oil/gas firms and utilities to push conservation and offer examples of how business concerns and the City of Los Angeles have coped with fuel cutbacks and made conservation work.

The major contributions of large solar energy projects will not be available until the year 2000. Here the authors feel much research and development is still required. In addition, building codes that protect solar homeowners, plus tax incentives are required to make small solar grow.

In summary, Stombaugh and Yergin in *Energy Future* push for a balanced program relying on all energy sources while recognizing the limitations of each. This well researched book has a detailed list of references and notes.

John M. Rooney
Major, MI

General Brown is the Assistant Vice Director for Estimates and Deputy Vice Director for Foreign Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency. An ROTC Distinguished Military Graduate from West Virginia State College, he is a tactical/strategic intelligence officer and a Foreign Area Officer (Russian). General Brown came to his DIA assignment from Fort McPherson, Georgia where he was the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, US Army Forces Command. Commissioned an RA 2LT in 1954, his assignments include: platoon leader and battery executive officer, 2d Airborne Battle Group, 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division; assistant G2, HQ 3d Armored Division, US Army Europe-Germany; battery commander, operations officer and battalion executive officer, 2d Battalion, 6th Artillery, US Army Europe-Germany; commander, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Group, US Army, Pacific-Vietnam; intelligence estimator, Soviet/East European Division, Directorate for Estimates, DIA; chief, Ground Forces/Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Branch, Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Intelligence Research, DIA; commander, US Army Field Station Berlin, US Army INSCOM. General Brown holds a BA in history and political science and an MA in government (Russian Area Studies) from Indiana University. Military training includes the Infantry Basic Course, Artillery Advanced Course, US Army Command and General Staff College, USA Russian Institute, US Naval War College (Distinguished Graduate), the Defense Language Institute (Russian and German) and the National Senior Cryptologic Officer's Course. Awards include the Meritorious Service Medal (2OLC), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Master Parachutist Badge and Aircraft Crewman Badge.

Strategic Intelligence The Army Role

by Brigadier General

Dallas C. Brown, Jr.

Strategic intelligence is our first line of defense and may well be the margin of our survival as a nation. Chronic instability in many parts of the world, advanced weaponry and the compression of time and space in modern warfare make this crystal clear. Our Army and its MI officers are playing a vital role in strategic intelligence. It is certain that this role will continue and expand in the future.

While most MI officers would agree with the above in general terms, there is a fair amount of discussion and some confusion about the term "strategic intelligence." Unfortunately, the problem is more than semantic. Differing perceptions of what strategic intelligence is and what it means contribute to running battles over roles, functions and missions within the Army as well as the intelligence community. For a working definition, I am defining strategic intelligence as intelligence that is used in making policy decisions affecting national security.

Beyond the basic definition of strategic intelligence, we have the task of deciding what is strategic and what is tactical intelligence. This seemingly small point has caused some difficulty over the years. As I see it, the distinction is (or should be) how the intelligence is used. Tactical intelligence is used to make operational decisions in the field while strategic intelligence is used at the international, national and perhaps theater levels. I think the confusion about this has arisen mainly because we have fallen into the habit of considering intelligence collected by national means to be strategic and that obtained by operational commands as tactical.

This is fallacious; it doesn't matter who collects the intelligence or how. A lone cavalry trooper on an outpost along some contested border may spot the advance guard of an attacking army. If he does, he has obtained tactical intelligence for his squadron and most assuredly strategic intelligence for the highest levels of government. The situation could easily be reversed if national means detected large scale movement toward that border. In that case the national means would provide timely tactical intelligence and warning to that same cavalry squadron.

Beyond the basic definition of strategic intelligence, it is useful to look at the subject from different perspectives for discussion. There are many ways to do this but Sherman Kent's categories seem most helpful. In his **Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy**, Kent said intelligence has three definitional subsets: knowledge, organization and activity.

Knowledge

In this context, knowledge is the result of our familiar intelligence cycle, i.e., planning, collection, processing, production and dissemination. To borrow from Kent again, this is the knowledge that our nation must possess regarding other nations in order to assure itself that its interests will not be harmed because of planning or decision-making done in ignorance. It is also the knowledge upon which our foreign policy is based. Again, we must remember that whatever intelligence national policymakers use becomes *ipso facto* strategic intelligence. Strategic intelligence encompasses a wide variety of topics; for example, economic, electronic, geographic, imagery, laser, medical, military, nuclear, political, radar, scientific, signals, target, technical and telemetry intelligence.

Obviously, the fund of knowledge that is strategic intelligence is not found in any particular document or series of documents. It is found in a variety of intelligence studies, analyses and estimates published within the intelligence community. The capstone strategic intelligence documents are the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and related documents published under the aegis of the Director of Central Intelligence with the participation of the various intelligence agencies and the military services. The Army is well represented in this process both as an institution and through the participation of individual officers.

Organization

Strategic intelligence functions are performed and directed at the national level by elements of the United States intelligence community. This is not a

Strategic intelligence is our first line of defense and may well be the margin of our survival as a nation. Chronic instability in many parts of the world, advanced weaponry and the compression of time and space in modern warfare make this crystal clear. Our Army and its MI officers are playing a vital role in strategic intelligence. It is certain that this role will continue and expand in the future.

single organization but rather a corporate body. The term, in the aggregate refers to the Central Intelligence Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department; intelligence elements of the military services; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Department of Energy; and others.

In addition to the national level organizations, the intelligence officers and organizations in the Unified and Specified Commands as well as the major commands of the military services play a vital role in the overall process, particularly in the collection and basic analysis of much of the material that ultimately becomes strategic intelligence.

The United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) with its worldwide operations makes daily contributions to all facets of strategic intelligence. The intelligence organizations and sections of our deployed regiments, brigades, divisions and corps also provide intelligence that becomes part of our body of strategic intelligence. Strategic intelligence can be viewed as the continuous flow of a large river with numerous streams and tributaries feeding into it. The MI officer should always realize that he is part of the "big picture;" even if that is not always apparent in peacetime, it becomes clear in crises or wartime.

Activity

The activity we are concerned with consists of the entire intelligence cycle as we know it. However, in the production of strategic intelligence at the national level there are significant variations from standard intelligence production methods. The process is complex and demanding on its participants. In the first instance, strategic intelligence produced at the national level is a synthesis of all the intelligence known or obtained by members of the intelligence community. As one might imagine, this melding of views to form coherent judgments is easier said than done. Highly competent intelligence officers can (and often do) disagree on interpretations of the same data. Typically a strategic intelligence officer has to research carefully, make a sound analysis and then defend it. Naturally, a high degree of professional knowledge, objectivity and intellectual honesty is required.

The Army and its MI officers play a major role in this process. Further, the analytic elements of OACSI, DA and INSCOM make large contributions to strategic intelligence production. Additionally, numerous MI officers are serving as strategic intelligence officers at DIA, NSA and other national level activities. These officers make significant contributions to strategic intelligence and national security.

Challenges in Strategic Intelligence

There are a number of pitfalls and challenges in the field of strategic (and often tactical) intelligence that both the novice and the old timer should recognize. Some are insoluble while others can be overcome with some difficulty.

The problem of intelligence collection gaps will always be with us and is troubling at times. However, we must remember that if we had all the facts, we wouldn't be dealing in intelligence. From my perspective, the most challenging aspect of strategic intelligence is the analysis facet of production rather than collection (which seems to get most of our attention).

There are several analytical traps that we are wont to fall into. A number of them might seem humorous, nevertheless, they are problems. A major one is the tendency to "worst case" instead of looking for the most likely case. A corollary of this is the insistence that we can only estimate capabilities and can't deal with intentions. That won't wash for strategic intelligence. We know for example, that the Soviet Union is perfectly capable of launching a nuclear attack against us today. It does no good to tell the decision maker that. We must tell him what the likelihood of attack is. Another problem is the reduction of key judgments to the lowest common denominator to gain consensus. This reduces the chances of being wrong; unfortunately it also reduces the chances of providing useful intelligence. We have the problem of the "mirror image" and the "double mirror image." In the first instance we assume that the enemy's strategic perceptions are necessarily like our own, while in the second we assume that they are necessarily different. We have the problem of bias or mental rigidity which prevents us from detecting change even though the evidence is there. There is also the growing tendency to rely on ADP systems and systems analysis to provide our strategic intelligence. Obviously, we must make full use of new technology and methodologies. Yet, we must remember that computers can neither think for us nor fathom our opponents' thinking. At best they are an aid and at worst they simply aggregate ignorance with precision.

Sometimes, the reaction of our consumers to the finished intelligence can pose a major problem. A high level decision maker may not accept the intelligence because his notions are contrary to the intelligence judgments provided or because they do not conform neatly to current plans or policies. This happened to us at the time of the Chinese intervention in Korea in late October 1950. It also happens to other nations, including our opponents. Despite a splendid set of strategic intelligence data, Stalin absolutely refused to believe that Germany would attack the Soviet Union in June 1941. Unfortunately, there is no sure solution to this one. One thing is clear, however, the intelligence officer must call them the way he sees them, whether the user agrees or not. If we do otherwise merely to get on the team, we simply are not doing our jobs. The point is that intelligence must drive plans and operations, not the reverse.

Strategic Intelligence for MI Officers

Recently I have received numerous questions from junior MI officers concerning the possibility and desirability of a career in strategic intelligence. Several of the officers I talked with had some misconceptions about the work. Others indicated that they wanted to enter the field after their initial duty assignment at the tactical level. As to the first point, I know that strategic intelligence is at once fascinating, challenging and rewarding. Yet, it is not something apart and special; it is simply another dimension of intelligence. There is not and should not be a separation between tactical and strategic

intelligence career patterns. In my view, the basic qualification for becoming a strategic intelligence officer is a thorough grounding and proficiency in tactical intelligence. A logical career progression is service as an intelligence officer (35 A/B) successively from battalion to DoD level. Interestingly, the MI officers who perform best at the national level usually have extensive tactical intelligence experience. Experience at the tactical level is also important for a more basic reason. You can't discuss, for example, Soviet armor doctrine with much credibility if you have never seen a tank. To put it another way, you need to understand basic tactical operations before you launch into strategy.

In addition to practical experience at the tactical level, training in one of the related fields of social science such as history, area studies, or international relations is helpful. Language training is also beneficial in that it gives one a certain "feel" for a nation or area, as well as the ability to read and communicate in the language. Perhaps the best academic and practical preparation is the Army's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program. Incidentally, the FAO program is perhaps the best program that the military services have in this general area and is the reason that many Army officers occupy key strategic intelligence billets within DoD.

For those MI officers who have the proper background, aptitude, and inclination, I highly recommend assignments in the strategic intelligence field. The vast majority of MI officers working in this field find it satisfying both in personal and professional terms. It has one overriding advantage. There is always a live mission. Strategic intelligence officers are heavily engaged in their basic mission every day of every year. For most of us in the field of strategic intelligence, this is sufficient reward for our efforts. To those who are of like mind, I say come and join us!

The Outlook for Strategic Intelligence

The decade of the 1980s will be a period in which the significance and importance of strategic intelligence will grow dramatically. Nuclear proliferation, new weapon systems, and fast moving change in the international order ensure this. Our overall intelligence collection means will improve, we hope at the same rate as the requirements. The Army's tactical intelligence organizations and INSCOM will make an enhanced contribution to the effort as we field new organizations and equipment. We may, however, be faced with an information glut—we might find that we have more data than we can deal with. Technology will help us to some extent. but in the final analysis, we will continue to rely on the skill and dedication of our strategic intelligence officers, many of whom are and will be members of Military Intelligence.

Intelligence Records Released

Thirty-three volumes of historically significant records released by the US Army Intelligence and Security Command under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) went on exhibit on 19 February in the Library at Fort George G. Meade, MD, marking the fifth anniversary of the effective date of the amended FOIA. The records are part of a display explaining the law and its purpose.

Included in the volumes are the history of the US Army Counterintelligence Corps and its investigative files pertaining to such persons as Adolph Hitler, his SS chief Heinrick Himmler, Gen. Rheinhard Gehlen, the Third Reich's intelligence chief on the Soviet front, Tokyo Rose and many others. Hitler's personal medical records, the transcript of the interrogation of his chauffeur who, following Hitler's suicide, assisted in burning his body, the marriage certificate of Hitler and Eva Braun and the dictators last will and testament are among the documents.

In releasing the records, the Army hopes to promote a greater public awareness of the objectives of the FOIA and of the contributions of Army intelligence to the nation.

The volumes will remain in the Fort Meade Library, which is open to the public, for an indefinite period of time. While the records may not be checked out of the library, copies of selected documents in the volumes may be purchased.

Elevation Data Edit Terminals Contract

The Commander and Director of the Army Engineer Topographic Laboratories has announced the awarding of a contract to produce two Elevation Data Edit Terminals (EDET). The prime contractor is DBA Systems, Inc. of Melbourne, Florida. Delivery is expected in February 1982.

DBA is developing the terminals under contract to the Engineer Topographic Laboratories for use by the Defense Mapping Agency. One terminal will be delivered to the agency's Hydrographic/Topographic Center in Brookmont, Maryland, while the other will go to its Aerospace Center in St. Louis, Missouri.

The purpose of EDET is to detect and correct errors in computer tapes of digital elevation data. The Defense Mapping Agency centers use digital elevation data in the production of map products. The centers also supply the elevation data bases needed for guidance and control of major weapon systems, such as the Pershing II missile.

EDET will superimpose the digital elevation data on the aerial photos from which the data were originally compiled. EDET will work by application of anaglyphic stereoscopic technique, the same principle used in three-dimensional comic books and movies.

Each terminal will resemble a television with only two colors, red and blue. The red and blue images are the right and left half of a stereo pair of aerial photos. Viewed with spectacles whose right and left lenses are red and blue, the double television picture becomes a three-dimensional picture or stereograph of terrain as seen from the air.

Raw digital elevation data stored on magnetic tape are also fed into the terminal. The elevation of each point on the data grid can be displayed on the terminal as a dot in space. If the stereo pair and the data are both accurate, the dots in space will be neither above nor below the ground level in the stereograph. Where a data point appears suspended aboveground or buried underground, a data error is suspected. The photos and the data can be examined in detail to find the source of the error and correct it.

Besides the rectangular matrix of dots described above, the digital elevation data and stereographs can also be displayed as a profile (cross section) of the terrain. Elevation data can also be depicted as contour lines superimposed on the relief of the stereograph. In addition to correcting inaccurate data, EDET will validate large masses of data, putting a higher confidence value on the maps and charts produced from the digital elevation data base.

Strategic Intelligence in the 1980s: Reflections on a Dynamic World

by MAJ (P) David T. Twining

Introduction

While a look at the 1980s is admittedly speculative and subject to change, military intelligence professionals should continually seek to anticipate what may lie ahead. The intelligence analyst, an often overlooked and neglected asset, is central to this quest.

The world of the 1980s will place new demands on strategic intelligence, particularly upon those who manage the process and use its product. It will be a world where the line between tactical and strategic intelligence becomes increasingly blurred and where events of local concern could quickly gain national and international significance. The role of the intelligence analyst, in whose judgment the nation places a special trust, will become essential to both the process and the product as never before.

As we move into the 1980s, we can already recognize precursors of the volatility, uncertainty and instability ahead: the unprecedented growth of Soviet military power, an emergent People's Republic of China, a North-South developmental gap, a burgeoning population explosion, an energy crisis which typifies the rising demand for scarce resources and a disintegration of the accepted patterns of behavior of states.

Based on these developments, the 1980s are likely to have the following characteristics:

A Rapidity of Events

The revolution in technology represented by advanced weapons research, microcircuitry and instant global communications holds two implications for events threatening vital US national security interests. First, such events may escalate more quickly than ever to dangerous proportions. Nuclear proliferation, record conventional arms sales and a widespread propensity to the use of terror for political purposes will enable minor incidents to swell to major dimensions. The same factors making possible the increased speed in which events unfold form the basis for the second implication: an increasing number of events of varying levels of intensity and degree of threat are likely to occur. The specter of more incidents developing at a faster rate will add a degree of criticality to intelligence analysis which was previously unknown.

Peace is not only better than war, it is infinitely more arduous.

A Proliferation of Actors

Responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, which had been the aegis of governments, is quickly dissipating. Instead, the resurgence of pan-Islamic and other religious movements, proactive organizations encompassing the entire political spectrum, regional alliances, ethnic outreach efforts, environmental activists, multinational corporations, and labor, cultural and social organizations have increased the complexity of foreign relations and, in some cases, placed its conduct beyond the reach of governments alone. This expansion of actors in the international arena—many of whom operate outside channels previously established for such activity—will greatly complicate the task of intelligence analysis.

Increasing Ambiguity and Uncertainty

The norms of accepted private and public behavior of states, organizations and individuals will undergo further assaults in the next decade. People, faced with unfolding events over which their governments have seemingly little control, will be even further buffeted by the prospect of economic, social and political dislocations. National values and the cultural heritage of each nation will assuage but not prevent widespread feelings of helplessness, ambiguity and uncertainty. The intelligence analyst will be challenged to give focus and direction to events without precedent.

Uncertainty Yielding to Instability

The bipolar world represented by US-Soviet strategic nuclear parity is in reality multipolar in nearly every other respect.[1] This multipolarity, combined with the prospect of rapidly developing events involving an increased number of diverse international actors within an environment of uncertainty, increases the likelihood of conflict. This conflict will probably be low in intensity, varied in nature and geographically widespread; it will be a particular threat to the so-called Third World of developing nations. Intelligence analysts will have to understand, assess and forecast this miasma of instability which will confront the world in the 1980s.

The Tactical/Strategic Intelligence Interface

These characteristics, present now and becoming more so in the decade ahead, will serve to blur the line between tactical and strategic intelligence. In this dynamic environment, combat information of tactical significance may decisively contribute to an understanding of emerging international developments that is strategic in nature. Information of strategic importance may also explain and support the interpretation of events at the tactical level. The speed of the information flow and the pace of events at all levels will blur the distinctions between tactical and strategic intelligence.

Along with this blurring of tactical and strategic intelligence and the information required to produce them will come an increased recognition of the analyst as a very vital resource. The precise assessment of tactical and strategic data will require someone who can understand developments within his or her field of responsibility while comprehending the dynamic nature of the world generating those events. Automated analytical aids and electronic information systems cannot replace the judgment, expertise and intuition of the analyst upon whom so much depends.

Conclusion

If the interpretation and analysis of current events already requires dedica-

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Tactical Intelligence in the National Arena: What Is It,

by CPT Ralph L. Longmire

Introduction

Tactical intelligence and the national-tactical interface have mystified the US intelligence community since the Revolutionary War.[1] Indeed, throughout two World Wars, the Korean Conflict, Vietnam and the post-Watergate era, there have been numerous revelations and extensive investigations, but the basic evidence remains obscured. Nowhere in the community, for example, does there exist an accepted definition of tactical intelligence, let alone a clear delineation of responsibilities for it.

In light of the contemporary emphasis on organization, rules and clear-cut rational procedures, it seems incredible that such an anomaly as the tactical intelligence mystery can exist. However, one need only consult the major intelligence orders and directives to realize that significant relationships have not been identified and that the delegation of responsibilities has been curiously overlooked in the area of tactical intelligence. This lack of guidance at the national level has caused tactical commanders severe difficulties, especially in light of assessments of current force structures and projected level funding which indicate that the US and its allies have chosen not to match the Warsaw Pact in the areas of manpower and weaponry. Rather, we intend to rely on superior weapons technology coupled with highly sophisticated intelligence information collection systems to insure deterrence or victory on the battlefield.[2]

At the national level, such sophisticated collection systems are indeed impressive. However, tactical commanders in all US services have likely experienced, under operational conditions, the frustration of receiving either too little information (or too much irrelevant information) too late. Given the growing Soviet threat, time is no longer our ally.[3] In this article I will attempt to highlight some aspects of this problem, seeking answers previously obscured by ambiguous definitions and the imprecise delegation of responsibilities found in the basic directives of the intelligence community today.

Semantics

The problem of intelligence terminology has plagued the community since its earliest days.[4] Considering the numerous definitions of tactical intelligence available, and their marked similarities, it seems only logical that the community select one and live with it. JCS Pub 1 defines tactical intelligence as, "Intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Essentially, tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence differ only in scope, point of view and level of employment."[5]

The distinction between tactical and strategic intelligence is decreasingly discernible today: major field commanders require much of the same intelligence available to Washington's top policy makers.[6] Because of this, the dispute over a precise definition of tactical intelligence becomes almost a moot point. The key factor is not semantic but rather what actually constitutes the system of tactical intelligence. However, despite this seemingly simple reality, a review of the current basic intelligence documents (i.e., the National Security Act of 1947, President Nixon's 5 November 1971 Memo, Executive Order 11905, Presidential Directive 17 and Executive Order 12036) reveals absolutely no definition of tactical intelligence.

The scope and depth of the semantics problem at the national level will not likely allow it to be solved in the near future. Although a committee on intelligence definitions has recently been formed, the present confusion in the intelligence community resulting from the changes dictated by EO 12036 will undoubtedly impede action on the tactical intelligence issue for several years. National level planners and managers must continually bear in mind that information collected against an enemy can be broken down into two categories: strategic intelligence and combat intelligence (combat information). To the tactical commander, there is a vast difference between the two categories—one which in the semantic sense may be nearly indistinguishable but in battle is crucial.[7]

Naturally, the solution to the problem of definitions involves bureaucrats and technological factors. Not only does each military service function according to differing needs, philosophies and operational doctrines, but so do the national level collection agencies such as CIA and NSA. In the past, Congress has virtually "rubber stamped" defense budgets and the intelligence community consisted of totally separate organizations with an undeniable duplication of effort and corresponding waste of resources.[8] In light of reduced manpower levels and declining defense budgets, the intelligence community as a whole must now eliminate such myopic problems as intelligence definitions and join together to develop efficient systems that rapidly collect, produce and disseminate combat intelligence.

Clues to Responsibility

The Presidential Memorandum of 5 November 1971 gave the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) the responsibility for planning and reviewing all intelligence activities including tactical intelligence and the allocation of all intelligence resources.[9] However, this brief document provided neither the DCI nor the Department of Defense with any guidance on how the DCI was to effectively control tactical intelligence. Additionally, tactical intelligence was not defined nor were its components identified.[10]

Executive Order 11905, dated 18 February 1976, superseded the Presidential Memorandum of 5 November 1971.[11] Of primary significance was the fact that tactical intelligence was deleted from the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) as defined by the order.[12] Furthermore, although EO 11905 established the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) and designated the DCI executive head of the CIA and the intelligence community, both the DCI and CFI were expressly denied responsibility for tactical intelligence. However, the CFI was tasked with the responsibility to, "Provide guidance on the relationship between tactical and national intelligence...."[13] The CFI has since been redesignated the Policy Review Committee (PRC) of the National Security Council (NSC) by Executive Orders 11985, May 13, 1977 and 11994, June 1, 1977.[14]

In spite of the above mentioned facts, EO 11905 failed to clearly define tactical intelligence and did not specifically

Where Is It and Whodunnit??

assign responsibility for it within the intelligence community. It did, however, authorize the Secretary of Defense to, "Direct, fund and operate the National Security Agency, and national defense and military intelligence and reconnaissance entities as required."[15] In addition, the following responsibilities were assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) under the Secretary of Defense: 1) coordinating all Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence collection requirements; and 2) establishing substantive intelligence priority goals and objectives for the DoD and providing guidance on substantive intelligence matters to all major DoD intelligence activities.[16]

In order to fulfill the purposes of EO 11905, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ellsworth announced on May 14, 1976 that staff and line authority over DoD intelligence activities were vested in the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), who was designated Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI). A Defense Intelligence Board (DIB) composed of senior military and civilian defense policy officials was also established on a trial basis to improve communications between operational users and intelligence producers.[17] The intent of the changes was to allow the DDI to coordinate but not direct tactical intelligence operations of the military services because, "... much of this activity is at a tactical level and under the direction of specific commanders or the services' staff."[18]

The changes to the DoD intelligence system listed above were largely voided by Secretary Brown on March 11, 1977 when he issued a directive further reorganizing DoD intelligence. The Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)/DDI and that of Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems were combined into a new office, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence). The new office has responsibility for intelligence resources including related warning and reconnaissance activities, and the allocation of intelligence activities under control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[19]

It is evident that the responsibility for tactical intelligence at the national level has never been clearly designated. Executive Order 11905 and subsequent DoD intelligence directives ambiguously delegated the responsibility for tactical intelligence through DoD to the JCS and the services.

On August 4, 1977, President Carter announced a major reorganization of the intelligence community. Under his proposals, the DCI was to have expanded central authority and responsibility for national intelligence priorities, intelligence tasking and the intelligence community budget.[20]

The purpose of these changes, as embodied in Executive Order 12036, was to centralize national intelligence management functions in order to improve central control of the intelligence community. The long-awaited EO 12036 has certainly made a major step toward these ends; however, the question of tactical intelligence remains unresolved. Executive Order 12036 clearly reaffirms that tactical intelligence is not part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program,[21] but a precise definition of tactical intelligence is conspicuously absent. The only concrete tactical intelligence guideline in EO 12036 gives the foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence elements of the military services the responsibility for monitoring the development, procurement and management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment and conducting research, development, testing and evaluation.[22]

Under the provisions of EO 12036, the fledgling National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC) will serve the DCI as the mechanism that provides advisory collection tasking concerning assets that are not part of the NFIP. Furthermore, all responsibilities and authorities of the DCI concerning the NITC are to be transferred to the Secretary of Defense upon direction of the President, and the NITC will periodically be turned over to the Secretary of Defense during exercises for wartime contingencies.[23] The problems and interagency conflicts that these provisions may generate cannot yet be predicted. One may only be certain that when tasking eventually reaches the commander in the field, the real test of the system will begin. If care is not taken to include the tactical commander in the planning process and in the design of the NITC's system for tasking tactical assets, then difficulties shall undoubtedly arise.

Our surveillance and intelligence acquisition capabilities are certainly as sophisticated as those of the USSR. However, the US tactical commander in the field is not getting the precise combat intelligence information he needs in a timely fashion. Perhaps the main stumbling blocks to solve this problem are more bureaucratic than technological. Surveillance satellites and other strategic systems are managed by organizations that are outside the immediate span of control of the military services' operational forces and are more often dedicated to fulfilling national level priorities.[24] Consequently, the tactical commander finds it nearly impossible to task or receive information from these crucial intelligence collection platforms.

Even when allocated to a unified command, intelligence is generally relayed to rear areas where it is scrutinized and manipulated by analysts. By the time the information reaches the field commander, precious time and the element of surprise have likely been lost. Furthermore, in response to requests for information on enemy movements and dispositions, the commander is often overwhelmed by a veritable "intelligence avalanche" of information in an unusable format.[25]

Technologically, the capability exists to overcome such problems. However, parochial bureaucratic issues must be resolved in order to allow our information collection assets to be truly supportive of commanders at all levels.

Is There a Solution?

The chaos of Watergate and the congressional intelligence queries has subsided somewhat, and there is a new order emerging within the intelligence community. Traditionally there has been a "... fuzzy chain of responsibility for intelligence actions,"[26] and there has been a concerted effort to give the DCI increased authority in national intelligence matters. However, the chain remains "fuzzy" regarding tactical intelligence. Should this situation continue, the traditional conflict between the tactical intelligence components (military) and the national level producers (CIA, State, DIA) will surely remain.[27]

It is extremely important to set this matter straight once and for all. If not, there will continue to be disputes within

the bureaucracy about intelligence resources based on meaningless arguments about control echelons. Military commands will jealously guard intelligence resources on the grounds of tactical intelligence requirements and Washington intelligence agencies will fail to see that their refined strategic collection systems are producing a great deal of tactical intelligence, neglecting the need for rapid dissemination to the commands.[28]

The semantics problem itself is compounded by tactical decisions made in Washington and the confusion between strategic and tactical intelligence (for want of a clear definition of tactical intelligence). This means that intelligence organizations in Washington often deal with tactical intelligence, and military intelligence units in the field often deal with strategic intelligence. This conceptual confusion is jeopardizing the commanders' control of their organic intelligence assets.[29] Only a precise definition of terms will provide the desired solution. If prudence is not used, the war-fighting and deterrent capabilities of US forces will be diminished by concentrating too narrowly on the needs of Washington-level intelligence users.[30]

If the tactical intelligence mystery is to be solved, directives clarifying EO 12036 regarding tactical intelligence responsibilities must be issued by the executive, DoD, or the DCI in his new role as leader of the US intelligence community. It is also essential that tasking and control of new systems be entrusted to military crises and conflict managers. Intelligence managers at the national level must insure that tactical commanders are provided with the means to utilize national assets. Field commanders themselves must continually strive to identify their specific intelligence requirements so that national assets can provide proper support. Furthermore, there presently exists no method through which tactical commanders can task national assets without risking conflict with strategic priorities. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that a secure, dependable and durable system capable of providing timely strategic intelligence information to the field commander does not yet exist. Rapid dissemination of intelligence at a low enough classification to be used by deployed forces must also be made possible.[31]

We do have the capability to meet the needs of both the national and tactical command levels. Enlightened joint planning by senior military and civilian decision makers is taking place with resultant programs such as: the Air Force TR-1, a tactical U-2 dedicated to direct support of a Navy Battle Group; the Air Force QSR, a quick strike reconnaissance RF-4C linked to the tactical commander; the Army's Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (ISIA) Program designed to develop and field a technologically-advanced ISTA system responsive to the tactical commander; the Army's All Source Analysis System (ASAS) designed to develop targets and enemy intentions for the tactical commander; and the Army's Battlefield Exploitation and Target Acquisition (BETA) program, its Technical Control and Analysis Center (TCAC) at the division level, and its Mobile Army Ground Imagery Interpretation Center (MAGIIC)—all of which are designed to respond to the tactical commander in the field. In addition, the US Army's Research and Development Command recently awarded a $54.9 million contract to Motorola to develop a Stand-Off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS) designed to aid the field commander's view of a large area and help increase the flexibility of helicopters.[32]

The key factor relative to all the above systems is that they are largely developmental or experimental. Today, there is no one system or combination of systems that adequately supports the tactical commander and, at the same time, ties him in to national level systems. Ideally what is needed is a single invulnerable system that monitors the battlefield, filters information according to the field commander's needs, instantly transmits directly to the commander as events are occurring on the battlefield, and enables the commander to both task national assets and receive timely and usable information from them.[33] Such a system does not now exist nor is it likely to in the foreseeable future—especially given the confusion over tactical intelligence at the national level.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, tactical intelligence can never be truly centralized and will likely remain a national level enigma for many years to come. The local commanders must be given a free hand to meet their tactical intelligence requirements with their own organic assets. National level planners must continually bear in mind that intelligence is a vital function at every level of military organization and cannot be centralized anywhere. In peacetime or on the battlefield, every commander will require intelligence assets responsible to his unique needs in order to achieve operational readiness or victory in combat. Policy makers must recognize this fact by clarifying current intelligence directives so that sufficient planning guidance exists to create a viable national-tactical interface.

Footnotes

1. Allen Dules, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: Signet Books, 1965), pp. 27 –30; see also Harry Howe Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 51–61.

2. Cdr. Richard E. Pearsall and LTC Richard C. Wheeler, "Combat Information: The Key Force Multiplier," *Signal Magazine*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (October, 1979), p. 45.

3. Ibid.

4. See George Berkeley, "For a Board of Definition (of Intelligence Terms)," *Studies in Intelligence*, Col. 9, No. 3 (Summer, 1965), pp. 13–17; see also Martin Binford, "A Definition of Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Fall, 1958), pp. 75–78.

5. Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, JCS Pub 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 September 1974), p. 326.

6. Harry H. Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 14.

7. Pearsall and Wheeler, op cit.

8. Ibid., p. 46.

9. Announcement of November 5, 1971 Outlining Management Steps for Improving the Effectiveness of the Intelligence Community, as reprinted in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, November 8, 1971, p. 1482.

10. Ibid. The problem of intelligence definitions is certainly not new. For example, see George Berkeley, "For a Board of Definitions (of Intelligence Terms)," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer, 1965), pp. 13–17.

11. Executive Order No. 11905 of February 18, 1976, as reprinted in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, February 23, 1976, pp. 234–243.

12. Ibid. p. 235.

13. Ibid., p. 236; see also Pat Towell, "Ford Submits Plans for Intelligence Overhaul," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, February 21, 1976, p. 418. The CFI was directed to be composed of the DCI, the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and reported directly to the National Security Council.

14. Mark M. Lowenthal, "Intelligence Community: Reform and Reorganization—Issue Brief Number 1B76039" (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, September 21, 1977), p. 5. (Mimeographed.)

15. Executive Order No. 11905, op. cit., p. 239.

16. Ibid.

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OPSEC and Technology

by LTC William J. Foley

To most people the term Operations Security suggests the application of noise and light discipline, proper radio procedures and the like in a tactical environment. A side of OPSEC that is of equal, and potentially far greater, importance is its application to our combat developments (CD) and research and development (R&D) activities. Simply stated, unless we provide comprehensive security umbrellas to our new technologies and their military applications, the battlefield advantages they are intended to provide could well be negated by an effective countermeasure concurrently developed by an enemy based on data collected early in our development cycle.

In recent months, we as a nation have become increasingly aware of our limitations in the projection of military power. It is even more disquieting to realize that our "technological edge" has been seriously eroded and even eliminated in many key areas. Christopher Foss, editor of **Jane's World Armoured Fighting Vehicles,** writes: "The days when the Russians had more of everything, but all their equipment was inferior, are over. Their tanks, other armored vehicles and transport perform as well as—and usually better than—their counterparts in the West." With the Warsaw Pact's already overwhelming numerical advantage, any further loss of our technological advantages could have grave and irreversible consequences.

Since World War II we have repeatedly witnessed the Soviet application of the best of US technology to its military R&D programs through the direct application or development of countermeasures. Specifically, the Soviets violated trade agreements by diverting US computers sold for other purposes to help make army trucks at the Kama River manufacturing plant. Despite President Carter's temporary embargo on the sale of "high technology" to the Soviet Union, the Soviets will continue to obtain what they need—especially by increasing their already intense intelligence collection efforts. Thus, the need for greatly improved OPSEC in our CD/R&D programs becomes evident.

While we already have OPSEC in our CD/R&D community, it is not what it should be. There appears to be considerable confusion within CD/R&D and military intelligence communities concerning just what OPSEC is and where responsibilities lie. The purpose of this article is to consider this issue in order to clarify problem areas while making recommendations on areas where the CD/R&D community can apply OPSEC and where MI can help it in its efforts.

OPSEC is a process by which a commander, activity chief, project manager (or whoever), uses all assets and methods available to provide proper security to mission-related activities. OPSEC is the responsibility of the commander and cannot be accomplished without his active participation. His role in the OPSEC process is as critical as his role in the operational decision-making process: he must state his OPSEC objective just as he states an operational objective before planning can commence.

. . . unless we provide comprehensive security umbrellas to our new technologies and their military applications, the battlefield advantages they are intended to provide could well be negated by an effective countermeasure concurrently developed by an enemy based on data collected early in our development cycle.

The OPSEC and operational planning processes are necessarily concurrent. Lack of concurrent planning will invariably result in compromises. Once the commander has stated and defined his operational and OPSEC objectives, the OPSEC process is underway. To state his OPSEC objectives, the commander must have sufficient knowledge of the overall hostile threat concerning his particular operation or activity. Without that knowledge, he cannot evaluate key technologies or events translating into the advantage he seeks. Military intelligence, primarily through INSCOM's Intelligence Threat Analysis Center (ITAC), must provide the best possible threat data available by defining the hostile threat to be defeated, the hostile ability to counter our proposed operation or activity and the hostile intelligence collection capability against our effort.

Support to the OPSEC process is multi-faceted and should employ organic and non-organic assets. The degree of support required involves a host of variables which include, but is not limited to: the scope of the operation or activity; the complexity of the objective; the sensitivity or classification involved; the geographic dispersion of associated events; the command structure; the actual and perceived threat; the vulnerability to the threat; the experience level of the command, and others.

While the commander is solely responsible for OPSEC , the OPSEC support role is a shared responsibility. The commander and his staff have the responsibility to assess requirements and request the support needed—be it from MI or otherwise. It is the responsibility of military intelligence to provide OPSEC support when requested. In CONUS that support comes primarily from the 902d MI Group through its subordinate detachments and Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalions. These battalions are broken into Field and Resident Offices at 46 locations throughout CONUS. The support MI can provide varies greatly but, at this point in the development of an Army-wide OPSEC program, the greatest contribution is perhaps experience. In the absence of adequate formal training at service schools or civilian equivalents, MI should have the responsibility to fill this educational gap. Until this gap is filled, the Army will not have a comprehensive OPSEC program.

The commander's major assets for the conduct of an OPSEC program are his designated OPSEC officer, his OPSEC committee and his organic security and intelligence personnel. These individuals are the ones who are, or should be, most familiar with the overall security posture and needs of their organization. Overall is the key word. The regulations, charters and guidance many security managers now work under causes them to orient only on narrowly defined aspects of it, like personnel and document security, at the expense of overall security. Because of this, a lack of command emphasis and a general lack of understanding, OPSEC is not working at many locations. There is no coordinated effort with central responsibility. Because OPSEC is not working at individual locations, it is not working within overall commands (and vice versa). OPSEC is a process and a system that cannot be sporadically applied. Rather, it must be all-encompassing and systematic. If not, what is protected at one

point is compromised at another. The responsibility to recognize the need for and establish this OPSEC system lies with the commander, not MI.

What then is MI's role in OPSEC support? One must keep in mind that a number of outside activities can be used for OPSEC support depending on the situation. Imagination is often the only limiting factor in determining where to look for help.

It is important to establish OPSEC requirements or plans as the technology is identified and evaluate the OPSEC environment throughout the life cycle management process.

MI's prime responsibilites are to provide experts in the systematic evaluation of an activity's OPSEC program and technicians to evaluate specific technical hazards. These technicians include, cryptofacility inspectors, TEMPEST specialists looking at uncontrolled compromising emanations from equipment processing classified information, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures specialists for detection/prevention of hostile technical electronic penetration efforts and Automated Data Processing personnel to consider the unique security problems posed by ADP systems.

It is important that MI evaluate rather than develop a supported command's OPSEC program, making recommendations to the supported commander to help him improve his program. The evaluation process can vary from one person for one hour to a team effort taking weeks or months. Too often, when asked to evaluate, MI finds no OPSEC program, and is required to develop the command's program.

Of course there are always exceptions: an extremely important technological break through could require more intense and detailed MI support. In such cases, the responsibility of military intelligence could include the actual development of an OPSEC program. It is crucial however, to first recognize the technology or its application as a key technology, critically sensitive. MI cannot do that for the commander.

What can commanders do? There are several points they should consider but the most important are the identification of the key technologies and their protection as soon as they are identified. This is generally when the item is in the concept stage before formal entry into the "life cycle management system." Today, those in the OPSEC business too frequently find themselves taking the band-aid approach and trying to enforce classification guides and apply fixes in an effort to "close the door" after the technology has been exposed to hostile intelligence collection.

It is important to establish OPSEC requirements or plans as the technology is identified and evaluate the OPSEC environment throughout the life cycle management process. Currently, the threat generating the need for the new technology is reviewed periodically as are all other cost and feasibility criteria ***except*** OPSEC. The OPSEC environment is as dynamic and critical as any other. Indeed, OPSEC is arguably the most important issue. We might spend millions of dollars and five years developing a new anti-tank weapon but poor OPSEC could allow the Soviets to identify the technology and develop countermeasures. Periodic OPSEC reviews could possibly determine if technology has been compromised so that a project can be altered, dropped or reconsidered.

We might spend millions of dollars and five years developing a new anti-tank weapon but poor OPSEC could allow the Soviets to identify the technology and develop countermeasures.

The commander must put his weight behind the OPSEC program. Over the past 18 months I have observed a wide range of programs but the ones that worked were those receiving more than lip service from the commander. OPSEC committees that worked had decisionmakers and key staff players as members. I've heard commanders, chiefs-of-staff, deputy commanders, etc., say "OPSEC is important and needs attention, but so does the Safety Program, Equal Opportunity Program, Alcohol and Drug Abuse, and all the others." While these other areas are important, the relegation of OPSEC to "additional duty" status suggests an inability to recognize its critical importance. We must realize that everything we do can be nullified by poor OPSEC.

There is a growing recognition in our CD/R&D community of the erosion of the US technological lead time. In an interview in the January-February 1980 edition of ***Army R, D&A,*** Norman R. Augustine, a former Assistant Secretary of The Army (Research and Development) makes several key points. In addressing current trends in US/USSR military strength, he states,

> "By almost any parameter one could choose to measure, we are being passed or have been passed by the Soviets. This is not a trend that has occurred in the last year, or even in the last five years, or even in the last decade. The Soviets, going back to 1962 or perhaps back as far as Sputnik, have been greatly increasing their emphasis on building military and technological strength.
>
> "Of course one can't, in general, compare Soviet military strength and US strength in isolation from that of our allies, or even in isolation from our economic strength and our will to endure. The fact remains, however, that there is a great deal of reason to be very concerned today about the trends in the US defense posture as compared to those of the Soviets and their allies. For the first time, there is also reason to be concerned over the relative technological strengths of the two nations as measured not by technology in the laboratory but by equipment in the field."

. . . we are losing and have lost, in some areas, our technological edge. Further losses will result in the deterioration of remaining capabilities and whatever deterrence value our technology has provided to this point.

The message is clear—we are losing and have lost, in some areas, our technological edge. Further losses will result in the deterioration of remaining capabilities and whatever deterrence value our technology has provided to this point. We cannot completely close our technological doors to the enemy but much more can be done. Good OPSEC is an effective "combat multiplier" and must be treated as one. OPSEC costs money but its costs could be far less in the long run than the cost of dollars and lives lost through poor OPSEC.

We really don't have a choice.

Garrison Functions of a Brigade S2 in Europe

by MAJ James H. Correll, II

Recent experiences by officers assigned as brigade S2s in Europe indicate that the Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer Course (TISOC) fails to prepare its graduates for those garrison aspects of security and intelligence which are common to a brigade S2 in peacetime. It is the purpose of this article to provide newly assigned S2s the information they need to make a smooth transition into their positions on a brigade staff despite the training imbalance.

As the first combat arms officer graduate of the TISOC in the 8th Infantry Division, I served as a battalion S2 for eight months and as a brigade S2 for 13 months. While a brigade S2, I conducted a survey of that position over a period of four months in 1979 to define my functions. I found that little of time in garrison was devoted to tactical intelligence although approximately 90 percent of the TISOC I attended in 1976 was directed toward tactical intelligence.

In garrison the S2 becomes heavily involved in the security aspect of the job. As the security manager for the brigade, he supervises and coordinates the entire security effort of brigade personnel. He is usually appointed by the commander as the final approving authority on related standard operating procedures and actions and, as such, must be well-versed in document security, personnel security and physical security.

Although a senior noncommissioned officer is normally assigned as document custodian and is responsible for storage, processing and control of all classified material in the brigade headquarters, the S2 must have a thorough knowledge of all applicable procedures and regulations. The reasons for this are many. The S2 spends an average of one to two hours daily reviewing or creating classified documents. He briefs appointed officers who conduct preliminary inquiries into any loss or improper handling of classified material. In addition, he coordinates once or twice weekly with supporting counterintelligence officers on matters pertaining to proper classification, handling and marking of documents.

An inordinate amount of time is spent on personnel security. The S2 is the commander's direct representative in this area, which makes him responsible for all security clearances and access actions for brigade headquarters personnel as well as the division point of contact for all actions in the brigade. The supervisory role becomes confused with the action role because there is no noncommissioned officer (NCO) assigned for the job, and the clerk/driver can only spend approximately half his time doing it. Action projects include determination of eligibility and granting of access, while supervisory functions include review of requests for clearance and associated paperwork, review of the Security Clearance and Access Roster (SCAR), plus conduct of local files checks and coordination with counterintelligence agents on personnel matters.

The physical security role is purely supervisory in nature but requires a working knowledge of all applicable regulations, letters of instruction, and standard operating procedures. Though physical security has long been considered to fall in the S1 arena, S2s are performing this function. At brigade level in Europe, this encompasses security of the installation and brigade headquarters, the arms rooms, the basic load ammunition storage area. It also spills over into key control and crime prevention. Though not authorized by TOE, a Physical Security NCO is usually assigned as action agent. In the field, this NCO coordinates with the Headquarters Commandant for tactical operations center (TOC) security.

While security is of paramount importance to the brigade S2, it is by no means his only duty in garrison. Though he rarely becomes directly involved in intelligence training, he does provide a key service as the interface between the battalion and division and is the best source of training aids for the battalions. He schedules appearances by the Soviet Orientation Team and any outside support for brigade or battalion intelligence training.

The brigade S2 also has supervisory responsibility for training of scout platoons, ground surveillance radar (GSR) sections, and Redeye sections. He insures instructors and training aids are available for classes in Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army (SAEDA), Soviet Military Liaison Mission (SMLM) and Code of Conduct.

Procurement and maintenance of the basic load and training load of maps for all brigade units is the responsibility of the S2 as is supervision of the Forward Area Limited Observation Program (FALOP).

The intelligence function is equal to security in importance and, although it is best accomplished in the field, there are certain aspects which are performed primarily in garrison. One of these is the Focus Program, which allows the S2 to monitor a Soviet tactical unit for order of battle information. The source for this information is the Daily Intelligence Summary Cable (DISC), a synopsis of all enemy activity in Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG). Much of the intelligence function is familiar to the S2 because of his TISOC training. His preparation and planning for general defense plans, contingency plans, field training exercises and command post exercises cause him to publish collection plans, intelligence estimates, annexes and summaries and to determine essential elements of information plus other intelligence requirements. And, as the focal point for all brigade reconnaissance and surveillance activities, he determines requirements, assigns priorities and prepares preplanned requests for missions.

The brigade S2 is the one staff member who must keep up with current events, particularly as they apply to contingency plans for trouble spots or potential areas of deployment. As the counterintelligence point of contact, he monitors all terrorist activity in Europe.

Finally, the brigade commander, in garrison, is often compelled to provide an officer for all sorts of activities outside the realm of normal staff functions. The S2 is often chosen for these activities because he has knowledge of all staff functions, he is a trained observer, he is capable, and his day-to-day presence is not generally as time-sensitive as is the presence of the rest of the primary staff. This, in effect, provides an additional action officer for the commander and good training for the S2.

The prospective S2 might now ask about the percentage of time spent on each of the activities discussed above. I found that requirements changed so much and so often as to make such an analysis impossible. Each day, each week differs from the predecessor.

Much of this information will be quite surprising to the S2-to-be because his training has not prepared him for this diversity as a staff officer. A careful study of this article and the realization that it serves as the rule rather than the exception will aid him in his first weeks on the job and reduce the shock effect.

Add Survivability to the Command/Control Equation Part II: For the EW Officer

by MAJ Nelson B. Collard, Jr.

Introduction

With command support of the remoted command post concept outlined in my article in the October–December 1979 issue of *Military Intelligence*, implementation will proceed with considerably less resistance. The techniques outlined in this article certainly are not the only methods by which the concept may be implemented although it is strongly recommended that they be followed for at least the first trial before improvements are made.

The Basic Concept

The basic concept of the system is the rapid remote installation of systems from signal hill to the command post area using 26-pair cable. Systems are streamlined, taking advantage of "normal-through" test point cabling and subordinating the admin/support system to the command post system. Detailed wire and cablehead procedures are implemented which establish engineering circuits all through the installation and operations phases. Maximum use is made of pre-cut field wire harnesses for complexes. Specific team assignments are made in the wire/cable section and maximum effort is directed toward cross-training the four teams. A full-time remote control desk is established in the command post where the signal officer or chief signal NCO controls all communications systems for the commander and staff. A full-time remote control operator is positioned in the track complex on signal hill where a hot line is terminated to control critical radio nets. A full-time technical control (TECHON) facility is established on signal hill which is collocated with the cablehead to respond to on-site trouble isolation/correction and to attend to the liaison vehicle radios. Supervision of all signal hill track drivers for radio operations, refueling and manning purposes is transferred to the signal platoon leader/sergeant. Signal hill evacuation, wheeled vehicle refueling and driver availability on signal hill become the responsibility of the platoon leader/platoon sergeant.

Organization for Support

The following organization must be structured within the unit:

CP Remote Control Desk—consists of the brigade signal officer and chief signal NCO.

Track Remote Control Position—consists of at least one track RTO on duty.

Technical Control Facility (TECHON)—consists of the signal platoon leader, platoon sergeant and wire sergeant.

Wire Teams—Team "A"—Track Complex (2–3 wiremen); Team "B"—Cable Run (4–6 wiremen); Team "C"—Command Post (2–3 wiremen); Team "D"—Tactical Command Post (1–2 wiremen).

Initial Installation

All signal vehicles actively involved in providing communications support which are organic and attached to the section are positioned by the platoon leader/sergeant on signal hill. The track complex with extensions and LNO vehicle complex must be established allowing sufficient room for the erection of direction antennas on those nets indicated at Table 1 and in such a manner that the commander/staff can operate from it initially until the GP medium is established. Two pre-cut harnesses are required in the track complex. One is installed by the track RTOs from their tracks to the junction box (Figure 1). The other is installed by the wire team from the junction box to initial contingency positions in the track complex. This "telephone and parallel harness" serves to remote circuitry back into the complex. The track complex remote control position is manned by the track RTOs and has a hotline to the CP remote control desk and an engineering hotline to both the TECHON and CP remote control desk.

Cablehead TECHON Operations

A GP small is established around the cablehead and serves as the TECHON operation. The cablehead itself is a pair of J1077 junction boxes with pre-wired pigtails secured to a board. The TECHON must be manned continuously by either the platoon leader/sergeant or wire chief, all of whom are capable of trouble shooting/rerouting all radio, telephone, switchboard and communication center circuits in the system. It is the focal point for on-site trouble isolation/correction while the VHF terminal is the focal point or off-site trouble isolation/correction.

Dual Cable Operations

A dual cable system is established as indicated by Figures 2 and 3. The dual cable system accommodates the 40 circuits which appeared on most of the exercises in which the writer participated in USAREUR. Close inspection of the dual cable cut sheet indicates that the engineer, VHF, and remote control circuits are "hot-looped" or strapped over. This permits re-engineering with all critical parties in the event of a single cable failure. Circuits are coordinated, prioritized and complementary. For example: the remote circuit for the division command net on pair 04 of Cable A is lost, a simple hookover at any of the three test points (Figure 2) will restore proximity communications to the staff. While initially, the brigade S3 will find himself on the division G3 net, he will at least have proximity communications with the division G3 at the division CP. Telling the staff what is about to happen and implementing a frequency change, both of which are accomplished from the remote control desk, maintain critical command/control. In a similar manner, all hot lines and secure switchboard lines and type radio nets are coordinated and complementary.

Pigtails are used at test points (TP3A and TP 3B) (Figure 2) for flexibility in channelization of cables. Experience in running the number of cable sections described in this article has resulted in two or three unusable pairs throughout the length of the systems. Pigtails at the cablehead permit the most flexibility in pair transfers.

Switchboard/Communications Combat Operations

The switchboard ties into the test point as indicated in Figure 2, using 26-pair cable and a pigtail. The decision to place the switchboard in the command system was based on operations



Corps / Division		Division / Brigade		Brigade / Battalion	
CMD	CMD	CMD	CMD	CMD	CMD
INTEL	INTEL	INTEL	INTEL	INTEL	FIST
RATT 1	RATT 1	SSB	RATT	RATT	USAF
RATT 2	RATT 2	RATT	CEWI	FA CMD	SSB
RATT 3	SSB	CEWI	FA FD		FM
SSB	FSE	FA CMD	ADA		UHF
	CEWI		ENG		ADA
	ADA		AVN		ENG
	FM		USAF		Security
	SSB		SSB		
	USAF		FM		
	SSB		UHF		
	FM		Security		
	UHF				
	Security				
Signature: 19 nets		Signature: 18 nets		Signature: 12 nets	

Note: Nets listed to the left of the line are directed to the next higher headquarters which is less likely to displace as often as the subordinate echelons. As a member station, it may be advisable to erect directional one-half wave rhombic antennas to further reduce the command post electronic signature.

Table 1. Command Post Electronic Signatures.

with two different divisions in Europe. It was found that the majority of off-site common user traffic originated in the command post and not in the admin/support area. A second switchboard is installed in the admin/support area and tied into the system as indicated by Figure 2.

The communication center ties into the test point as indicated by Figure 2, using field wire. The decision to place it on signal hill again was driven by the fact that most traffic originated at the command post and by the interest generated for a "quiet CP" with no generators in the vicinity. The trade-off of immediately available hard copy message support versus noise and infrared signature is one of which the commander must be informed and for which adjustments must be made.

Command Post Remote Control Desk

The focal point for both on- and off-site trouble isolation/correction is the CP Remote Control Desk. It is at this location that the concept will succeed or fail. The brigade SIGO or Chief Signal NCO must man this position and service the staff with communications support. Hot lines to the VHF terminal, Cablehead/TECHON, and to Track Complex remote control positions permit the remote controller to determine **in seconds** where the fault lies in a nonoperational circuit/system. A call to the VHF terminal for a "ringback," coupled with a call to the cablehead can isolate telephone troubles. A call to the track complex remote control position for a ringback again coupled with a call to the cablehead can isolate remote radio circuit troubles in a similarly rapid manner. Prepositioned cutsheets and Tal/sound-powered telephones at test points proved invaluable in trouble isolation/correction. The hot line between the two remote controls was found to be more effective than remote set wire communications due to ringer breakdown/shut off. The remote control desk in the CP also serves as a focal point for appraising the staff **continuously** of the alternate means which are available to use in the event of temporary failures. In the event of a total single cable failure, the remote control desk can accomplish a hockover in position.

Installation Sequence Action

The following installation sequence/action listing is presented in detail to indicate the degree of training and coordination that is required. Portions



Note: Two harnesses are required in the track complexes. The remote harness is pre-cut, coiled with slack and run immediately after position occupation by the track RTOs to TP 4B. The staff/RTOs then operate from their tracks while the wire teams are establishing parallel communications. The telephone and parallel harness is pre-cut, coiled with slack and run back into the track complex from TP 4B to provide simultaneous communications both in the track complex during preparation of the GP medium tent and in the event of contingency operations. This method proved more efficient than permitting RTOs to lay their own remote lines into the test point and operating station simultaneously.

Figure 1. Remote Harnesses.



Figure 2. Signal Hill.

of it apply not only to the initial installation of the dual cable system, but to subsequent installations at Jump and/or Tactical Command Posts.

Site occupation/vehicle positioning by platoon leader/sergeant.

- **Wire Chief**—establishes cablehead (TP3A, TP3B), channelizes sections 3a, 3b; terminates/mans engineering, VHF and remote control circuits at TP3A; receives reports of system installation progress/verification at cablehead, tracks situation status for SIGO.
- **VHF Team**—establishes system; lays section 3A to cablehead; terminates VHF circuit.
- **Wire Team "A"**—lays section 3B, establishes TP4B; lays telephone and parallel harness; connects remote harness from track RTO's; terminates telephones.
- **Track RTOs**—lay remote harness to TP4B; connect remote sets to telephone and parallel harness.
- **LNO Vehicle RTOs**—lay field wire to TP3B; connect remote sets in track complex to telephone and parallel harness.
- **SWBD Team**—establishes switchboard; lays 26-pair with pigtail to cablehead.
- **COMMCEN Team**—establishes COMMCEN; lays field wire to cablehead; positions runner at track complex.
- **Wire Team "B"**—lays sections 2A and 2B (minimum separation 50 meters); establishes TP2A and TP2B; terminates/mans engineering circuit at TP2A; reports to cablehead; lays sections 1A and 1B.
- **Chief Signal NCO**—establishes TP1A and TP1B; establishes CP remote control desk; terminates/mans eng; VHF and remote control circuits and division signal battalion syscon circuit at TP1A; reports to cablehead; verifies circuits.
- **Wire Team "C"**—lays CP harness (Figure 1); connects to telephones to division CP in control (if no duplicate phones available).
- **Chief Signal NCO**—informs S3 that are prepared to start phased transfer of command/control to GP medium.

Cable "A" Sections 1A, 2A					Cable "B" Sections 1B, 2B				
Cable Pair	Inst Order	From	To	Sys Chan	Strap	Cable Pair	Inst Order	From	To	Sys Chan
01	1	TP1A	TP3A		Yes	01	1	TP1B	TP3B	
02	2	VHF	CP Remote Cont		Yes	02	2	VHF	CP Remote Cont	
03	3	Track Remote Cont	CP Remote Cont			03	3	Track Remote Cont	CP Remote Cont	
04	4	Div Cmd Remote	CP S3			04	5	Div Intel Remote	CP S2	
05	6	Bde Cmd Remote	CP S3			05	7	Bde Intel Remote	CP S2	
06	8	FA CF Remote	CP FSCC			06	9	Fac Cmd Remote	CP FSCC	
07	10	ALO FM Remote	CP ALO			07	11	ADA FM Remote	CP ADA	
08	12	LNO FM Remote	CP LNO			08	13	ENG FM Remote	CP ENG	
09	14	LNO FM Remote	CP LNO			09	15	CMO FM Remote	CP CMO (S5)	
10	16	Div SSB Remote	CP S3			10	17	ALO SSB Remote	CP ALO	
11	18	66 Secure	CP S3	66/3		11	19	66 Secure	CP S2	66/4
12	20	Div FSE	CP FSCC	66/2		12	21	Arty S3	CP FSCC	66/5
13	22	56 Secure	CP S3	14/9		13	23			
14	24	66 Nonsec	24 Nonsec	66/1		14	25	66 Nonsec	24 Nonsec	66/10
15	26	56 Nonsec	24 Nonsec	14/2		15	27	24 Nonsec	CP CU #1	
16	28	66 C/C	24 C/C	66/7		16	29	14 C/C	24 C/C	
17	30	14 Nonsec	24 Nonsec	14/1		17	31	14 Nonsec	24 Nonsec	14/3
18	32	24 Nonsec	Spt Swbd			18	33	24 Nonsec	Spt Swbd	
19	34	VHF	24 Nonsec			19	35	Tracks	24 Nonsec	
20	36	Div TAC	CP S3	14/6		20	37	ADCEO	CP Remote	
21						21				
22						22				
23						23				
24						24				
25						25				
26						26				

NOTE: Site Designation Numbers: 66—Division MAIN; 56—Division Alt; 24—Brigade CP; 14—Brigade Trains.

Figure 3. Cable Pair Assignments—Dual Cable Operations



Figure 4. Cable Distribution Plan — Displacement Operations

- **Staff**—mans radios inside track vehicles.
- **Wire Team "A"**—directed by platoon leader/sergeant, disconnects remotes in track complex and releases to Team "3."
- **Wire Team "B"**—transports to GP medium and releases to Team "C."
- **Wire Team "C"**—connects remotes to harness.
- **Chief Signal NCO**—verifies remote communication status and informs S3.
- **Staff**—displaces to remoted command post GP medium.
- **Wire Team "A"**—disconnects remaining phones in track complex; transports to GP medium, releases to Team "C."
- **Wire Team "C"**—connects phones to harness, installs neon bulbs on all ringers.
- **Chief Signal NCO**—verifies status.

Command Post Displacement Operations

Operations during command post displacement are basically the same as during initial setup with the added complication that less equipment is available. If the brigade has employed a TAC CP, the preferred method is a transfer of control temporarily to the TAC CP accompanied by a rapid close-out of the old command post and a rapid initial setup at the new location. Operations described in this article do not address, for security/survivability reasons, the closure of the main command post on the TAC CP.

If the brigade has no TAC CP, assets normally used in support of that echelon of command/control are available. In this situation, displacement systems may be established as indicated by Figure 4. Due to limited assets, a single cable system is established in a manner which supports an add-on of the complete dual cable system as the main body closes. Cable assignments

Cable Pair	Inst Order	From	To	Parallel to Track Complex
01	1	TP 1A	TA 3A	TP 4B (Signal Officer)
02	2	VHF	CP Remote Control	Signal Officer
03	3	Div Cmd Remote	CP S3	S3
04	4	Div Int Remote	CP S2	S2
05	5	Bde Cmd Remote	CP S3	S3
06	6	Bde Int Remote	CP S2	S2
07	7	FA CF Remote	CP FSCC	FSCC
08	8	FA Cmd Remote	CP FSCC	FSCC
09	9	ALO FM Remote	CP ALO	ALO
10	10	ADA FM Remote	CP ADA	ADA
11	11	ENG FM Remote	CP ENG	ENG
12	12	LNO FM Remote	CP LNO	LNO
13	13	Div SSB Remote	CP S3	S3
14	14	ALO SSB Remote	CP ALO	ALO
15	15	Div G3	CP S3	S3
16	16	Div G2	CP S2	S2
17	17	Div FSE	CP FSCC	FSCC
18	18	DivArty S3	CP FSCC	FSCC
19	19	Div TAC G3	CP S3	S3
20	20	SWBD	Track Complex	
21-26		Open		

Note: 1. AN/GRC-106 radios are remoteable with AN/GRA-39 with 5-pin adapters organic to ALO radio vehicles.

2. At TP 4B wire team "A" connects remote radio harnesses to TP 48 from track radios and lays telephone and parallel harness from TP 4B to parallel positions where track RTO's terminate them (Figure 1).

Figure 5. Cable Pair Assignments — Single Cable Operations (Section 3B) Displacement Operations TAC CP Operations



Figure 6. Cable Distribution Plan—TAC CP Operations

would be similar to those established for cable section 3B of the base system (Figure 5).

If the brigade TAC CP is employed, but a transfer of control is not desirable due to the tactical situation, a new command post position may still be prepared for occupation. This is accomplished by forming a composite displacement team from Wire Teams "A," "B" and "C." Cable A and associated distribution boxes may be removed from the dual cable system in its entirety after the wire chief and chief signal NCO have cut over circuits from cable to cable in the priority established at Figure 3. Depending on the degree of command/control the commander desires the TAC CP to exercise, operations may at this time be split between the existing CP and the TAC CP thereby freeing some radio vehicle assets to accompany the composite jump team and advance party to the new location. In both displacement scenarios, a duplicate set of CP harnesses must be constructed per Figure 1.

TAC CP Operations

Operations at the TAC CP are faster and lighter and require more precision due to the small size of the team and the frequent moves the TAC CP is required to make. Figure 6 diagrams the operation. Again, for the purpose of



NOTE: Space instruments apart for local operating noise conditions. Use crawl space to install/maintain wire harnesses. Build slack coils into harnesses between all stations/posts. Position common user lines away from density communications. Parallel key nets to plans area for commander.

Figure 7. Typical Command Post Layout—GP Medium

impressing the importance of training and coordinated action, a type list of sequenced actions which have been employed is presented.

- **Site Occupation/Vehicle Positioning** by Team "D" chief and operations NCO, VHF and jump track are collocated; extension is set up; LNO vehicles positioned in the vicinity of the complex.
- **Wire Team "D" Chief**—establishes cablehead (TP2B); channelizes cable 2B per Figure 4 (example); connects remote harness from track; connects telephone and parallel harness; terminates/mans eng; VHF and remote control circuits; verifies circuits.
- **Track RTOs**—erect track extension, directional antennas (1/2 wave wdl/tt rhombics); lay remote harness to TP2B and terminate telephone and parallel harness with remote sets.
- **LNO RTOs**—lay field wire to TP2B; terminate remotes in track extension on telephone and parallel harness.
- **Wire Team "D"**—lays telephone and parallel harness; terminates telephones; lays section B; establishes TP1B; lays CP harness; verifies circuits; and informs operations NCO.
- **Staff**—moves inside tracks.
- **Wire Team "D"**—disconnects remotes in track extension; transports to GP small and installs remotes.
- **Staff**—displaces to GP small.
- **Wire Team "D"**—disconnects remaining phones in track complex; transports to GP small; and connects neon light bulbs on all ringers.

Conclusion

I consider the technical installation procedures described above to be "first generation" remoting/cabling techniques. They were tested on several local dispersal area (LDA) and local training area (LTA) exercises and on one NATO field training exercise in USAREUR. They proved workable to the command. Some resistance was experienced from both the maneuver staff and the signal platoons which were used to other doctrinal methods. The concept will work and support command post survivability through proper training if "spearheaded" by the signal officer. I am prepared to offer further details or assistance in the interest of implementing and improving upon the concept within your command.

Vehicle Recognition Quiz

(continued from page 51)

1. SAU 122-Soviet
   - PT-76 Type Chassis with Seven Road Wheels
   - Turret Location is Rear of Center
   - IR Searchlight Top Left of Turret
   - Double Baffle Muzzle Brake and Bore Evacuator
2. S Tank-Swedish
   - No Turret
   - Bore Evacuator Near Mantle
   - Low Hull
   - 4 Road Wheels Hydro-Pneumatic with Support Rollers
3. BTR 152-Soviet
   - An Armor Plated Truck with Six Wheels
   - Command, "U," Version has Raised, Covered Top and Antennae
   - Wide Bumper with Winch and Rounded Mud Guards over Front Wheels
   - Three Firing Ports on Each Side
4. M109 SP-United States
   - Distinctive Short Gun Tube with Double Baffle Muzzle Brake
   - Seven Evenly Spaced Road Wheels with Low Front Sprocket and Idler Wheel
   - Large Boxy Turret Mounted Rear of Center
5. Marder-West German
   - Small Turret Placed Centrally on Hull
   - Gun Mounted on Turret
   - Long Hull with Inward Sloping Sides, Domed Cupola at Rear
   - Six Road Wheels with Support Rollers
6. JP Kanone-West German
   - No Turret
   - Bore Evacuator and Muzzle Brake at Muzzle
   - Low Flat-Topped Silhouette with Step Between Fighting Compartment and Rear Deck
   - Five Road Wheels with Support Rollers
7. Scorpion-British
   - Small Turret Towards Rear of Hull
   - Short Gun Tube, No Bore Evacuator
   - Long Front Slope
   - Five Road Wheels, No Support Rollers
8. PT 76-Soviet
   - Cone Shaped Turret Set Well Forward
   - Short Gun with Evacuator at Center, Muzzle Brake at End
   - Wide Long and Square Hull
   - Narrow Back, Six Road Wheels, No Support Rollers
9. BMD-Soviet
   - Same Turret and Armament as BMP
   - Driver's Hatch Centered Below Main Gun
   - Five Road Wheels, Four Support Rollers
   - Found with Airborne Units
10. M60-United States
    - High Rear Deck
    - Tortoise Shell Shaped Turret
    - Six Road Wheels with Three Support Rollers
    - Prominent Cupola
11. HS-30-West German
    - Small Turret Well Forward on Right
    - Long Thin Gun
    - Low Silhouette with Sloped Edges
    - Five Road Wheels with Support Rollers
12. Saladin-British
    - Box Shaped Turret Set Well Forward
    - Short Gun Tube
    - Squat Angular Hull
    - Wheeled-Three on Each Side
13. BRDM-Soviet
    - No Turret
    - Armament may vary from Pintle Mounted Machinegun to Antitank Missiles
    - Long Sloping Hood and Raised Troop Compartment
    - Four Wheel
14. BTR 60P-Soviet
    - May have Small Turret
    - MG towards Front
    - Large Boat-like Hull with Sharp Square Nose
15. Leopard-West German
    - Large Rounded Flat Turret
    - Bore Evacuator 2/3 from Muzzle
    - Long Sloping Sided Hull from Horizontal Exhaust Louvers at Rear
    - Seven Road Wheels with Support Rollers

Executive Intelligence Oversight: A History and Assessment

by CPT Martin H. Joyce, III

Introduction

In the Executive branch of the United States government, intelligence demands two things of decision makers: management and oversight. Intelligence management is concerned with the functions of policy formulation and implementation, intelligence community organization and responsibilities and resource allocation. Intelligence oversight is concerned with the quality, effectiveness, legality and propriety of intelligence activities.

The purpose of this article is threefold: first, to trace the evolution of intelligence oversight in the Executive branch since 1955; second, to assess the effectiveness of Executive oversight in each administration; and third, to identify significant issues affecting Executive oversight. I will address the development and assessment of intelligence oversight by analyzing the oversight organizations of each administration and some of the topics that they investigated. A discussion of the important issues concerning Executive oversight in light of current attitudes and legislation related to the intelligence community will follow.

Background

The basic organizational structure of the present intelligence community was established by or developed from the National Security Act of 1947. At the White House level, the National Security Act's major impact was the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) to:

> advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.[1]

The Act provided the framework for the national security process, or intelligence management as defined above. The topic of intelligence oversight was not addressed until the Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government released its findings in 1955.

The Hoover Commission had been established earlier to examine all facets of the Executive branch, not simply the intelligence community. General Mark Clark was chairman of a task force appointed by the Commission to analyze US intelligence activities. The Clark Task Force studies were forwarded to the Hoover Commission, which recommended in a report issued on June 29, 1955:

> That the President appoint a committee of experienced private citizens, who shall have the responsibility to examine and report to him periodically on the work of Government foreign intelligence activities. This committee should also give such information to the public as the President may direct.

These findings were reviewed by the President, and were directly responsible for the "birth" of intelligence oversight in the Executive branch.

Historical Development

In line with the recommendations of the Hoover Commission, President Eisenhower appointed an eight-man board of advisors on January 13, 1956. The board was formally organized by Executive Order 10656, dated February 6, 1956, as the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA). Eisenhower stated at that time that the Board should focus upon:

> the Central Intelligence Agency and...those elements of key importance in other departments...[and] the overall progress that is being made, the quality of training and personnel, security, progress in research, effectiveness of specific projects and the handling of funds, and general competence in carrying out assigned intelligence tasks.

Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was the first chairman of the Board. He was succeeded by John E. Hull on February 28, 1958. Other Board members are identified at the end of this article.

The greatest concern of the Eisenhower Board was the improvement of technical capabilities for intelligence collection. Several of the Board members had scientific or technical backgrounds and were able to deal with and influence technical decisions, such as the improvement of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft and sensitive National Security Agency (NSA) collection assets.[2] The PBCFIA held nineteen meetings, usually in two-day sessions, and met with President Eisenhower on five occasions, submitting over forty-two recommendations dealing with the role of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), covert operations, and strategic warning systems, in addition to the activities mentioned earlier.[3] However, the Board's recommendations had little impact in areas other than technical matters, because Allen Dulles, then DCI, ignored PBCFIA's recommendations regarding the CIA and covert operations, and Eisenhower apparently gave the Board little support.[4] In anticipation of the Kennedy Administration, the Board members resigned on January 7, 1961.

The failure of the Bay of Pigs operation in April, 1961, again identified the need for an intelligence oversight body early in the Kennedy Administration. The President reacted by issuing Executive Order 10938, on May 4, 1961, reinstituting Eisenhower's Board as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). Dr. Killian, who had served as chairman of the PBCFIA, was appointed chairman

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Executive Oversight of the Intelligence Community

A Chronology

Date	Event
July 26, 1947	National Security Act of 1947 is passed. (Public Law 80–253)
June 29, 1955	Hoover Commission recommends "... That the President appoint a committee of experienced private citizens, who shall have the responsibility to examine and report to him periodically on the work of Government foreign intelligence activities."
January 13, 1956	President Eisenhower appoints an 8-man board.
February 6, 1956	E.O. 10656 formally establishes the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA) to report to the Executive on the quality and performance of US intelligence activities.
January 7, 1961	PBCFIA members resign in anticipation of the Kennedy Administration.
January 20, 1961	Kennedy becomes President.
April 17, 1961	Bay of Pigs operation.
May 4, 1961	E.O. 10938 redesignates the PBCFIA as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to evaluate US foreign intelligence and related activities.
November 22, 1963	Johnson becomes President. PFIAB continued to operate under E.O. 10938, and remained relatively intact.
January 20, 1969	Nixon becomes President.
March 20, 1969	E.O. 11460 reestablishes and expands the PFIAB to ten members, and specifies various functions.
July 13, 1972	Murphy Commission is established. (Public Law 92-352)
August 9, 1974	Ford becomes President.
January 4, 1975	E.O. 11828 establishes the Rockefeller Commission.
June 10, 1975	Rockefeller Commission report released, recommending expansion PFIAB staff and responsibilities, and a broadening of PFIAB functions in its relations with the CIA.
June 28, 1975	Murphy Commission report released, advocating strengthening PFIAB as a source of independent advice and oversight.
February 18, 1976	E.O. 11905 establishes the IOB to examine the propriety and legality of US intelligence activities.
March 11, 1976	PFIAB expanded to seventeen members, including IOB members.
January 20, 1977	Carter becomes President.
February 18, 1977	***Washington Post*** releases story of CIA payments to King Hussein of Jordan, and says that Ford's IOB had reviewed the payments.
May 4, 1977	E.O. 11984 abolishes the PFIAB. Carter appoints new members to his IOB.
January 24, 1978	E.O. 12036 supersedes E.O. 11905, and reestablishes and specifies IOB responsibilities.
June 28, 1978	Carter grants original TOP SECRET classification authority to IOB chairman.

of Kennedy's Board. (He was succeeded by Clark Clifford on April 23, 1963.) In the Executive Order, Kennedy instructed the PFIAB to report to the President at least semi-annually,

> with respect to its assessment of the objectives and performance of those activities by the Central Intelligence Agency and the several additional civilian and military agencies engaged...in the field of national security and foreign relations.

Under Kennedy, the PFIAB enjoyed greater presidential support than the PBCFIA had under Eisenhower. During the period May–November, 1961, the Board met twenty-five times, nine times with the President, and through November, 1963, forwarded over 180 recommendations, most of which were adopted.[5] In addition to studying foreign intelligence operations in light of the Bay of Pigs failure, Kennedy's PFIAB investigated the failure to discover the Cuban missile build-up sooner, and recommended improving technical collection capabilities, consolidating defense intelligence activites, and increasing coordination of covert activities.

President Johnson allowed the Board to continue under Executive Order 10938. Clark Clifford remained chairman until February 23, 1968, when he was replaced by General Maxwell Taylor. Although the board continued to hold its bimonthly meetings during the Johnson Administration, PFIAB met with the President only three times. However, several of the Board members met frequently with Johnson in his "Tuesday lunch" meetings.[6] Clifford says that there was a definite decline in presidential interest in the PFIAB, and one congressional staffer has said that, "If you asked him [Johnson], President Johnson probably couldn't have named who was on the Board."[7]

The recommendations of the Johnson PFIAB, like those of earlier Boards, dealt largely with technical capabilities, including NSA operations, data storage and retrieval operations, and satellite reconnaissance systems.[8] Shortly before Johnson left office, PFIAB was also tasked to investigate why the CIA had been unable to forecast the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.[9]

President Nixon reconstituted the PFIAB on March 20, 1969, when he issued Executive Order 11460. He expanded the Board to ten members, several of whom had served on earlier Boards, and continued Maxwell Taylor as chairman. (Taylor was succeeded by retired Admiral George Anderson on May 1, 1970.) Nixon announced additional appointments on several occasions, which were viewed by some critics as rewards to political friends. These appointees included John Connally, Clare Boothe Luce, George Shultz, and Leo Cherne. Unfortunately, the Board appears to have been dominated by Henry Kissinger, who funneled information to and from the President throughout the Nixon Administration.[10]

The Nixon PFIAB held thirty-five meetings, and met with the President on eight occasions, submitting over 70 recommendations. The Board conducted inquiries into the FBI's so-called Huston Plan, the Allende election in Chile, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) problem, in the last instance, providing its own threat estimate to supplement those of the intelligence community.[11]

President Ford continued the PFIAB under Executive Order 11460. However, several important events occurred during the Ford Administration that led to the reform

of Executive intelligence oversight. In July, 1972, Congress established the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. This Commission, headed by Robert Murphy (also a member of PFIAB, appointed in 1961), conducted a broad study of all governmental activities contributing to the foreign policy effort. In January, 1975, prior to the release of the Murphy Commission's findings, and in response to public outcry concerning alleged illegal CIA activities, President Ford established the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States. Vice President Rockefeller, a member of the Murphy Commission and former member of the Nixon PFIAB, was designated chairman.

The findings of the Murphy and Rockefeller Commissions were released less than three weeks apart, in June, 1975. These reports recommended the expansion of the staff and responsibilities of the PFIAB, a broadening of PFIAB functions in its relations with the CIA, and the strengthening of the PFIAB as a source of independent advice and oversight.[12] President Ford responded to these findings by organizing a White House task force to draft proposed changes regarding the organization and control of the US intelligence community.

In the area of Executive intelligence oversight, the task force reviewed the development and functions of the PFIAB. Throughout its existence, PFIAB had acted as an advisory body to the President for intelligence matters, assessing the quality and effectiveness of the intelligence community and its activities. It had not performed the "watchdog" function recommended by many outsiders, for which it lacked presidential authority and support. Although the task force agreed that the oversight function needed to include an "outside influence," disputes arose whether to give this function to PFIAB or to a new body. The decision was made to create a new and separate oversight board, whose responsibility would be to judge the legality and propriety of US intelligence activities, while PFIAB would remain as an advisory panel for quality and effectiveness.[13]

President Ford issued Executive Order 11905 on February 18, 1976, instituting the three-member Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB). Appointed were Robert Murphy as chairman, and Stephen Ailes, a Washington, DC lawyer, and Leo Cherne, a noted economist, as members. Ironically, despite the decision to keep the two Boards separate, the members of the IOB were also members of the Ford PFIAB, and Cherne was appointed chairman of PFIAB on March 11, 1976. In the Executive Order, Ford charged the IOB to review the procedures for internal controls within the various intelligence agencies, and to review and report to the President and the Attorney General any activities raising questions about legality or propriety. The Inspectors General, General Counsels, and heads of intelligence agencies were tasked to cooperate and voluntarily report any

Executive Oversight Board Membership, 1956–1979

PBCFIA Members—Eisenhower Administration

Dr. William O. Baker
Ambassador David K. E. Bruce
Admiral Richard L. Conolly, USN (Ret.)
Governor Colgate W. Darden, Jr.
Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, USAF (Ret.)
Mr. Benjamin F. Fairless
General John E. Hull, USA (Ret.)
Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy
Dr. James R. Killian, Jr.
Mr. Robert A. Lovett
Mr. Edward L. Ryerson

PFIAB Members—Kennedy Administration

Dr. William O. Baker
Mr. Clark M. Clifford
Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, USAF (Ret.)
Mr. Gordon Gray
Dr. James R. Killian, Jr.
Dr. Edwin H. Land
Dr. William Langer
Ambassador Robert D. Murphy
Mr. Frank Pace, Jr.
General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret.)

PFIAB Members—Johnson Administration

Dr. William O. Baker
Mr. Clark M. Clifford
Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, USAF (Ret.)
Mr. Gordon Gray
Dr. Edwin H. Land
Dr. William Langer
Ambassador Robert D. Murphy
Mr. Frank Pace, Jr.
Admiral John H. Sides, USN (Ret.)
General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret.)

PFIAB Members—Nixon Administration

Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Dr. William O. Baker
Mr. Leo Cherne
Governor John B. Connally
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.
Mr. Robert W. Galvin
Mr. Gordon Gray
Dr. Edwin H. Land
Mr. Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.
Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce
Dr. Franklin D. Murphy
Ambassador Robert D. Murphy
Mr. Frank Pace, Jr.
Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller
Mr. George P. Shultz
General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret.)
Dr. Edward Teller

PFIAB Members—Ford Administration

Mr. Stephen Ailes
Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Mr. Leslie C. Arends
Dr. William O. Baker
Mr. William J. Casey
Mr. Leo Cherne
Governor John B. Connally
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.
Mr. Robert W. Galvin
Mr. Gordon Gray
Mr. Melvin R. Laird
Dr. Edwin H. Land
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA (Ret.)
Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce
Ambassador Robert D. Murphy
Mr. George P. Shultz
Dr. Edward Teller
Mr. Edward Bennett Williams

IOB Members—Ford Administration

Ambassador Robert D. Murphy
Mr. Stephen Ailes
Mr. Leo Cherne

IOB Members—Carter Administration

Mr. Thomas L. Farmer
Senator Albert Gore
Governor William Scranton

questionable activities to the IOB. Ford reiterated his support for the PFIAB on March 11, 1976, when he expanded the Board to seventeen members, stating that he anticipated its continuing to advise him on the effectiveness of US foreign intelligence efforts.

The primary efforts of the IOB during its first several months of existence were oriented toward establishing the procedural methods by which the intelligence agencies would report to the IOB. The IOB members met monthly among themselves, but with President Ford only a few times, conducting most of their work through correspondence. The IOB had presidential support, and both its members and staff (two lawyers and one secretary) felt that they had good access to the President and his staff. Although the specific investigations and recommendations of the IOB remain classified, most of its concerns dealt with budget appropriations matters and the propriety of various clandestine funding operations.[14]

Neither PFIAB nor the IOB met following the inauguration of President Carter. Carter advisors apparently ignored advice to establish liaison with Ford's oversight boards during the post-election transition, and they soon learned that this was a mistake.[15]

The ***Washington Post*** disclosed on February 18, 1977, that the CIA had been funding King Hussein of Jordan for twenty years, and that the IOB had briefed former President Ford about the matter during his administration. There had only been a question of propriety, and Ford had not stopped the payments. Carter claimed that he had had no knowledge of the payments prior to being informed by the ***Washington Post,*** following which he reviewed IOB and CIA findings on the matter. Carter had little choice except to stop the payments, and if the existence or roles of the PFIAB and the IOB had previously escaped his attention, they now came to the forefront.

The Administration's response came on May 4, 1977, when Carter issued Executive Order 11984, abolishing the PFIAB. The following day he announced the appointments of Thomas Farmer, a Washington, DC lawyer, as chairman, and former Governor and UN Ambassador William Scranton and former Senator Albert Gore as members of his IOB. The President stated that he felt that the National Security Council and the Congressional intelligence committees could effectively review and assess foreign intelligence activities. The specific functions of the IOB were restated on January 24, 1978, when Carter issued Executive Order 12036 restructuring the organization and control of US foreign intelligence activities. Although this repealed Ford's Executive Order 11905, those sections pertaining to the IOB remained essentially the same. The current IOB will not release any information regarding its activities, due to the sensitivity of the information, and the Board's perceptions as working within the constraints of Executive Privilege.[16]

Issues of Concern

Recent congressional inquiries and disclosures by the media have raised many questions regarding effective control and oversight of US intelligence activities. The most fundamental of these addresses the basic premise upon which the IOB operates: will a board which is a creature of the Executive be able and/or willing to probe any sensitive area? This problem has arisen before, for example in 1970, when PFIAB requested information from the 40 Committee and the NSC pertaining to the Allende affair in Chile. The NSC refused the request and the Board dropped its inquiry. The IOB will only be effective so long as it receives strong presidential support enabling it to initiate investigations into any matter.

Some critics argue that a small, part-time advisory board cannot devote sufficient attention to matters of national importance. They criticize President Carter's decision to eliminate the PFIAB, because it forces the IOB to devote much of its efforts to matters dealing with intelligence quality, rather than legality or propriety. Some people also question the ability of the Board to function efficiently with only a two-member staff (secretary and counsel).

Disclosure is the third area of contention. To what degree, if any, should reports provided to and produced by the IOB be made available to the Congress and the public? The proposed National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978 (S. 2525—95th Cong.) seeks to legislate the existence of the IOB along the same lines as Executive Order 12036, and would require those agencies that report to the IOB to submit their reports also to the Congressional intelligence committees. It would also require the Attorney General to report to these committees. These requirements essentially would eliminate the reasons for having an oversight board within the Executive branch and conflict with the concept of the separation of powers. The concerns for public disclosure of IOB information deal with the public right to know, versus the sensitivity and classification of the intelligence involved.

Another area of concern with the proposed Act is the mandating of the Executive oversight function, including the IOB and its specific responsibilities. This has been criticized by some as going too far. General Richard Stilwell, President of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on June 15, 1978, said that Congress should:

> Direct by law that the President establish an oversight function within the Executive and then leave the matter in his hands to prescribe the precise procedures and functions in this most sensitive area.

Conclusions

The evolution of Executive oversight of US intelligence activities has occurred rapidly, beginning with President Eisenhower's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities in 1956. That Board, created as a result of the recommendations of the Hoover Commission, was modified only slightly by President Kennedy when he redesignated it the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, following the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961. The next major development was the creation of the Intelligence Oversight Board by President Ford in 1976, in response to the reports of the Murphy and Rockefeller Commissions. Whereas earlier oversight boards were primarily concerned with the quality and effectiveness of US intelligence activities, the IOB was designed to examine the legality and propriety of these activities. The most recent change in Executive oversight was the elimination of the PFIAB by President Carter in 1977. It will probably be difficult to assess the effects of that development for quite some time.

Despite the critical issues cited previously, the procedures and organization for Executive intelligence oversight as they exist today provide an effective means to curb the excesses of the intelligence community. However, the degree to which they remain effective will depend upon the support that the IOB receives from the President and the level of trust placed in its abilities and findings by Congress and the public.

* * *

Author's Note

Following the preparation of this article, Senate Bill S.2284 (96th Congress, 2d Session) titled the "National Intelligence Act of 1980" was introduced into the US Senate on February 8, 1980, and referred to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The Committee approved the Act on May 8, 1980, and it now awaits further congressional action. Although this bill also mandates the establishment of the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), it does not detail the procedures that the IOB is to follow, leaving those to the President's discretion. As stated in S.2284, the primary role of the IOB is to "function to provide the President independent oversight of the intelligence community, in order to report to the President on questions of legality and propriety." This is a significant improvement over the previously considered S.2525 covered in this article. For an in-depth discussion of S.2284, see the Winter 1980 issue of the **American Intelligence Journal.**

Footnotes

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3. John S. Chwat, *The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board: An Historical and Contemporary Analysis (1955–1975)* (Washington: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1975), p. 6.

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6. Chwat, p. 11.

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9. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p. 335.

10. William Safire, "Piffiab to the Rescue," *New York Times,* (November 27, 1975), p. 37.

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12. Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence Community: Reform and Reorganization* (Washington: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1979), pp. 3–4.

13. Statement by Stephen Ailes, former IOB member, personal interview, Washington, March 13, 1979.

14. Ailes, interview.

15. John Osborne, "Carter's Oversight," *The New Republic,* 12 (March 19, 1977), p. 8.

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(continued from page 12)

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21. EO 12036, p. 35, paragraph 4-210. (e).

22. EO 12036, p. 18, paragraph 1-7204. (c).

23. EO 12036, pp. 5–6 paragraph 1-502 (d) and 1-504.

24. Pearsall and Wheeler, op. cit., p. 45.

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28. MG Daniel O. Graham, "Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job," *Army Magazine*, April, 1973, pp. 14–18.

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

The Defense Intelligence School's Postgraduate Intelligence Curriculum: Strategic Intelligence for the MI Officer

by CPT Peter V. Huisking

Introduction

Most MI officers attend the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course (MIOAC) at Fort Huachuca before their eighth year of commissioned service. The MIOAC prepares them for staff assignments at battalion level and above and commands at company level and higher while officers who have not served at division or below learn the basics of division combat and combat support operations.

Officers in the 35 career field who have spent several years at the tactical level and had command experience may find certain MIOAC training redundant. At the same time, their career development may require an appreciation of strategic intelligence that would not be available to them through the MIOAC. These officers may find the Defense Intelligence School's Postgraduate Intelligence Curriculum very rewarding.

In this article, I will consider the Defense Intelligence School and its Postgraduate Intelligence Curriculum.

The Defense Intelligence School and the PGIC

The Defense Intelligence School (DIS) is a joint services institution like the National Defense University and the Defense Language Institute. It is chartered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operated and controlled by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The mission of the DIS is to prepare military officers and civilians for key intelligence positions in the national and international security structure. Curricula covering all aspects of strategic intelligence doctrine, techniques and methods are offered.

One of these, the Postgraduate Intelligence Curriculum (PGIC), provides a graduate level program of study in the following areas:

- Principles of strategic intelligence
- Methods of intelligence research
- The intelligence cycle
- Problems of intelligence assessment
- The role of intelligence in joint operations
- Management of intelligence

The PGIC lasts 36 weeks (10 longer than MIOAC) and consists of three 10-week quarters during which time students complete a series of core and elective courses. Four core courses per quarter provide training in intelligence systems management, strategic intelligence operations, area assessments and national organizations and policy. These required courses provide a basic understanding of the national intelligence system and the elements of strategic intelligence.

PGIC Core Courses

Core courses within the area of **Intelligence Systems Management** are Intelligence Management, Resource Management and Aspects of Probability for the Intelligence Analyst. Intelligence Management covers managerial and administrative behavior of the intelligence manager and provides an in-depth evaluation of contemporary managerial problems peculiar to the intelligence community. Resource Management considers the allocation of resources for national defense and how the Department of Defense and the intelligence community fit into the budgetary system. Aspects of Probability provides an overview of alternative methodologies to standard analytical procedures, covering Bayesian analysis, subjective probability and decision-making.

Strategic Intelligence Operations offers core courses in Counterintelligence (CI), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and International Terrorism; Technical Systems and Indications and Warning (I&W) Intelligence; and Intelligence Operations. The last course considers all phases of the intelligence cycle as they relate to the production of intelligence for the user/decision-maker. CI, HUMINT and International Terrorism covers the nature of US CI and HUMINT systems, the theory and practice of contemporary international terrorism and the relationship between the two. Technical Systems and I&W introduce the student to the various technical collection systems available to the intelligence officer, the fundamentals of warning analysis and the operations of the Defense Indications and Warning System.

Core courses taught in **Area Assessments** include surveys of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China, an examination of Europe; and introductions to Latin America and the Middle East, concentrating on the reasons these regions are vital to US interests and of continuing concern to the intelligence community.

National Organizations and Policy consists of three courses. National Security Policy explores the environment, systems and processes involved in the making of national security policy. Each seminar deals with the role of one of the major participants in the policy process and their relation to the intelligence community. (A member of the Washington press corps is an invited guest participant in the seminar dealing with the media.) Defense Intelligence Community covers the DoD members of the national intelligence community, and familiarizes students with the operations of NSA and DIA, and the functions and responsibilities of service intelligence agencies (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps). National Foreign Intelligence Community covers all executive departments outside the Defense Department which have an intelligence role (State, Treasury, Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency).

Electives in these same areas examine specific topics and require more extensive research. For example, in the assessments department, a course titled Problems in the Middle East deals with current regional issues (Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran, oil interests, etc.) and recently required each student to prepare a position paper as a representative of a selected interest group for a decision-making simulation. A course assessing the role of the Soviet intelligence and security services is taught by a former CIA official who was, for many years, the agency's top analyst on the subject. One management elective requires that students choose an intelligence agency/organization in the Washington area (DIA, OACSI, INSCOM, etc.) and conduct on-site research on a selected intelligence/management problem. Other electives broaden knowledge

Curricula and Programs Offered at the Defense Intelligence School

Postgraduate Intelligence Curriculum (PGIC)
National Senior Intelligence Curriculum (NSIC)
Basic DIAOLS/COINS Curriculum
Advanced DIAOLS/COINS Curriculum
DIAOLS/COINS For Managers Curriculum
Intelligence Indications and Warning Curriculum (I&W)
Reserve Symposium on Strategic Intelligence (RSSI)
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Analyst Introductory Curriculum (STIAIC)
Combined Strategic Intelligence Training Program (CSITP)
Joint Intelligence Curriculum (JIC)
Intelligence Analyst Curriculum (IAC)
Joint Intelligence Management Curriculum (JIMC)
Operation DIALOGUE
Attache Curriculum
Reserve Attache Curriculum
Attache Staff Operations Curriculum (ASOC)
Station Techniques Curriculum (TECH)

Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence (MSSI)

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in operational aspects of intelligence from imagery to scientific and technical intelligence.

National Organizations and Policy also includes an exceptional array of electives such as The Problems of Intelligence, taught by a former Deputy Director of the CIA with first-hand experience of some of America's intelligence triumphs and failures and strong feelings about recent developments in the intelligence community. Another course is taught by the former Chief of Air Force Intelligence and deals with the future of intelligence in the national security process.

Taken together, these courses offer a wide range of subject areas allowing the student to go into as much depth in a particular area of interest as he desires. The qualifications of instructors —with current operational experience or an intimate appreciation of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Penkovsky affair, and the intelligence "failure" surrounding the 1973 War—add to the student's educational experience.

Most classes are conducted as three hour seminars, meeting once a week. There are about 15 students in core courses while elective classes are normally smaller so students have a better opportunity to freely and meaningfully exchange ideas.

Six of the PGIC's 36 weeks are devoted to classes lending themselves to "platform" presentations and lectures and a one-week practical exercise in strategic intelligence and decision-making. These sessions are scheduled before and in-between the three 10-week quarters.

The school's Washington location provides excellent research facilities and contact with other national level intelligence elements and allows it to operate on an "open-campus" concept so that intelligence officers stationed in the area can participate in regularly-scheduled DIS courses under the auspices of the Intelligence Continuing Education Program (ICEP). Enrollment is subject to normal prerequisites on a space-available basis. Completion of courses in the ICEP can be credited toward DIS residence curricula. Participation in this program is highly encouraged and can be coordinated through the DIS registrar.

Requirements for Attending PGIC

Requirements for attending PGIC include Specialty Code 35 (as one of two OPMS specialties) and a strong tactical intelligence background (See ***Military Intelligence***, July-September 1979 or contact MI branch). Every officer in a recent PGIC had spent most of his career in division and battalion assignments. All had experience as S2 officers at battalion or higher. One had been the S2 of an armored brigade, and five had commanded MI or combat arms companies. Of the 15, only two were not in the 35 career field.

A new feature of PGIC is the "flexible admission" system. The PGIC traditionally began in the fall and was conducted only once each year. Because of the nature of the curriculum and the multiple offerings of required PGIC courses through the school's four academic quarters, it is now possible for a student to enter PGIC at the beginning of any of the four quarters (Fall, Winter, Spring or Summer) and complete the curriculum at the end of the third quarter following. This system should allow more flexibility in fulfilling manning requirements and in completing assignments within PCS time constraints.

Follow-on Assignments

Most PGIC students know what their next assignment will be well before their last quarter at the school. This provides an opportunity to concentrate on issues directly related to follow-on assignments and make the course more meaningful. Several students in the last PGIC worked on projects directly related to the organizations to which they would be assigned, projects which later proved quite useful to those organizations.

Once PGIC graduates reach their assignments, they may continue their strategic intelligence education because PGIC is the first step toward a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence (MSSI). The MSSI Program is conducted in two phases, the first at the school and the second at the officer's next duty station. The second phase consists of the practical application of knowledge and skills learned at PGIC. The officer must submit a research paper or project related to his assigned intelligence duties within four years of completion of PGIC. The MSSI candidate is then given a comprehensive oral examination by a board of intelligence professionals. Legislation authorizing DIS to grant the MSSI degree was introduced in Congress in January. Once this authority is granted, PGIC graduates will be awarded the MSSI degree upon completion of all degree requirements.

Assignments after PGIC are generally at joint service or national level. Orders for Army students who graduated in June, 1979 included DIA, INSCOM, IPAC and NSA. The new Rapid Deployment Force, which will respond to immediate crises world-wide will also provide assignment opportunities to graduates because the Army, as part of this force, must have officers familiar with joint and national level intelligence operations. The same holds true for officers in key intelligence positions in existing Unified and Specified Commands. Such positions require

a thorough understanding of joint intelligence operations.

JIC, JIMC and NSIC

The Defense Intelligence School offers curricula beyond PGIC in both joint operations (Joint Intelligence Curriculum, JIC, and Joint Intelligence Management Curriculum, JIMC) and senior level intelligence operations (National Senior Intelligence Curriculum). The JIC and the JIMC are designed to familiarize the student with the purpose and major functions of joint intelligence and the application of the components of strategic intelligence to problem areas. They consist of courses within the four functional intelligence areas (operations, organizations and policies, management and assessments) offered at the School, and are also open to Allied intelligence officers. The NSIC is for senior intelligence officers (LTC and above) and deals primarily with national and strategic applications of the intelligence disciplines in support of national security efforts. Strong consideration should be given to evaluating these curricula and validating those most useful to officers bound for assignments in Unified and Specified commands, and the OACSI.

Other Curricula

Other curricula of possible interest to MI officers are the Indications and Warning Curriculum which prepares officers for duties in watch/I&W centers such as the National Military Intelligence Center; the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Analyst Introductory Curriculum which would be useful to anyone assigned to any S&T intelligence organization; and the Defense Intelligence Agency On Line System/ Community On Line Intelligence System Curricula, which offer three levels of instruction in the ADP aids available to the analyst and manager.

Senior officers may be selected for the Attache Curriculum. Consisting of courses in all aspects of intelligence collection policies, procedures and programs, as well as the many dimensions of service in a diplomatic mission, this curriculum prepares officers for duty within the Defense Attache system. It is 12 weeks in length, and selection is controlled through the military services, with final approval by DIA.

DIS offers a series of dynamic curricula designed to be useful to today's intelligence officer. New programs are currently under development: DIS is working with the Marine Corps, the Air Force and the Navy to fulfill intelligence education requirements, and it also maintains contact with the US Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) to assist in designing strategic intelligence instruction for the MIOAC. USAICS is the home of tactical intelligence eduction; DIS is the home of strategic intelligence education. The MI officer assigned at echelons above corps needs the education that both of these schools offer.

Conclusion

As the distinction between tactical and strategic becomes increasingly blurred, the Army must have representatives on joint staffs who know how the national and the tactical systems function. These officers must also understand the realities of tactical units and be able to make both these systems responsive to the commander's intelligence requirements. The Defense Intelligence School can give MI officers the education to fulfill this role. Anyone interested in more information about the Defense Intelligence School, or any of its programs or curricula, should contact the school's Registrar.

US Army Intelligence Badge Trophy

The US Army Intelligence Badge Trophy is a five inch high, three and one-half inch wide wedge of lucite with a dark blue background. An authentic US Army Intelligence Badge, with the words, "Retired" or "Served" superimposed on the face over the American Eagle, is embedded in the lucite. Included with the trophy is a brass plate, suitable for engraving, with adhesive backing. The total cost of the badge trophy is $24.

Only money orders will be accepted in payment, one made out to V. H. Blackinton and Company for $16 and one made out to Treasurer of the United States for $8, the replacement cost of the badge.

Requests for the trophy should include: full name; a copy of retirement orders, DD Form 214 (Armed Forces of the US Report of Transfer or Discharge) or DD Form 257A (Discharge Papers); complete address to which the trophy is to be sent; badge number (if known) assigned while on active duty.

If your request is approved you will receive your trophy within 60 days; if not, your money orders will be returned immediately.

Requests, along with money orders, should be forwarded to:

Commander
US Army Intelligence and Security Command
ATTN: IACSO-ZCB, Badge and Credential Controller
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755

Quarterhorse on the Border

by SP4 John R. Arpin

Reaction force lined up and ready to move out the gates.

The watchwords here are "potential threat." The dictionary defines these words as "a source of possible danger, that can, but has not yet, come into being."

For most of the American service members stationed in Western Europe "potential threat" is just a phrase. Unless they see the Berlin Wall or take a border orientation tour, they might forget the reason for being there in the hustle of day-to-day mission requirements. But if they happen to be in an armored cavalry troop on border guard, the phrase becomes reality.

The armored cav is no stranger to the border (having the border security mission since the end of World War II) and the 1st Infantry Division (Forward)'s own C Troop 1st Squadron 4th Cavalry isn't either. It spent last July on the border with the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and was there again this February. Working out of Border Camps Roetz and May, the "Quarterhorse" was responsible for approximately 170 kilometers of the Iron Curtain.

The mission of a cavalry unit on the border is to gather intelligence, maintain border security, provide a deterrent to aggression and function as an early warning system for NATO forces. Constant daily patrolling in all kinds of weather is required to complete the mission. "Some sectors we cover once every four days, others once every seven days. Some sectors are covered every day," said SFC William Sampson, Camp May NCOIC.

Patrols may sound glamorous, and compared to other duties on the border, they may be. The team on patrol is given certain sectors to cover and each sector has checkpoints which must be watched for at least 15 minutes.

It has been said that any border is "just an artificial line drawn on the earth." The West German-Czechoslovakian border is more detailed than a simple line. It has no fences and killer dogs like its East German counterpart, but it is still part of the Iron Curtain and serves to keep its people from crossing to the West. The border is identified by trace stones, colored poles, and in some cases, a body of water known as a "wet border."

The apparent peacefulness of the border area is deceptive. At one checkpoint the border cuts right through a building. Scan the area with your binoculars. The border is marked by a line of blue and white poles. The trace stones are under two feet of snow. A concrete watchtower stands beyond them complete with two Czech guards who have AK rifles and the authority to track down or kill anyone foolish enough to leave the "workers paradise."

Team leader SGT Glick relaxes on M2 .50 caliber machinegun after giving the "thumbs up—all ready" sign to testers. Reaction force must be ready to move in 15 minutes once an alert is called.

SSG John Hutson scans the border area with binoculars while on patrol.

"It was a new experience, my first time on the border, to see the border itself and the people in the tower," said SSG John Hutson, patrol leader and C Troop Training NCO. "If something ever happened while you were out

The flesh and blood mounts of bygone days have been replaced by these "Iron Horses," M60A1 tanks. Cav's tanks provide the troop with its greatest firepower. Here platoon leader 2LT Mike Foncannon and the crew of a C-17 rumble into position as Border Camp May simulates going on a combat footing.

there, it would be a weird feeling, because you'd be the first one to tell the rest (of the unit) what's going on."

"If you have a day patrol you can see who you're dealing with. You can see the towers and the border points and the men," said mortarman SP4 Robert Otto. "Try and imagine the United States with each state having border crossings and checkpoints with towers and guards on the state lines. If you can imagine that, that's what I feel when I look at the border between West Germany and Czechoslovakia."

Legal crossing point into Czechoslovakia manned by Czech officials.

Border duty requires a high state of readiness. As NATO's early warning force, there will be no time for preparations if the "balloon" goes up. Alerts are called several times a day until proficiency is achieved and once achieved, it is maintained constantly. Each camp keeps a ready reaction force (consisting of six to eight men and two APC's) prepared to respond to any incident within 15 minutes of an alert. All other combat teams have 30 minutes, support elements, an hour. With the border less than 10 kilometers away, time is something a cav trooper cannot waste.

Is the Quarterhorse prepared for any potential threat? "Most definitely," said Sampson. "We have some of the best NCOs in the Army, and that's where the training comes from."

Most armored cavalry units, especially those in a division, never get to season themselves on the border. "It's a real-life mission here. It's one of the things the troop exists for," said Sampson. "It's the closest thing they'll ever get to combat without going to war." Others felt a bit differently: "It's a good experience but I wouldn't want to do it all the time ... once every six months would be fine. It's a lot better than going to Grafenwoehr or Hohenfels for 30 days," said Hutson. And Bob Otto said, "I believe it's a good opportunity, but it's also just another job. It's just like another field problem, although an important one."

"I would like to see the troop come here (the border) on a regular basis, twice a year or so," continued Sampson. Why? "It gives everybody in my platoon a chance to practice a lot of skills they normally don't have the time for. And during a field problem we have to follow a certain scenario, we can't stop and do it over if we screw up. This is almost like a field problem, with a variety of challenges."

"It's real training," added 1SG John Dixon. "I'd like to see us with a border mission every six months. It's a chance to have real-life situations that field problems just don't give. This is a real cav mission."

Will the potential threat ever become a reality? Nobody on this side of the Iron Curtain knows for sure but if it does, the armored cavalry will be ready. In the 2nd Cavalry Museum at Camp Hof an inscription on a photo of a former VII Corps commander, LTG David Ott is dedicated to the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment although it applies to any unit in Western Europe whose mission is to watch the border:

"To the 2nd ACR—The enemy will never reach the FEBA!"

photos by SP4 John R. Arpin

AGSI Viewpoint

A Systems View of Strategic Interface

by Major General
Edmund R. Thompson

We are currently witnessing a quantum leap forward in the support provided to tactical commanders by strategic intelligence systems. The interface between strategic systems and tactical users is due in large part to technological developments that permit tactical commanders near real-time access to national level intelligence collectors. A second factor contributing to the development of strategic level intelligence interface is our commitment to the development of doctrine for Echelons Above Corps (EAC), designed to maximize support to the Corps and subordinate commanders. This momentum for strategic interface must continue and our concepts refined if we are going to provide commanders the timely and accurate intelligence they absolutely must have on enemy follow-on forces.

TRADOC is in the final stages of designing the Army's Division and Corps for the next decade; however, the requirements of these echelons cannot be adequately assessed unless the structure above Corps is known. Therefore, to ensure a comprehensive approach to the development of total Army doctrine, TRADOC early this year, formed a Study Group to define the composition, structure, and functions of EAC and develop interfaces with the tactical force. The EAC study will address the NATO theater of operations as its initial and primary effort. This has significant implications to the intelligence community since it implies the use of nuclear warfare as well as conventional combat. With the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield comes the need to see deeper and with greater accuracy in order to target enemy command and control facilities and to destroy his nuclear delivery means. This is a challenge that is beyond the capability of those systems that are designed to directly support the Division or Corps commander. It must be accomplished by the collection means available to the EAC commander. Those collectors must be responsive to the needs of the tactical user, and they must provide their product to him in real time so that battlefield management and nuclear fire planning can be expeditiously accomplished.

We generally concede that we will be outmanned and outgunned numerically at the outset of any conflict involving our commitment to NATO. We have no choice but to "make every bullet count" and position our forces in the most effective manner. Commanders think in turns of time and space. The Division commander plans and allocates resources for operations up to 24 hours in the future. Time and space factors indicate that he must have detailed intelligence on enemy forces that are within 70 km of the Front Line of Troop (FLOT), and must have some information on forces that can close on his area within 48 hours, or within 150 km of the FLOT. Corps plans and allocates resources up to 72 hours in the future so the commander needs intelligence on enemy forces within 150–300 km of the FLOT. It is here that the collection systems organic to the Corps and Divisions are weak due to their range limitations. In order for the Corps to disrupt, attrit, or destroy the second echelon divisions and follow-on forces before they can affect the battle being fought by the divisional units, the commander must have information provided by EAC or National collections systems.

In doctrine now being developed for EAC, the Army Group (e.g., CENTAG) has the mission of providing SIGINT on High Frequency (HF) emitters. Systems now under development for this purpose will provide much faster and more accurate locations on second echelon command and control facilities, logistics complexes, and other potential nuclear targets. Development of the enemy situation will be accomplished through Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) techniques. This intelligence will be rapidly disseminated to the Corps and used for target development. At the next echelon, the Regional Command, e.g., AFCENT, Air Force and national collection systems are integrated to provide intelligence out to 1,000 km from the FLOT. Again, IPB techniques will be used by the supporting intelligence organizations to build a comprehensive picture of the enemy and provide this analysis to the tactical forces. The Theater Command, SHAPE, is the interface between the tactically oriented combat commands and the strategic/politically oriented management of the war at the national level. Here we see the integration of strategic IMINT and SIGINT systems, technical intelligence support, and HUMINT activities, to include clandestine collection. Again, the picture developed here is designed to be passed expeditiously to the tactical forces. As you can see from this brief description, the major function of the EAC intelligence organizations is to support the commanders who control tactical assets. Intelligence must be acted upon if it is to be of value!

This brings us to our National Collection means. The program designed to interface the national systems with the tactical units is TENCAP—Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities.

With the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield comes the need to see deeper and with greater accuracy in order to target enemy command and control facilities and to destroy his nuclear delivery means. This is a challenge that is beyond the capability of those systems that are designed to directly support the Division or Corps commander. It must be accomplished by the collection means available to the EAC commander.

This program is making great strides toward getting the information collected by national sensors to the tactical commander in time to be useful. We have developed processors which receive and display IMINT and SIGINT data collected by national systems. The Interim Tactical ELINT Processor (ITEP) is operational in Europe and CONUS and has already provided intelligence of exceptional value to its supported Corps. A prototype Tactical Imagery Exploitation System (TACIES), developed under the auspices of the TENCAP Program, was fielded last fall and surpassed the expectations of the developers in providing IMINT directly to the tactical user. Strategic/tactical intelligence interface is now state of the art!

Now that the commanders have the sensor input from National systems and EAC and the processors required to convert the data to usable form, the next step is to tie it all together with a system that can do intelligence analysis and production, collection manage-

ment, and target acquisition. For these functions, the Army is developing the All Source Analysis System—ASAS. This system will tie together the Division, Corps, and EAC so that we have a coordinated, integrated, interoperable and mutually supportative intelligence system. The Functional Systems Description for ASAS is currently being developed to define those functions that we want accomplished by ASAS. Concurrently, CACDA is working on an acquisition strategy with the goal of fielding an interim ASAS in the mid-1980s and the objective system in the late 1980s. This is an extremely high priority effort that is being supported by several other concurrent programs: Technical Control and Analysis Center —Division (ICAC-D) for SIGINT control; Battlefield Exploitation and Target Analysis (BETA) for joint targeting; and the Intelligence Information Subsystem (I^2S^2), now operational in Europe, for analysis and production. ASAS will be a reality and will greatly improve our ability to pass and process strategic intelligence from EAC to the Division Commander.

Where do we go from here? As professional intelligence men and women, we must get behind this effort for strategic/tactical intelligence interface and make it work at whatever echelon we can affect it. We need to push the development effort to make automation, primarily in terms of software, even more efficient in the transmission of this intelligence. We must continue to stress interoperability and interface with the intelligence systems of the sister services and our Allies so that we have a truly coordinated and mutually supportive intelligence system. We need to push for additional MI officers and NCOs with tactical experience to be assigned to National agencies and programs so that the needs of the Army can be properly articulated and pushed from within. We must stress intelligence training at EAC so that the system works, and EAC personnel have the requisite concern for the importance of their product at Division level. The list could go on and on. What is of paramount concern is that we all approach the subject of national level interface with the same zeal that we tackled the problem of improving organic intelligence support to tactical commanders. We have already crossed the first and highest hurdle, but we cannot rest on our laurels. The subject is much too important to give anything other than our best, collective effort!

In Time of Storm: Revolution, Civil War and the Ethnolinguistic Issue in Finland, by Pekka Kalevi Hamalainen, State University of New York Press, 1978.

I began this book with little knowledge of Finland beyond its geographic location. I found **In Time of Storm** very difficult to understand because of the author's continuous use of words like "ethnolinguistic" and others.

About halfway through the book, I broke down and asked a native-born Finn with whom I share office space for a quick lesson in Finnish history. From this point, the book made a bit more sense.

In 1918, Finland plunged into civil war between factions called Red and White. The Soviet Union supported the Red faction while Sweden supported the White. There were both Finnish and Swedish populations within Finland and, since the preponderance of the Swedish Finns were wealthy and educated, Finns today discussing the civil war are inclined to view it as a struggle between languages rather than between social classes. The author presents this controversy and several other aspects of Finnish life that contributed to the civil war.

As a contribution to the subject of Finnish history and for the serious student of the Finnish Civil War, this is a much-needed book. I, however, finished **In Time of Storm** with the impression that I should have read an introductory text to that nation first.

In Time of Storm is also important as a case study on civil wars promoted and supported by outside interests and for a look at early Soviet foreign policy (although this is not the author's primary purpose).

At the present time, we are seeing the break-up of the bi-polar world with many smaller nations seemingly unaligned. Finland has been able to remain autonomous in the shadow of the Soviet Union while remaining geographically and thus politically within the Soviet sphere of influence.

I would strongly recommend **In Time of Storm** for students of Finland and for strategic intelligence officers or foreign area officers (or anyone) with an interest in Finland and Scandanavia.

MAJ William L. Howard, USAR

How Wars Begin, by A. J. P. Taylor, Ebenezer Baylis and Son Ltd., The Trinity Press, Worchester and London, 1979, 180 pages, $10.95.

A. J. P. Taylor, in his book *How Wars Begin,* has successfully blended important world events with his own insights to provide the reader with a fine narrative of how several major wars in history began.

Taylor describes to the most minute detail the events leading to each conflict, pointing out that wars can be caused by revolutionary politics (French Revolution of 1789 and the Italian Revolution of 1859) or by religious differences, as was the case in the Crimean War. The Crimean War began as a dispute between groups of Jerusalem monks as to who was entitled to the keys to the Holy Christian places. The conflict eventually escalated into a war as a result of intervention by various world powers.

Taylor goes on to show that wars are usually begun as a result of personal or governmental desires for increased power. This is especially evident in the section devoted to Otto von Bismarck, prime minister of Prussia who waged three wars before he was satisfied that progress was being made to unite Germany.

Taylor does an excellent job in dealing with the causes of World Wars I and II. He gives the causes of the wars and, by offering his own interpretations, almost brings the reader into the era.

The final section of Taylor's book deals with causes of the Cold War. He explains "the Cold War ... was a war which was expected to begin but never actually began." Taylor explains that the Free World feared Soviet advances into Czechoslovakia and Poland after World War II. At the same time, American economic aid was strengthening the countries of western Europe. Thus, two opposing fronts, East and West, were formed.

Based upon the United States' nuclear capabilities and with the emergence of the Soviet Union as a nuclear threat, Taylor suggests that the two sides are now governed by a balance of terror featuring the threat of nuclear holocaust.

Throughout the book, Taylor does a fine job outlining the causes of various wars. *How Wars Begin* should be read by all persons interested in finding the causes of various conflicts throughout history.

2LT John Schmidtbauer
Co G, USAICS

Interdiction Planning and Soviet Offensive Operations

by CPT David L. Cooper

Introduction

Interdiction is the destruction by firepower of any enemy line of communication to halt his advance. Because the destruction of one or even all available lines of communication will not halt a determined enemy, however, interdiction becomes, in effect, the application of firepower to disrupt and delay advancing enemy forces. Inflicting maximum damage on an enemy force is contingent upon a proper plan. This in turn depends upon a complete understanding of the effects of friendly weapons and the terrain on the enemy force.

Interdiction and IPB

Effects of terrain have undergone extensive analysis within the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) concept. IPB procedures represent a systematic codification of previously disjoint techniques used to analyze weather, enemy and terrain. New only in its organization, IPB reveals the potential for incorporation into operational planning. The IPB sequence should lead to extremely specific effect analyses and probable target locations which would, in turn, be quite useful in interdiction planning. (See TC 30–27, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield).

Briefly, IPB is a five step process: evaluation of the enemy; determination of friendly areas of interest depending upon echelon and mission; extensive terrain analysis; incorporation of the effects of weather on the terrain and potential enemy operations; and, finally, threat integration.

Until now, terrain and weather analysis have often received short shrift, and threat integration is now far more highly articulated because of the use of doctrinal, situational, event analysis, and decision support templates. A doctrinal template is a graphic depiction of any enemy unit in formation. Adapted to the terrain, it becomes a situational template, and is used to determine choke points, predict the location of enemy units designated as named areas of interest and focus the attention of friendly collection assets on these locations. An event analysis matrix specifies particular activity in these named areas of interest which would confirm or deny projected enemy courses of action, while the decision support template is used to isolate enemy actions inviting or requiring friendly response.

Terrain analysis and threat integration are most obviously applicable to interdiction planning although they cannot be separated from the overall procedure. Terrain analysis results in a mobility overlay while threat integration results in target areas of interest which, if successfully interdicted, will force the enemy to abandon a course of action or to employ unanticipated levels of engineer support.[1]

Figure 1 is a mobility overlay, although engineer symbols have been omitted. Obstacles include slopes greater than 45 percent, dense vegetation and untrafficable soils. Features assisting enemy mobility, such as roads and areas with slopes less than 5 percent are also depicted. These factors reveal avenues of approach as indicated by arrows 1 and 2.

The phase lines within the avenues of approach mark the advance of a deployed force cross-country in equal time increments assuming friendly resistance is sufficient to force deployment but not to retard the advance appreciably. Phase lines thus indicate the overall effect of the terrain on mobility without requiring a host of map symbols. Assuming a deployed formation facing a covering force would probably move about half as fast as this hypothetical formation and a formation in the main battle area half as fast as one in the covering force, these phase lines can be used to predict the future enemy front line traces in the defensive sector. If one increment represents, say, 30 minutes to an unopposed but deployed force, this same increment will represent 60 minutes in the covering force area and 120 minutes in the main battle area.

An Application of IPB

Were a battle to be fought on the terrain in Figure 1, the overlay would indicate the most dangerous avenue of approach (#2), advance rates along each avenue and the best location for resistance. Assuming threat evaluation indicated a Soviet motorized rifle division would cross this terrain, Avenue 1 would be most easily defended and could be more lightly manned, while Avenue 2 would most likely accommodate the heaviest enemy effort: the division main attack. Division fire support would most likely be concentrated along Avenue 2, and the tank regiment would most likely follow the lead regiment down this avenue.

Once this division is forced to deploy, doctrinal

A Soviet offensive effort is vulnerable, but practically speaking, only to a properly planned counterattack. Soviet weaknesses will not manifest themselves without our connivance. We must make them appear.



Figure 1. Mobility overlay without engineer symbols.

templates would be adjusted to fit both avenues with named areas of interest designated where enemy forces would be forced to converge, such as phase line 10 in Avenue 1. Events in these areas would warn of impending enemy actions while phase lines would help coordinate the arrival of friendly forces to interfere with these actions.

Planning

While the application of IPB to interdiction planning is analogous to situational templating, additional factors must be taken into account. Roads, for example, are extremely important targets when considering second echelon forces, although they would not be very useful

when planning for forces in contact.

Road composition and wear figure prominently in interdiction planning. Depending upon composition, roads bear differing finite, though large, amounts of traffic. Engineers can calculate the lifespan of roads in terms of vehicle operations. In the case of improved earth or waterbound macadam surfaces, military traffic quickly exceeds the maximum road surface tolerance.[2] Therefore, if optimal road surfaces like concrete are denied the enemy, he will destroy remaining road surfaces simply by using them and will be forced to employ unusual engineer support to maintain movement along any route.

Interdiction planning should take this into account by projecting the destruction of optimal road surfaces so as to shunt enemy forces onto less desirable ones. As the enemy is forced to use engineers to repair roads, second echelon forces and support elements would be delayed.

Other targetable features on the mobility overlay include ferries, bridges, tunnels and lucrative terrain features. By taking advantage of terrain features and forcing traffic onto winding roads or roads with excessive slope and by destroying roads in front of columns approaching choke points which cannot be bypassed, further disruption and delay are achieved. At phase line 1-10 in Figure 1, the traffic must reverse itself and take another road if the road is blocked. If a regimental column must be diverted to Avenue 2, the division will move with at least three regiments in column, delaying subsequent deployment of the diverted regiment and possibly disrupting movement of two regiments should the diverted regiment emerge on the new road while another is passing.

This suggests the importance of coordination of the interdiction plan to maximize confusion, since interdiction measures have so far been discussed merely as a list of opportunities presented by the terrain.

Roads on the overlay may be evaluated through engineer symbols[3] indicating load-bearing capacity, route constrictions, slope factors, radius of curvature, tunnels, ferries, bridges and so forth. Choke points where roads pass through untrafficable areas are potential points of interdiction. Once these are discovered and designated, it is necessary to take into account what damage the commander wishes to inflict on the enemy, and how to effect it.

The enemy evaluation performed in threat integration will indicate what forces will be involved while terrain analysis shows how these forces will be constrained to move before interdiction commences. The commander must now select which enemy forces he wishes to interdict. Should he choose the leading elements, destruction of interdiction targets would probably be most effective after enemy reconnaissance elements have passed through the target areas.

Observation of the areas may therefore be difficult or impossible, so timing is important. In this case, the situation template and the event matrix would be useful, since the situation template would show the disposition of the march column along the route of march, and the event matrix would delineate the timing of events in the target area as they are expected to occur.

By using doctrinal march rates and column formations in a movement to contact, the event matrix would list expected times of events from the first observation of reconnaissance elements to the arrival of the target elements in the target areas. For example, if reconnaissance elements are believed to be 5 kilometers in front of the column, and the march rate 20 kilometers per hour, the column will enter the target area 15 minutes after the reconnaissance. The timing of the attack can thus be determined, although certain alterations would necessarily be made for any inability to observe the target area.

Where human observation is impossible, remote sensors could be used. An event matrix for another observable named area of interest could also be used and events in the new area would be correlated with events in the target area so that the timing of events in the target area can be estimated.

In order for an attack on an interdiction target to be effective, targeting requires consideration of enemy intentions; the consequent locations of elements in target areas as determined by the situation template; selection of observable named areas of interest; and the designation of events which must take place and expected times of occurrence in the named areas of interest. If predicted events occur at predicted times in the named areas of interest, the interdiction plan can be executed with a high probability of success. If the enemy does not behave as predicted, alternative courses of action will have to be considered.

When the commander elects not to attack leading echelon forces but rather to interdict second echelon and support elements, attention must be given not only to the timing of attacks on given elements, but also to the effects these attacks will have on forces that have already passed through the target areas. In Figure 1, the closure of the road at line 1-10 after one regiment has passed would delay the second echelon regiment, and force it into another avenue of approach as well, thus depriving the lead regiment of its follow-on forces and forcing the division to reconfigure its attack plan.

Planning and timing the attack on the second echelon regiment would be accomplished as would an attack on a lead regiment, although the consequences of the attack would be felt at a higher echelon. The effects of interdicted roads would also be felt in the second echelon. Once again, before selecting interdiction targets and

the timing of these attacks, the commander must consider which enemy echelon he wishes to influence.

Applications to Soviet Offensive Operations

Soviet doctrine advocates an offensive of extraordinary momentum, characterized by rapid attainment of objectives, bypassing of obstacles and continuity of the attack. These features dictate a highly fluid and even chaotic battlefield in any conflict involving the Soviets. While this doctrine is intended to allow Soviet ground forces to seize the initiative and quickly destroy the enemy; its very advantages create exploitable conditions for a resourceful enemy while a variety of Soviet weaknesses and managerial compromises can be used to exacerbate these conditions if the Soviet offensive is well understood.

Their offensive doctrine provides the Soviets with three major advantages. First, Soviet ground forces can achieve considerable mass very quickly. Second, moving at the high velocity called for by doctrine, this mass provides powerful shock. Third, the Soviets have a highly maneuverable combined arms amalgam and a coherent doctrine for its employment. The very maneuverability of this organization will, in Soviet estimation, permit destruction of the



Figure 2. Portion of a division sector, with enemy front line traces anticipated from terrain effects.

enemy with ammunition and personnel expenditures in inverse proportion to the ability to maneuver.

At the same time, our active defense requires early, accurate identification of the major Soviet effort, expeditious lateral movement to block prospective penetrations and sufficient attrition of the attacking force to halt it. Given correct force ratios, this requires perfect execution for an American victory. The Soviet emphasis on speed guarantees that an active defense will be penetrated if the major effort is identified too late, and the shock action of a Soviet assault will force a penetration if the effort is identified incorrectly. Further, if the Soviets attack with an evenly distributed first echelon with the second echelon prepared to exploit success as US forces mass in expectation of a single breakthrough effort, Soviet forces will be exploiting a breakthrough before US reserves can be gathered to face them, because lateral displacement of forces will be rendered impossible by first echelon forces attacking across the defensive front. The infiltration of BMP-equipped infantry forces through difficult terrain could also prove especially dangerous for us as defending commanders normally shift forces out of such terrain to meet traditional breakthrough efforts.

The foregoing implies that the intelligence effort of defending forces is extremely critical and that American commanders must be prepared to stop a fast-moving Soviet offensive which can manifest itself in a variety of forms; and that any opportunity allowing the defender to disrupt the coordination and execution of the attack would be most useful.

Some potentially successful techniques may be discovered through an examination of potential weaknesses of Soviet offensive doctrine and the managerial compromises the Soviets have made to control their offensive organization. For example, Soviet insistence on the rapid attainment of objectives and the continuity of attack means that offensive operations will be conducted at high speed at all times and that decisions to commit the second echelon or mass forces must be made extremely quickly, based on minimal intelligence and rapid consideration of consequences. This implies a vulnerability to deception because decisions will probably be based upon information obtained from forces in contact and on the known locations of defending antitank weapons, armor reserves and artillery. Further, since the Soviets must rely on intricate advance planning to manage and coordinate a huge organization, contingency plans will consist of a series of plans for the commitment of second echelon forces at successive phase lines. This will help the defender predict the disposition of specific Soviet elements over time.

The momentum of the Soviet attack depends on velocity and mass. For maximum momentum, nearly all forces will be forward and moving in the direction of the attack as quickly as possible. US containment of that effort, coupled with a counterblow on the flanks or rear could be devastating. Additionally, high momentum multiplies the effect of command lag (Figure 3).

High momentum multiplies the effects of command lag.



Figure 3. Defensive actions against a Soviet attack result in a new situation that is reported to the command. Counteractions are staffed, ordered and implemented even as subsequent defensive actions create another situation.

Still other aspects of command lag may be exploited: staffing and implementation require more time if defending actions are unexpected, and could cause a complete loss of momentum if such changes occur faster than staff action and movement of forces can compensate for them. Consequently, in order to disrupt the attack, the defender must seize the initiative immediately, rather than wait for attrition of Soviet formations before beginning a counterattack.

Vulnerabilities examined above are common to any high speed offensive effort, but Soviet ground forces have demonstrated a number of weaknesses peculiar to themselves:

> The presence of open flanks of PODRAZDELENIYA will be an ordinary phenomenon in the conduct of an attack along axes under contemporary conditions. The flanks of the combat formation are most vulnerable because the main efforts of troops in the attack are directed toward the front. In case the enemy moves to the flank of attacking PODRAZDELENIYA, he immediately receives serious advantages and can force them to a hasty regrouping toward the flank. However, turning a front toward a flank is a complex maneuver which in addition involves the forced rejection of operations in the previous direction, i.e., the possibility of loss of the initiative. In addition, control of PODRAZDELENIYA under these

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conditions becomes very complex. Consequently, the unexpected attack by the enemy against the flank of attacking troops represents a special danger, and therefore the combat formation must ensure the possibility of repulsing an enemy attack against the flanks, particularly an attack by his tanks.

Sidorenko
The Offensive

His solutions, however, are quite interesting.

> It is advisable, in order to have reliable support for the flanks and to repulse an attack by the enemy, especially his tanks, to have on the flanks as part of the combat formations antitank reserves echeloned nearer to the threatened flank; to have at one's disposal and shift a second echelon to the flank; and when necessary, to allocate forces and means to consolidate captured positions and regions.

Thus, combat formations must be disposed to meet flank threats without diluting the offensive effort to provide heavy flank security, while the second echelon provides security for the rear of the formation. Soviet formations are not prepared to foil strikes to the flanks and rear of their second echelons but remain almost entirely directed toward the front. Flank and rear protection of the Soviet formation depends on the proper positioning of the second echelon. And, if the flanks or rear of the second echelon itself are jeopardized, or the second echelon interdicted and not properly positioned, the entire offensive formation can be in serious trouble.

C. N. Donelly pointed out other weaknesses in *International Defense Review* (Vol 11, No. 9, 1978). Among these are the lack of speedy command mechanisms, including insufficient provisions for warning orders and parallel staffing, model orders for use in predictable contingencies, or standardized order formats to speedily formulate and transmit instructions; the inability of Soviet logistics to provide adequate fuel for pursuit operations; and over-emphasis on speed of execution resulting in flawed implementation. These weaknesses exacerbate the problems faced by an attacker.

Concentration of the main defensive effort in front of the main Soviet force does not capitalize on these weaknesses, but rather simplifies Soviet command and control problems by providing predictable resistance where the offensive is best able to concentrate itself.

Should the defender capitalize on these weaknesses however, he will be able to seize the initiative and the offensive. Limited initiative for the defense gained by effective interdiction of key Soviet second echelon elements should provide sufficient leverage for maneuver exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities.

Predicting Second Echelon Locations

Because Soviet contingency plans will most likely consist of a series of plans for commitment of second echelons at successive phase lines, the flexibility of an attacking Soviet formation lies in the series of options concerning the commitment of the second echelon. Advance planning therefore posits a certain tempo maintained by the timely commitment of second echelons at phase lines corresponding to objectives of successive echelons from battalion through army and higher. At least two additional contingencies would then be introduced to reflect greater or less resistance from the defender than anticipated. Should a given echelon have trouble obtaining its immediate objective, the contingency plan will allow the commander to commit his second echelon early so the attack will not bog down. In fact, the attack will probably not even falter since tempo will be maintained by the infusion of additional attack forces. If the defense presents less resistance than anticipated, the contingency plan on hand will allow the commander to delay the commitment of the second echelon and continue to deeper objectives.

The immediate objective of a second echelon force is the subsequent objective of its parent unit. With this in mind, contingencies for second echelon commitment can be diagrammed (Figure 4).

(Here, Objectives 1–5 represent:)

Table 1

Objective	Description	Distance from FEBA (km) Tank	Motorized Rifle
1	Immediate Regimental Objective	6–8	6–8
2	Subsequent Regimental/ Immediate Division Objective	10–15	10–15
3	Subsequent Division Objective	25–30	20–25
4	Division Mission of the Day	50–60	35–40
5	Army Immediate Objective (3–4 days)	90–130	90–130



Figure 4 represents the approximate disposition of three divisions as the second echelons listed are committed. The force will then carry forward to the next objective line. Thus, the division shown at Objective 4 at the commitment of its second echelon will now move on toward Objective 5. For each second echelon commitment illustrated, the uppermost figure shows the dis-



Figure 4. Contingencies for second echelon commitment.

position of forces if a division meets heavier resistance than anticipated; the center figure, the disposition anticipated in the basic plan; and the bottom figure, the disposition if the division makes greater headway than anticipated. Elements depicted are the forces in contact of the division, the second echelon battalions of the lead regiments (in company columns), the second echelon regiment of the division (in battalion columns), and the second echelon division of the army (in regimental columns).

Note first that the normal formation of advancing elements, until they are actually in contact, is the march column. Second, if the diagram represents three dispositions of an army as respective divisions commit battalion, regimental and finally division second echelons, the resilience given to Soviet planning by phasing the commitment of second echelon elements by objective depths is apparent. By this expedient, an advancing army can accommodate a wide variation in resistance across its front. A counterattack to the flank or rear of units in contact will meet a second echelon regiment of division moving to thwart it. While several theoretical weaknesses exist in a Soviet attack, we cannot expect them to automatically manifest themselves at our convenience. To exploit vulnerabilities, we must create situations where vulnerabilites are exploitable.

The limited initiative gained by effective interdiction of key second echelon elements can provide such a vulnerability, as we will see below.

As we have seen, we can also take advantage of terrain constraints on the Soviet advance by examining the trafficability of the terrain in the defensive sector. Terrain favors the attack where it is most trafficable to the attacking formation. If our resistance to a Soviet attack is uniform across a division sector, as in Figure 2, Soviet advances will be greater where trafficability is



Figure 5. Magnification of terrain factors by maneuver forces strengthening the covering force on Avenue 1, permitting penetration on Avenue 2.

greatest and least where the trafficability is the least, creating an elongated formation for an attacking Soviet army when trafficability is not uniform. Permitting faster penetration where terrain favors the attack and slowing the advance where terrain is most defensible, the attacking army formation is made even more distended, creating a potentially exposed flank, as in Figure 5.

If this flank were exposed in the active defense, we would not have forces disposed to exploit it. Extra forces would have been moved to block the major penetration. By contrast, here we have created an exposed flank by permitting a Soviet advance without using uncommitted and reserve forces to block the penetration. Reserves will remain available to counterattack the exposed flank.

Planning

After deciding where this flank will be, we can identify the second echelon element which will be most dangerously situated with respect to the counterattack. Since it can be located in space and time, it can be targeted.

The purpose of the interdiction effort is not the destruction of this key second echelon element. The interdiction strikes need only delay this element long enough for our counterattacking maneuver elements to position themselves to deal with it. Thus, a carefully planned interdiction program against a specific target for a limited period of time can create sufficient time for a counterattack to be launched into an exposed flank. By containing the penetration rather than blocking it entirely, we will retain sufficient forces for the counterattack.

In a division sector counterattack by a brigade-size task force into the flank of an attacking division, the second echelon regiment of the enveloped division is the key interdiction target. It can be targeted when most vulnerable by tracing it back to its probable assembly areas and planning the strikes that will catch it at its weakest moment. Once it has been delayed sufficiently for a blocking position to hold it off the flank of the counterattack, the interdiction effort can be terminated. Meanwhile, the remainder of the American division must delay in front of the other lead divisions of the army while the lead elements of the enveloped division are attacked from the flank and rear. If the counterattack is successful, a continuation can probably be carried into an even more vulnerable flank of the next division once the strike force has been reconstituted.

The most critical second echelon for any continuation of the counterattack would be a second echelon division of the army. While the American division would not have the organic capability to engage this target division at its most vulnerable, corps would have the necessary weaponry as



Figure 6. Division counterattack in exploitation of an exposed flank. March columns represent enemy second echelon regiments.

well as air sorties. Since the second echelon division must arrive before the lead divisions are defeated in detail, it depends on roads, especially in the initial stages of the march. Thus, corps can take advantage of road trafficability factors the division interdiction planners could not exploit.

Road trafficability can be exploited in two ways. First, if the target division can be forced to march along one major route, the first echelon will probably not arrive early enough to affect the American counterattack. Second, road surfaces have a limited traffic-bearing capacity especially under peak traffic conditions. This trafficability limitation is summarized in Table 2.

This means a tank division in column cannot be accommodated if any portion of the route of march is of bituminous-treated roads. If there is heavy rainfall or a thawing condition, not even two regiments can be accommodated. Thus, by forcing the target division onto one march route, the arrival of the first echelon would be seriously delayed and the final closure of the division would be contingent on the speedy assistance of the engineers.

The corps interdiction effort can also rely on

Table 2
Maximum Number of Tank and Motorized Rifle Regiments without Maintenance

Road Surface	Subsoil Conditions					
	Moist/Dry		Wet/Thawing Sand/Gravel		Clay	
	MRR	TR	MRR	TR	MRR	TR
Concrete, Bituminous	22.1	9.6	14.7	6.4	7.4	3.2
Intermediate Bituminous	11.0	4.8	3.7	1.6	1.5	0.6
Bituminous-treated	7.4	3.2	2.2	1.0	0.6	0.2
Waterbound Macadam, Gravel, Crushed Stone	1.7	0.7	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.05
Improved Earth	1.4	0.6	0.1	0.03	0.1	0.03
Unimproved Earth	0.5	0.2	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01

the delay caused by strikes directly on elements of the target division. Since the corps effort need only delay the target division sufficiently for the continuation of the American division counter-attack to succeed, interdiction by corps directly parallels interdiction by division in this case. The requirement for both programs is to cause disruption and delay; neither is required to produce annihilation or permanent stoppage of the target unit.

Conclusion

Thus, the characteristics of a Soviet offensive can be used against it to permit exploitation of the vulnerabilities inherent in any high speed attack, and of the vulnerabilities peculiar to the Soviets themselves. The high momentum demanded by Soviet doctrine creates potentially vulnerable flanks, which can be exploited through appropriate use of the terrain. Key second echelon elements can be identified, located and targeted to permit a counterattack enough time to succeed. This interdiction effort, since it need only create sufficient delay for our maneuver forces to get into position, is quite limited and can capitalize on all the temporary delays caused by destruction by artillery, route denial by interdiction and road degradation by the Soviets' own traffic. The necessary maneuver forces are not large and can be gathered within a single division by creating favorable conditions for our exploitation rather than using the forces to try to correct an unfavorable situation and delay a little longer.

A Soviet offensive effort is vulnerable, but practically speaking, only to a properly planned counterattack. Soviet weaknesses will not manifest themselves without our connivance. We must make them appear.

Footnotes

[1]TC 30-27, pg. 5–8, for definition of target areas of interest. The circular actually calls for a combined obstacles overlay as the culmination of terrain analysis, this overlay consisting of all significant obstacles in the area analyzed. However, it is useful to include factors which assist the enemy's mobility, such as roads and areas of unusually flat terrain, and it is also useful to consider the effect of terrain on cross-country mobility of deployed forces, which is accomplished by use of phase lines within depicted avenues of approach. The combined obstacles overlay with these additions I have called the mobility overlay.

[2]These figures are approximate, and have been obtained from FM 5-35, *Engineers' Reference and Logistical Data,* April 1971; and FM 55-15, *Transportation Reference Data,* including changes 1-3, February 1968. Calculations are based on the equivalent operating factors of vehicles in Soviet regiments, estimated from FM 5-35, table 6-4, and transformations of highway tonnage capabilities, listed in FM 5-15, pg. 3–67.

[3]See, for example, FM 5-36, *Route Reconnaissance and Classification,* January 1970.

Military Intelligence in History

To prepare for the upcoming battle, "Joshua sent two men into Jordan secretly, saying, 'Go, view the land, especially Jericho.'"

The Chinese philosopher and writer, Sun Tzu, wrote in *The Art of War*, "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear a hundred battles."

Little happened in Rome that Hannibal didn't know about through his system of espionage—he had an excellent information collection system.

In Caesar's time, each Roman Legion of 3,000 to 6,000 men had ten **speculators** assigned to intelligence duties.

Genghis Khan sent agents throughout the world under the guise of merchants and traders.

During the English Civil War, Oliver Cromwell employed a bishop of the Irish Church to collect information on the Royalists through the use of informants and agents.

In Europe during the 1500s and 1600s, 10 percent of the British government's budget was devoted to support embassies and establish informant networks.

General Von Steuben served as Washington's combat intelligence officer during many campaigns in our War of Independence. A product of the Prussian system, Von Steuben provided a great deal of intelligence expertise.

In the spring of 1863, Union Colonel Benjamin Grierson took his regiment 600 miles in 16 days through the heart of the Confederacy. The success of the raid was credited to Grierson's scouts, who were dressed in Rebel uniforms.

After our entry into World War I, Colonel Ralph H. VanDeman, the father of American Military Intelligence, was placed in charge of a newly formed Military Intelligence Branch of the War College Division, the forerunner of today's Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.

USSR-Afghanistan: Perspectives on the Conflict

by Mr. Jim Hansen

This article has been reviewed by the CIA to assist the author in eliminating classified information; however, that review neither constitutes CIA authentication of factual material nor implies CIA endorsement of the author's view.

Author

The conflict in Afghanistan is a landmark episode of counterinsurgency since it involves a direct intervention by Soviet combat troops. As such, the Soviet campaign against the Afghan rebels warrants close study by US specialists. If the Soviets succeed in the major goal of pacifying the countryside, the future role of the Soviet contingent in Afghanistan deserves even more scrutiny.

The Soviet View

In February 1976, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev addressed the 25th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and stated,

"Literally before our very eyes the world is changing—and is changing for the better. Our people and our party are not passive observers of these changes. No, we are active participants in them. The labor of the Soviet people constructing communism and the activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state in the international arena make a worthy contribution to the cause of social progress. Do you not think we should be proud of this?"

When the next Party Congress convenes in Moscow in 1981, what will the Soviets have to boast about in relation to their recent invasion of Afghanistan? Will Afghanistan be labeled as another victory for the socialist camp, or will Brezhnev or his successor even wish to mention it?

Moscow's interests in Afghanistan should be seen in the long term, as this is how the Soviet leadership tends to view world events. The USSR has long considered the country to be of primary importance to Soviet interests. Soviet assistance to Afghanistan began in earnest in 1956, when the USSR supplied MiG-15 jets and other military equipment. Since then, Afghanistan's military forces—now decimated by the conflict—steadily received Soviet military aid and a substantial advisory contingent.

Moscow's "brotherly" aid has since assumed a vastly different form. It is likely that there are not enough Soviet troops now stationed there to pacify the countryside, and many more may be sent in. An eventual upper limit of 200,000 is not implausible, considering they will be operating against rebels supported by an alienated population of 20 million.

Counterinsurgency Experience: Direct and Indirect

Contrary to some published reports, the USSR has substantial experience in counterinsurgency-type warfare, practiced within its own borders. In the 1920s, the Red Army was called upon to crush the Moslem rebellion led by the ***basmachi*** movement in the Soviet Central Asian republics. During the late 1940s, the Soviets faced stiff guerrilla opposition in the western Ukraine as well as in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and particularly Lithuania). In all of these areas, opposition was eventually crushed, often by the combined use of armor, aircraft and infantry troops by the thousands. Unlike the current campaign, these did not threaten to spill over into neighboring countries, and Soviet authorities enjoyed total control of news sources from these areas.

More recently, the Soviets and their allies have encountered continuing armed resistance in areas which had previously been considered victories for the socialist camp. In south-central Angola, the anti-government UNITA guerrilla movement flourishes to this day. In Ethiopia, the Western Somali Liberation Front and the Eritrean guerrilla groups have kept thousands of Cuban troops tied down in a similar manner. Soviet combat troops have not operated in either country, but presumably Moscow has learned something about counterinsurgency in an indirect manner through its military advisers there.

This Type of War

The resistance movements in Africa may well appear to be tame compared with the armed insurgency developing in Afghanistan, where the Soviets must mount a comprehensive effort. If anything, the campaign against the Moslem rebels there should point out to at least some Soviet leaders the great costs (in terms of human and financial resources) necessary to wage an effective counterguerrilla campaign.

The Soviet force currently in Afghanistan, as seen by Moscow's planner, is above all a counterinsurgency force. It has the military mission of eliminating a stubborn and resilient rebel force in the mountains, and also the more symbolic mission of representing a counterweight to the instability in Iran and in other Moslem nations in Central Asia. The symbolic mission cannot be credible to other countries without the successful completion of the anti-guerrilla campaign.

It will be most informative to see how the Soviet forces tailor their operations to fit this type of conflict. The current campaigns will give US specialists an in-depth look at Soviet capabilities for conducting mountain operations. Indeed, Soviet military literature abounds with references to mountain warfare tactics. One may expect to see sophisticated combined-arms operations featuring the joint use of helicopter gunships, fighter-bombers, paratroops and mobile artillery units. The Soviets will attempt to interdict the flow of supplies to the Moslem rebels, and probably will employ ground forces for this task. This will prove to be a most difficult job in view of the terrain which characterizes the long border with Pakistan (the Durand Line of 1893). If the Soviet campaigns against the rebels bog down, Soviet military commanders probably would be tempted to employ air-delivered chemical munitions. Soviet capabilties for conducting offensive and defensive chemical operations are well known, and the USSR's allies have used chemical bombs in similar circumstances: the Egyptians in Yemen in 1967, and the North Vietnamese in Laos in the late 1970s.

Future Prospects and Soviet Goals

The future role of the Soviet contingent in Afghanistan is less certain and more troubling to the US and a host of allied nations. Beyond the current cam-

paigns against the rebels, no departure date for Soviet forces there is foreseeable. Should Soviet troops pull out, the insurgent groups probably would begin to reassume control over the countryside.

Thus, Soviet troops are likely to occupy Afghanistan in a permanent arrangement, as they have occupied Czechoslovakia (with the so-called Central Group of Forces) and Mongolia. In both of these cases, several divisions have remained to form a group of forces which could become a *front* (the largest type of Soviet military formation) or part of a *front* in the event of a major war.

Over the long term, the Soviet contingent may perform as a "pivot" or "swing" force. It could eventually be employed against China, augmenting the substantial body of Soviet troops already garrisoned near the Sino-Soviet border. Depending on future events in the region of the Persian Gulf, it might also operate in concert with the Soviet, Cuban and East German contingents now in South Yemen. Whatever its future role, the Soviet force in Afghanistan is a brand-new element in the equation of this troubled area, a force which did not even exist several months ago.

These developments invariably lead to the larger questions of long-term Soviet intentions, perhaps the key topic on President Carter's agenda. Simply put, the Soviets appear to have an enduring pair of goals in the practice of their foreign policy: protection of the Soviet state, and promotion of Moscow-style communism abroad. In the past, when the two goals were in conflict with one another, Soviet policy-makers have been guided primarily by the first goal, defend the state. The Soviet move into Afghanistan fits well with both goals. Even in this case, the goal of defending the state could have been the predominant consideration, for the USSR has a large and rapidly-growing Moslem population which might be affected by emotional spillover from the Moslem revival taking place in non-communist Central Asia.

Our Need to Know

Among the numerous US foreign policy specialists here, there has been little in the way of a concentrated effort to study the interplay of Soviet and Soviet-sponsored forces in the Third World. The general effort has been inadequate and slow in coming, even though the Soviets have long professed their keen interest in establishing their influence in the Third World. Far more attention has been focused on the more visible elements: Soviet strategic nuclear forces and the Warsaw Pact theater forces in Central Europe. It is essential that US foreign policy specialists expand their general level of effort in response to rapidly-changing conditions in the Third World, where the USSR and its allies have been most active.

To complement this expanded research, Soviet specialists should be looking for new wrinkles in Soviet military doctrine. The buildup of power projection forces (heavy-lift transport aircraft and a family of surface ships) over the past several years is well known to some, and a few Soviet writers have stated how they envision these forces to be used. What is less well known, however, is whether the Soviets are now considering the role of counterinsurgency as a regular mission of their armed forces. Soviet weapons designers have given their forces a number of weapons, such as assault helicopters, which are well-suited for this type of war. But has the General Staff reshaped Soviet military thought and doctrine in a similar fashion?

Symbolism and Perceptions

It may be difficult for some to consider Afghanistan as vital to American national interests, but that country has assumed a symbolic significance which exceeds its actual geopolitical value to the United States. The Soviet Union, it appears, does consider Afghanistan as important, if not vital, to its interests. With the continued presence of Soviet combat troops there, Afghanistan is becoming symbolic to Moscow as well.

Afghanistan is one more example of the differing views of the Soviet Union and the US on a wide variety of topics. These differing views have been colored by mutual misperceptions, and neither country really understands the other much better than was the case in 1933, when diplomatic relations were established.

Misperceptions, as we should know by now, may lead to actions threatening world peace. In 1914, Serbia was another out-of-the-way country where local turmoil drew in the great powers of Europe, each misreading the intentions of the others. The superpowers' current perceptions about one another and about Third World countries are sometimes just as misguided as the perceptions of the European powers before World War I. In the nuclear age, the world cannot afford another Serbia.

The most publicized Military Intelligence activities of World War II were carried out by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). General Alexander Patch, commanding General of the Seventh Army, credited the OSS with providing 60 percent of the intelligence used for the invasion of Southern France.

The importance of photographic intelligence was recognized early in the Korean War. The interpretation of aerial photography was an invaluable source of information for commanders.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, reconnaissance aircraft provided the photographic intelligence necessary to prove the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Vietnam provided the impetus for the continued development of combat surveillance aircraft and many types of sophisticated electronic sensing systems, both manned and unmanned.

Today, computer technology is being used to increase the speed, accuracy, and availability of intelligence data.



The New Red Army

by Stuart L. Koehl & Stephen P. Glick

The following article has been reprinted with permission from ***The American Spectator.*** *While readers might note certain discrepancies that have come to light since its initial publication,* ***The New Red Army*** *is especially appropriate for its analysis of Soviet military operations in Afghanistan.*

Editor

By now, the invasion of Afghanistan has driven the debate over American foreign policy toward an appropriate rethinking of Soviet intentions, but so much so that the political implications of the Soviets' decision to invade threaten to dwarf the invasion itself, as a military event. The two are, of course, inseparable: Concerning the Soviets, the beginning of wisdom about intentions often begins somewhere in an understanding of their military. If for no other reason, this makes the invasion's scenario worth recounting:

On December 24, 1979, the Soviet Union began an around-the-clock airlift of an airborne division into the Afghani capital, Kabul, over 200 miles from the Soviet border. It continued the airlift well into the New Year. Simultaneously, Soviet motorized rifle divisions assembled on the Soviet-Afghan border. In the early evening of Thursday, December 27, the Soviet paratroopers in the city went into action. Explosions sounded in downtown Kabul; government buildings and communications centers were seized. Soviets assaulted the Presidential Palace, where Hafizullah Amin had dug in with a force of loyal soldiers.

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An Afghani armored division, brought to the city by Amin, was immobilized by Soviet advisors, who had solicitously removed key parts from the tanks "for repairs" prior to a planned large exercise. Artillery ammunition had also been collected for the same reason. Middle echelon Afghani officers were all invited to a party by their Soviet comrades-in-arms, who, in the spirit of good clean fun, locked them into the building.

While this was happening in Kabul, the Soviet divisions on the border crossed into Afghanistan and dashed down the major highways in Kabul and Herat, securing these vital routes, including a seven-mile tunnel on the road to Kabul. Throughout Afghanistan, Soviet advisors with Afghani army units assumed their units' direct control and awaited further orders. Soviet soldiers on Afghani army bases and in major cities seized centers of communications and control. By the next morning, the situation was well in hand and the official radio in Kabul announced that "the monster Amin" had been overthrown. The Soviet Union had gained control of the organs of Afghanistan's government by *coup de main.*

The conventional view of the Soviet military machine, like that of the Russian army before it, is of a force both massive and clumsy, its thousands of tanks and hordes of soldiers advancing slowly but inexorably, relying on the sheer weight of numbers, rather than subtle strategems or elegant maneuvers, to achieve victory. Within the United States Army this view of the Soviets as a kind of military "steamroller" is expressed in the new operations manual, FM 100-5. On the offensive the Soviet Army is believed to concentrate three or four divisions on a narrow front, with several more divisions assembled to the rear in a second echelon. Advancing under a tremendous artillery barrage, with possible chemical and tactical nuclear support, the first echelon divisions go right at the defender, taking heavy losses, but also overwhelming the opposition and creating a breakthrough into which the second echelon divisions charge. In short, the machine crushes anything that stands in its way, rather than going around it.

What a surprise, then, was the Soviet *coup de main* in Afghanistan: no great masses of troops, no heavy-handedness. Instead, there was superb planning based upon excellent intelligence and a sophistication in the details of execution that we associate with Israelis and Germans rather than with Russians. The swift seizure of all the key nerve centers (with little actual fighting) accomplished what no mere superiority of numbers and firepower could have: It presented Afghanistan and the world with a *fait accompli.*

Obviously, the Soviet Army is no longer the awkward juggernaut of conventional Western conception, slowly deploying and easily targeted and dislocated, but a war fighting instrument of great flexibility, which moreover has an operational confidence lacking in a good many Western armies. True, the Soviets did have troops in place before the coup, and the Afghani Army was demoralized and enervated by civil war and political dissension, but these facts do not obscure the proficiency and boldness of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.

To demonstrate just how boldly the Soviets have operated, consider that the American armed forces are not only unwilling to contemplate such operations but are totally unable to execute them. The United States, with its present force structure and deployment plans, lacks the necessary amount of long-range airlift and trained aircrews needed to intervene with a speed and strength comparable to that which the Soviets demonstrated in Afghanistan. To deploy appropriately the entire 82nd Airborne Division to the Middle East would take the United States *two weeks*—and this is the American Rapid Deployment Force!

When the Soviets moved into Kabul they faced an Afghani armored division, yet this did not stop the operation as planned. Had similar circumstances confronted American military planners, the ill-fated Operation Market-Garden of World War II might well have come to mind, where British 1st Airborne

dropped next to German Panzer troops and were annihilated. And the analogy would have been justified, since American airborne troops are equipped for all intents and purposes exactly as they were in 1944. The weapons have changed, but the airborne troops are still armed with light weapons, lacking armor and artillery. In contast, Soviet airborne divisions have organic armor, artillery, and transport (such as the BMD light tank and personnel carrier, and the ASU-85 tank destroyer). These weapons give the Soviet division greater firepower and immeasurably greater mobility that its American counterpart. The American airborne division is configured for World War II "drop and hold" operations, not *coup de main*. Soviet divisions are much more flexible, and the Soviets possess sufficient airlift capability to move a division in one day, rather than two weeks.

To engage in *coup de main* operations requires precise intelligence, concerning, among other things, the organization of the enemy's command structures, its forces, leaders, and intentions. The Soviets were able to gather this information because they had an effective *human* intelligence system in place. Should the United States seek to intervene, say, in Iran, it would be operating blindfolded because it long ago dismantled CIA operations in that country. Advanced technology can tell something of the what and where of enemy forces, but only human agents-in-place can supply the all important how, when, and why. The Soviets have such agents—we do not.

Recent operations involving Soviet "advisors" and their Cuban auxiliaries (Angola and Ethiopia) have shown increasing degrees of adventurism, spurred on by the lack of American response. On the whole, these operations do not demonstrate any great skill; aside from expanding Soviet influence into new regions they were militarily unremarkable. The last operation involving substantial numbers of Soviet troops, the 1968 freezing of the Prague Thaw, was marred by massive logistical problems; supply shortages, delays, and traffic jams several miles long. These planning disasters sufficed to convince Western analysts that even if not totally incompetent, the Soviet Army was incapable of handling any but the simplest of operations involving large units.

Evidently the Soviets have been working hard to improve their staff and supply systems, and this reorganization has resulted in an enormous improvement in efficiency. Unlike Czechoslovakia, which has well developed communications systems and a relatively, docile population, Afghanistan is a logistician's nightmare. Yet in this nightmare, in the midst of a civil war, the Soviets have been able to maintain, not an occupation army, as in 1968, but a fighting army of more than 90,000 men.

Above all else the ease and efficiency of the Afghanistan invasion show that the Soviets now relate their operational methods to their opponents. They examine the enemy's strengths and weaknesses, working backwards from these points to develop a strategy and tactics which will circumvent effective opposition. And if this method works in Afghanistan, it is logical to assume that the Soviets are applying a similar approach to the defenses of NATO.

Even so, Western analysts, particularly those in the American Army, have not bothered to reexamine their perceptions of the Soviet Army. They still see the Soviet military machine as knocking down obstacles rather than circumventing them, carrying out a doctrine based on inflexible, blind obedience. This lack of attention to the changes in Soviet methods could have serious consequences for the American forces in any conflict with the Soviets. American doctrines and weapons systems are so carefully tuned to the outdated "steamroller" conception of the Soviet military machine that any deviation from this by the Soviets would completely unhinge our defense capabilities on the day of judgment.

Moreover, the Afghanistan coup has several strategic implications, all of which increase the likelihood of our defenses being tested. First, the success of the coup is likely to increase the strength of that Politburo faction which feels that military force is a useful solution to external problems. Second, the lack of a serious response by the United States can only encourage further Soviet adventures. Third, if Afghani resistance proves more formidable than anticipated, and Soviet efforts at pacification fail, this confidence in the success of Soviet arms could turn to a deep pessimism. This could lead the Kremlin to feel that their "strategic window" is closing more quickly then expected, driving them to desperation measures (much in the same way the Imperial Japanese government felt driven to general war in 1941).

In the short term, the Soviets will gain all of the advantages inherent in the occupation of the Afghanistan salient. They secure yet another section of the Soviet border with the complete subjugation of Afghanistan. They magnify their geopolitical dominance of Asia by their demonstration of willingness to use force, a willingness not matched by their chief rival, the United States. No nation in Asia will be able to engage in foreign (and even certain domestic) initiatives without calculating the response of the Soviet Union first. To the minds of foreign leaders will come images of the Soviet invasion juxtaposed with the dispatch of *unarmed* American F-15s to Saudi Arabia. Which power projects an image worthy of fear and respect. They will not take long to decide.

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Air Forces of the World, by Barry C. Wheeler, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, NY, 1979, 112 pages, $11.95.

The air arms of the world's countries continually attract the interest of both military professionals and aviation enthusiasts. This book has been produced to meet that need.

The author, Barry Wheeler, has a rich background of aviation writing as a former editor of **Flight International** and collaborator on other air power volumes.

Air Forces of the World consists of short summaries on the air forces of more than 120 countries. If the nation has an air arm with its navy, army or a quasi-military organization, it is also briefly discussed. Each country is listed alphabetically for easy reference with no regard to its geographical location or neighboring countries.

Due to the size of this book, most of the summaries are basically thumbnail sketches detailing the current aircraft inventory, strength and missions. The one-year lag time from the acknowledged cutoff date of February 1979 to publication has very little detrimental effect on the value of the book. An addenda with updates on several air forces has been included to provide the most current information.

This book is well-illustrated and reflects most of the major aircraft types in use throughout the world today. It is also indexed by country.

Although this is certainly not the most comprehensive guide to today's air power scenario, its convenient handbook format and compactness will make it convenient for quick, unclassified reference use.

Captain Don Rightmyer, USAF
Office of Air Force History

Strategic Intelligence, Geopolitics, and Afghanistan

by CPT Howard G. Salisbury, USAR

Introduction

Most of the non-communist world was shocked and appalled by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Yet a strategic analysis of the geopolitical situation in Southwest Asia indicated that such an invasion was highly probable. A critical aspect of the strategic situation surrounding Afghanistan must focus on how US actions in Pakistan, Turkey and Iran shifted the balance of power in favor of the Soviets.

Geopolitics is the study of the interrelationship between geography and politics, particularly power politics. Global strategic power theories such as Freidrich Ratzel's "laws of the organic state," Admiral Alfred T. Mahon's emphasis on sea power and Alexander DeSeversky's air power theory have long been a major component of geopolitical studies. This kind of analysis is also an important aspect of strategic intelligence.

The Heartland Theory

One of the most controversial geopolitical theories was espoused by Sir Halfred MacKinder at the Royal Geographic Society in London in 1904. The "heartland theory," although MacKinder used that term only once in his original paper, viewed the world as consisting of three basic regions. The heartland or "geographic pivot" consisted of nearly nine million square miles within the Eurasian core characterized by rivers of internal drainage or drainage into the Artic. The remainder of MacKinder's "world island" (Eurasia and Africa) was the "inner crescent" which included the coastal areas of Asia, Europe and North Africa and the bulk of the world population. The "outer crescent" contained the rest of the world including Britain, South Africa, Australia, Japan and the Western Hemisphere.

MacKinder felt that the great age of naval warfare and power were over and that changing technology, especially the railroad, had altered the relationship between sea and land power. He concluded that the heartland had the greatest potential for world control primarily because the heartland was an immense area (defense in depth) surrounded by rugged mountains, immune from sea power and containing an abundance of resources and climatic variety.

Four primary gateways into the heartland can also be viewed as the primary containment points surrounding the heartland. The Baltic Gateway provides a western entry along the North European plain while the Amur Gateway provides an access route through the Soviet Far East. Two gateways on the southern flank with shorter but more rugged access routes are the Caspian and Khyber Gateways.

A primary limitation of MacKinder's theory at the time was that the heartland was lightly populated and that Russia, Germany and China, the states with the best access or potential control of the pivot, were still fairly weak and disorganized. Additionally, MacKinder did not envision the emergence of air power, although it may actually have reinforced his theory. Such considerations were incorporated in his 1919 and 1943 revisions of his theory.

The world geopolitical situation, especially as regarded the heartland, changed drastically after World War II when most of the heartland came under control of the Soviet Union as the world's newest superpower. Virtually the entire heartland fell under Communist control after Mao's victory in China. The rapid post-war expansion of Communism and threats of world domination precipitated the "cold war."

The containment of communist expansion by any means available was the essential element of the Truman Doctrine, the basic policy of US cold war operations. The Caspian and Khyber Gateways were vital strategic points in the containment process. The Truman Doctrine led to the formation of numerous international and bilateral alliances as the US sought to maximize its presence in that area. The bulk of US involvement and deployment in this region focused on Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, countries having strategic dominance of the Caspian and Khyber Gateways. The critical alliances in this region were CENTO and SEATO. The US poured billions of dollars into these countries. Turkey received more US military aid and arms during the 1950s than all of the Latin American countries combined. This commitment was a major reason why there was little communist expansion in the area in the 25 years following World War II. Only after our presence greatly diminished in the 1970s did the geopolitical balance of power shift.

Pakistan

Pakistan was a unique geopolitical entity because it consisted of two major sections separated by more than 1,000 miles of hostile territory as a result of bitter conflicts with India. Despite serious ethnic, linguistic, historical and economic differences, it was hoped that Islam could provide the cohesion that would hold this fragmented state together.

With more than 80 percent of the total land area, the western portion of Pakistan contained only slightly more than 40 percent of the population. Yet militaristic and politically motivated Pathan and Punjabi tribesman of the west soon usurped political and military control from the pacifistic easterners, making East Pakistan a virtual neo-colony of West Pakistan.

Eighty percent of the national budget and an equal amount of all foreign aid were spent in the west. Eighty-five percent of the civil service and 90 percent of the military were westerners. Per capita income rose 45 percent in the west during the 1960s but only 17 percent in the east. While it produced the bulk of Pakistan's agriculture, the east had only one agricultural college compared to the west's three. The east had four universities while the west had six. The so-called "20 families" of West Pakistan owned 97 percent of the insurance business, 80 percent of banking and 66 percent of industrial production.

The above imbalances led to the escalation of secessionist feelings in the East in the 1960s and the fragile east/west geopolitical balance finally ruptured as the result of: 1) the diversion of eastern funds to western projects in 1965; 2) an attempt by the west to make Urdu, a language spoken by 15 percent of the population, the national language in a country where 60 percent spoke Bengali; 3) mass corruption associated with the distribution of international aid

following a disastrous typhoon in 1969 in the east; and, 4) failure to convene a legally elected parliament in 1970. Strikes, riots and demonstrations broke out in the east and secession seemed inevitable.

The west responded by crushing resistance. Western troops immediately attached Dacca with artillery, tanks and machine guns, torturing and slaughtering professional people and intellectuals. All of the students in one dormitory were massacred at the university in Dacca.

Many of the horror stories of the brutal repressions were reported internationally. In April 1970, US citizens who had been trapped in East Pakistan escaped on a special plane and reported the mass slaughter of civilians. Stories of the total annihilation of villages, rapes, sexual slavery, babies thrown in the air and caught on bayonets were common. A Punjabi (West Pakistan) major was quoted, "There are millions of them and only thousands of us. The only way we can control these people is to scare them stiff."

From the beginning, India made friendly overtures to East Pakistan. India's motives were not all humanitarian, however. For years India had essentially been covered on two flanks by its enemy. To see that country divided and gain an ally at the same time would be invaluable. East Pakistani refugees pouring into India to escape atrocities committed by the Pakistani Army put a great financial stress upon India, but also provided an excuse for Indian intervention. Most of the refugees fleeing to India were placed in refugee camps or guerrilla base camps near that border. Indian artillery was provided to protect the camps and prevent Pakistani troops from pursuing Bengali guerrillas who had been supplied arms, training and advisors by India.

By late November 1970, there were more than 10 million Pakistani refugees in India. As soon as snow made the Himalayan Passes impassable to Chinese troops, Indian artillery and troops stationed near the East became very aggressive and were given permission to pursue Pakistani troops into East Pakistan if attacked. The troops themselves broadened that order and pursued Pakistani troops into East Pakistan on sight. These and other Indian actions put great pressure upon the Pakistan Army and government.

Indian forces finally invaded the East in December 1970 and quickly defeated West Pakistani troops there. Thus East Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh and an Indian ally in early 1971. Facing the new geopolitical balance of power and defeat in South Asia as well as the anticipated emergence of India as a nuclear power, Pakistan embarked on a massive drive to develop a nuclear capability despite vehement US objections. In 1972, the US withdrew nearly all its aid, personnel and equipment from Pakistan.

Turkey

Cyprus has been a critical Mediterranean issue for years. Of its 650,000 people, 530,000 are Greek and 120,000 people are Turkish. Greek Cypriots demanded ***enosis*** or union with Greece while Turkish Cypriots promoted union with Turkey.

Cyprus gained independence from Britain in 1960 after a bloody civil war. The Zurich Agreement held that Cyprus would become an independent republic, and specifically described both ***enosis*** and partition. The Turkish Cypriots were given 30 percent of the posts in the civil service and the cabinet and, initially, 40 percent of the posts in the security forces and the army. The Greek Cyprists were incensed by an accompanying treaty allowing the permanent establishment of a 650-man Turkish army contingent. If the Greek Cypriots resumed their campaign for ***enosis*** or violated the Zurich settlement in any way, the Turks had the military capability to protect their interests and restore the status quo. The Turkish contingent was a perpetual and humiliating reminder to President Makarios that the Turkish community had a protector.

In retrospect, faults in the Zurich agreement seem obvious: 1) it was essentially an imposed settlement; 2) Makarios accepted it under duress; 3) the constitutional machinery it set up was basically unworkable; and, 4) it did not prescribe an effective means of disarming the island.

Civil war flared with sudden ferocity after President Makarios presented his "13 points" to revise the Zurich constitution in November 1963. These alterations were rejected by both the Ankara government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership although most Greek Cypriots wanted the Zurich agreement drastically revised or abrogated. Consignments of arms flowed to the island until the situation reached the flash point.

Cyprus remained an armed camp for more than 10 years with numerous incidents of violence between various factions. The Greek Cypriot National Guard had some 20,000 men and numerous reservists. The Turkish force had between 12,000 and 15,000 controlled by officers from mainland Turkey. With an assortment of medium artillery, light armor, modern automatic rifles, machine-guns, bazookas and mortars, the Greek Cypriots were better armed. The Turks were fairly well-equipped but had little in the way of artillery or armor. The local balance of terror was preserved by the fact that Turkish jets could take off from bases in southern Turkey and bomb the island within minutes. There is little doubt that the Turkish government had contingency plans for such operations. It was significant that when Turkish fighter-bombers attacked Greek Cypriot positions in northwest Cyprus during the height of the fighting in August 1964 there was no challenge from the Greek forces based hundreds of miles to the west. Thereafter, Greek Cypriot military operations were notably more cautious although violence flared again in November 1967 and Turkey again threatened to invade Cyprus.

The tenuous peace ended in July 1974. President Makarios was overthrown as a result of a coup d'etat led by the Greek Cypriot terrorist Nikos Sampson. Sampson was a fanatic supporter of ***enosis*** and there was considerable evidence that the military junta ruling Greece supported the coup. At this point, Turkey launched a military invasion and captured almost half of the island. Soon afterward, the US Congress cut off all military aid and sales to Turkey, thus severely limiting our influence, and presence, in that country.

Iran

After breaks with Pakistan and Turkey, the US virtually had "all its eggs in one basket" along the southern flank of the heartland. That basket was Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran. Our dependence on one person in the politically volatile Middle East is questionable at best, especially because unique characteristics of the Iranian political situation made such a relationship extremely tenuous. The Shah, then 19, was originally put into power as a result of British and Soviet intervention in 1942. He was reinstated after a brief hiatus in 1953 after a successful CIA counter-coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh. While opponents often claimed he stayed in power only because of the brutal suppression of his US-supported secret police, it was the Shah's attempt to modernize his country that proved a major factor in the collapse of his government.

The Shah's "white revolution" was designed to make Iran one of the most modern countries in the world. Unfortunately, modernization alienated conservative Shi'ite Muslims, the middle

class and students. His father and predecessor had long since abolished many feminine dress restrictions and the Shah completed the process by granting full equality to women (including the right to divorce their husbands). The Shah further alienated the Muslim clergy by taking large tracts of land from them during his land reform program for redistribution to more than two million people in 1963. Unfortunately, land reform failed to achieve desired objectives because of rural manpower drains resulting from rapid urbanization. Agricultural failures were a major factor in inflation frequently exceeding 80 percent per year.

It was in the cities that modernization was most obvious. High-rise apartment complexes dominating the skylines of Tehran and other major cities conflicted with the Moslem tradition of privacy in housing. Casinos and brothels were conspicuous parts of the urban landscape. Alcohol and cigarettes were readily available. The presence of tens of thousands of infidels, westerners utilized in the modernization process, offended the Muslims and suggested that the Shah was a US puppet. The Shah spent billions on glamorous but often offensive projects and the military, while 63,000 of the 65,000 villages and towns and much of Tehran had no plumbing or sewers.

The democratically elected parliament had virtually no voice in Iran's government. The Shah's regime was viewed as a totally closed, nepotismic, corrupt group dedicated to the perpetuation of its self-interests by means of terror. Following considerable unrest throughout the 70s in both Iran and abroad, the Shah's regime collapsed and a government very hostile to the US came to power. Thus, after over two decades of active, often aggressive, presence on the southern flank of the heartland, the US was virtually eliminated from that region.

Afghanistan

The Soviet interest in establishing a communist regime in Afghanistan stemmed from the fact that control of that country would place the Soviets 400 miles closer to a centuries-old (Russian and Soviet) dream of obtaining warm water ports. Afghanistan also brings the Soviet Union that much closer to domination of Middle Eastern oil supplies, a major factor in Soviet strategic planning in the wake of petroleum shortages in the USSR. Afghanistan puts the USSR within 300 miles of the vital Straits of Hormuz. As mentioned above, the removal of the US from Turkey, Pakistan and Iran created a geopolitical vacuum in the region. Afghanistan thus became a critical wedge for exerting greater Soviet pressure on southwest Asian states.

Afghanistan is a rugged, arid nation approximately 250,000 square miles in size and characterized by extreme ethnic diversity. Afghanistan's 18 million people can be broken down into 20 major ethnic groups including the Pushtun, Hazara, Uzbek, Tadzhiks and Balucis. Most of these tribal groups, which comprise over 85 percent of the population, are traditionally fierce warriors whose bloody reprisals are a part of everyday life. Afghanistan has been described as one of the poorest and most backward countries in the world with more than 90 percent illiteracy and a life expectancy of less than 40 years. Before 1978, a feudalistic single-family monarchy had controlled it for nearly 200 years. The only apparent common denominator in this fragmented society seems to be a fierce, even fanatic, loyalty to Islam.

Afghanistan has long been a contested area. Greek troops clashed with peoples of inner Asia, and Hellenic culture met Buddhism. Here flowed the eastward tides of Mongol conquest under Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. Persia conquered the country during the 6th century B.C., and has ruled western Afghanistan at various times until recently. Repeated invasions from what is now Soviet Central Asia brought in Tajiks, Turkmen, Uzbek, Kirghiz, and others. Chinese pilgrims crossed the Hindu Kush in the 7th century, bringing Buddhism from India to China. More than five million Afghan people of Aryan stock, commonly known as Pushtuns, live in Pakistan as a reminder of the time when the Mogul dynasty ruled from Delhi.

The 19th century witnessed the gradual approach of the Czarist bear and the British lion. Russian penetration into Middle Asia did not reach the Aral Sea until the mid-19th century or the borders of Afghanistan until the 1880's. Alarmed by this advance toward India, Great Britain sought to bring Afghanistan into her orbit and fought three wars on its territory. After Great Britain ceased to control India, Afghanistan was no longer a frontier of British Empire. Only seldom has a single state occupied what is now Afghanistan, and there has never been anything like ethnic or cultural unity. Loyalty and coherence are still tribal rather than national.

It was not until May 1978 that the Soviet Union was able to accomplish a major breakthrough in Afghanistan. President Mohammed Daoud had come to power in 1973 by assassinating his cousin and brother-in-law. It is difficult to estimate the amount of direct Soviet intervention in the overthrow of Daoud. It is clear, however, that: 1) the subsequent president, Noor Mohammed Taraki was founder (1965) and head of the "Khalq (the masses)" or communist party of Afghanistan; 2) the army and air force carrying out the bloody coup had been trained and armed by the Soviet Union; 3) there were thousands of Soviet advisors in the country at the time; and, 4) the USSR recognized the new regime even before there was an official announcement of the coup.

Taraki was not very successful at imposing communism on this Muslim country. His social reform and land redistribution programs met severe resistance in the form of guerrilla war. It was estimated that guerrilla forces controlled 22 of the country's 28 provinces. In September, 1979 Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin assassinated Taraki and took control. Amin was more radical and unstable than his predecessor and it became clear that communist rule in Afghanistan could not survive without major assistance. In December, 1979, Russian forces entered Afghanistan, removed Amin from power, and replaced him with Soviet puppet Bobrak Karmal.

The outcome of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is still very much in doubt. Many analysts are saying that Afghanistan may prove to be the Soviet Union's Vietnam. Certainly there are numerous indications that this might be the case. The critical factor, however, in terms of strategic intelligence was that the US was virtually powerless to prevent the Soviet intervention.

Summary

The purpose of this article is not to condemn the US for withdrawing its arms and aid from Pakistan and Turkey or for failing to provide adequate support for the Shah. Nor is it to argue that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would not have occurred had a US presence been strongly felt in these CENTO (organization now defunct) countries. It is clear, however, that it would have been far less likely that the Soviets would have invaded Afghanistan had we still been in the region. The critical lesson of geopolitics and strategic intelligence is that the US should have done everything possible to bolster its presence in other parts of the region to counterbalance its diminished presence in the three countries discussed. In other words, we should have considered and worked toward

the establishment of bases in Oman and Somalia long before the hostage situation and invasion rather than afterward. Similarly the US should avoid whenever possible becoming dependent on any one personality in such strategically critical regions.

Although MacKinder's ideas are controversial and outdated, they seem most applicable to our recent problems in Central Asia. It would be wise for strategic intelligence analysts to review MacKinder's ideas as well as those of other geopolitic strategists in the hope of preventing similar problems in the future.

The 485th MID Goes to Sea to Provide Training

What possible useful purpose could an Army reserve intelligence unit serve by spending a weekend training a Navy Seabee unit? This question was considered by many as the 485th Military Intelligence Detachment ventured to Lambert International Airport one weekend last December to instruct a Reserve Naval Construction Battalion Maintenance unit and Seabee Unit 0625 in the organization and mission of MI.

At 0900 a highly confident MI team met the Seabees in their classroom. MAJ William E. Bodden, 485th commander, introduced team members: CW2 Gary Kartye, WO1 Robert Dugger, WO1 Uldis Alks, SFC Richard Amrein, SSG Richard Thevel, SGT Tom Messina, SGT Dave Wright, SP4 John Seper and SP4 Ralph Tharp.

Major Bodden began instruction with map reading. Grid coordinates, map orientation, azimuths and back azimuths, bisection and resection, contour lines, terrain features and map legends were explained. WO1 Alks continued instruction with a detailed account of the Universal Transverse Mercator system dividing the surface of the earth into zones and was in turn followed by SGT Wright explaining electronic warfare: what we can do to the enemy and what the enemy can do to us electronically. A discussion of signal security and jamming techniques was included.

CW2 Kartye briefed the class on counterintelligence and its function. Many Seabees had thought CI dealt solely with spying, but Mr. Kartye shattered previous misconceptions by explaining how CI could help them with security procedures.

At 1600 class adjourned to the local NCO Club for an evening of food, drink and unending conversation.

At 0900 Sunday, instructors and students were again assembled for the day's classes.

CW2 Kartye took the podium to explain how the Seabees should deal with captured soldiers. SSG Thevel then discussed how a prisoner of war should be treated in order to aid the MI interrogator in securing timely information. Of course no interrogator would talk to a prisoner until he had been thoroughly searched. SSG Thevel and SFC Amrein demonstrated a "strip" search with the assistance of a volunteer from the Naval unit. Items found on the "prisoner" included a wide variety of knives and documents.

WO1 Dugger then reviewed what occurs in an analysis and production shop, providing a demonstration of the process in action. SP4 Seper handled incoming messages; SFC Amrein logged the messages in the journal; SSG Thevel plotted enemy locations on the situation map; and SP4 Tharp served as section chief, overseeing the entire operation.

Next, a discussion of IPW techniques was led by CW2 Kartye. Since the day was winding to a close, the Seabees thought classes were ending. They were wrong! The next person entering the room was a "real" prisoner of war (played to perfection by WO1 Arks). SGT Wright began interrogating the belligerent soldier without success; he called upon his "enforcer," the Bear (SFC Amrein), who proceeded to intimidate the prisoner. After the enforcer was removed from the room, SGT Wright questioned the prisoner with considerable success.

But the 485th had one more surprise. The prisoner returned, belligerent as ever. SSG Thevel tried to interrogate him without success and an irate civilian (SP4 Tharp) barged into the room claiming the prisoner had committed an atrocity against a member of his family and proceeded to throw the POW on the floor. With great difficulty the civilian was removed from the room; unaware that he had been set up, the prisoner gratefully answered the interrogators questions. The MI team then explained that this established identification approach can be useful with certain prisoners in special situations.

In the short discussion that followed, everyone agreed the weekend had been helpful to all. The Seabees had learned how MI functions and how it can help them accomplish their mission while the MI team learned a great deal about Navy customs, traditions, dress, appearance and mission.

SSG Rich Thevel
485th MID

Editor:

We have just received the January–March 1980 issue of MI Magazine and were delighted to see the publication of our article on The Foreign Area Officer Program/Reserve Component.

We thank you for the opportunity to inform your readers of the program and as a result expect an influx of applications from MI officers. Requests for additional information should be forwarded to:

RCPAC
ATTN: AGUZ-PMF (MAJ Troche)
9700 Page Boulevard
St. Louis, MO 63132
693-7425 (Autovon)
314-263-7425 (Commercial)

You might be interested in knowing that since writing the article membership in the program has more than doubled and utilization tours for FAO/RC officers are expanding.

A. TROCHE
MAJ, GS
FAO/RC Program Manager

Vehicle Recognition Quiz



902d MI Group Soldier of the Year

MG Edmund R. Thompson and SP4 Kathleen A. Scoggins, 902d MI Group Soldier of the Year.

The first annual 902d Military Intelligence Group Soldier of the Year competition was held on 9 April 1980.

Five soldiers competed for the honor: SGT Kevin M. Bolk of Security Support Battalion, Fort Meade; SP5 James T. Adams of USAINSCOM CI Detachment, the Pentagon; and, from the CI/SIGSEC Support Battalions, SP4 Deborah A. Roe, Fort Meade; SP4 Kathleen A. Scoggins, Fort Sam Houston; and SP4 Cindi R. Richards, Presidio of San Francisco.

Following the competition, a banquet was held at the Fort Meade NCO Club in honor of the candidates. If the candidates had difficulty eating their meal, it was because they did not then know who had won. CSM John Dunford, 902d Military Intelligence Group, finally announced that SP4 Kathleen A. Scoggins, a signal security specialist assigned to the Fort Sam Houston Field Office since June 1977, was the first 902d Military Intelligence Soldier of the Year. She received an engraved desk set and a Certificate of Achievement from the 902d Military Intelligence Group Commander, COL Arion N. Pattakos.

The following day the five candidates toured Washington, D.C., beginning with the White House and also visiting the Washington Monument, one of the Smithsonian Museums, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and other landmarks. They then went to the Pentagon for a visit with MG Edmund R. Thompson, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. MG Thompson praised all the candidates for becoming soldiers of the year for their respective units. The day in Washington ended with a guided tour of the Pentagon.

SFC Philip J. McKeon
PAO, 902d MI Gp

(continued from page 9)

tion, perseverance and a high degree of professional knowledge, events of the next 10 years will place an even greater demand upon the human element in the intelligence analysis process. In a world where political, social and economic instability and conflict of all sorts may become more widespread, the likelihood of US military forces being engaged to defend interests considered vital by our national leaders may also increase. To assist those responsible for such decisions, the intelligence analyst is critical, as one upon whose judgment and recommendations peace or war may depend. This 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week, year-round task cannot be taken lightly:

"Peace is not only better than war, it is infinitely more arduous."[2]

Footnotes

[1]Phillip Windsor, "The Soviet Union in the International System of the 1980s," *Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s: Part II (Adelphi Papers*, No. 152; London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), p. 4.

[2]Craig Ladwig, "Hardhearted Altruism Beats Wholehearted War," *The Kansas City Star*, February 17, 1980, p. 4E.

US Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, MA, "Instructor of the Year for 1979" Sergeant First Class Lynn J. Woodard is congratulated by Brigadier General Thomas J. Flynn, Deputy Commander for Intelligence, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Arlington Hall Station, VA, as Colonel Stanley G. Kozlowski, USAISD Deputy Commandant looks on. SFC Woodard was awarded the Army Commendation Medal for his work as an instructor at USAISD.

Finalists in the US Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, MA, "Instructor of the Year for 1979" competition and their "support." From left to right: Sergeant First Class Charles E. Cline, second runner-up, and his wife, Zandra; Mrs. Linda Mohr and Sergeant Bradley E. Mohr, first runner-up; Sergeant First Class Lynn J. Woodard, winner, and his wife, Karen. (US Army photos by PFC Bill Hrusth)

Intelligence School, Devens Instructor of the Year—1979

Sergeant First Class Lynn J. Woodard has been named the US Army Intelligence School, Devens, "Instructor of the Year for 1979."

In a ceremony held on April 7, 1980, SFC Woodard was presented the Army Commendation Medal, a trophy, and a special name tag by Brigadier General Thomas J. Flynn, Deputy Commander for Intelligence, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Arlington Hall Station, VA.

SFC Woodard is currently assigned to the Intelligence School as Senior Instructor in the Military Science Branch, Electronic Warfare/Cryptologic and Security Department, Directorate of Training (DOT). He was cited for his "ability to impart military skills and knowledge and his success in developing innovative instructional strategies" while serving as an instructor at the Intelligence School.

First and second runners-up were Sergeant Bradley E. Mohr and Sergeant First Class Charles E. Cline, respectively. SGT Mohr is an instructor in the Processing Branch, Operations Division, Communications Intelligence Department, DOT. SFC Cline is a Master Instructor assigned to the Lecture/Advanced Training Branch of the Communications Intelligence Department, DOT.

This ceremony, the Charles H. Hiser Award Ceremony, is named for Colonel Charles H. Hiser, a former Commandant of the United States Army Security Agency Training Center and School (now USAISD).

COL Hiser served as Commandant of the Training Center from August 1958 to June 1960. During that period, he initiated a number of training innovations, most notably the modernization of the Training Center's Automatic Data Processing systems.

The award was established to bring recognition to the Intelligence School's outstanding classroom instructors. Each month an instructor is chosen as "Instructor of the Month" in competition against all other classroom instructors in the Intelligence School. The

monthly selectees then compete for the annual honors with final selection made by a committee of representatives from the Directorate of Training Development, Directorate of Evaluation, and the Chief of Staff, USAISD.

Presentation of the award began in 1960 and, except for the period from 1964 to 1969, has taken place annually.

Colonel Alfred E. Spry

Cited by Spain

The "Cross of the Order of Military Merit, 1st Class, with White Distinctive" has been presented to COL Alfred E. Spry, School Brigade Commander, United States Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, MA.

Special guest for this prestigious occasion was Don Fernando Perpiña-Robert, Consul and official representative of the Spanish government, from the Spanish consulate in Boston.

Don Perpiña-Robert presented the award on behalf of the government of Spain, commending COL Spry for his outstanding work in support of United States-Spanish cooperation.

COL Spry came to the Intelligence School in 1979 from an assignment in Madrid, Spain, where he held the position of United States Co-Chief, Intelligence Division, United States-Spanish Coordination and Planning Staff. He was awarded the "Cross of the Order of Military Merit" in recognition of the "services and merits demonstrated" while serving in that capacity.

The "Cross of the Order of Military Merit" is one of the highest honors awarded by the Spanish government to oustanding members of the armed forces. The award was established by Queen Isabella II of Spain on August 3, 1864. It was designed as an award for individual merit for the officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted soldiers of the Spanish army.

Spanish Consul Don Fernando Perpiña-Robert presents the "Cross of the Order of Military Merit, 1st Class, with White Distinctive" to Colonel Alfred E. Spry, School Brigade Commander, US Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, MA. (US Army photo by Michael Hass)

Training Device Development

by 1LT Tim M. Kop

Introduction

The development of training devices for military personnel is more complex than generally supposed. A number of requirements must be met before a final product emerges—when and if such a product is considered "final." These requirements are dictated by the logic of research and development (R & D), especially in the case of educational products. A variety of individuals, units and organizations within the military can, and are sometimes required to make contributions to the development of a training device.

Primary Responsibility for Development

The US Army Combined Arms Center, as the TRADOC OPFOR proponent, is responsible for program management for life-cycle development, production and distribution of OPFOR training devices. As the proponent, it must first analyze training programs to determine what training device requirements (TDRs) exist or might be anticipated. Once a TDR has been established, the proponent conducts or coordinates a number of other functions.

These functions include the development of a unit basis of issue and a priority-oriented system for Army-wide distribution. But first, the Center must plan, program, coordinate funds, and manage the entire life-cycle development, production and distribution process. It is necessary to coordinate with the proponent Training and Audiovisual Support Center (TASC) for the purpose of development, testing and validating of prototype devices.

The development of such hardware has other facets. Ancillary activities involve "soft" matters. For example, the office must prepare a statement-of-need document explaining why a device is necessary and describing how it will support a training program. This document must then be submitted to TASC for review prior to development of any prototype device. Along with the statement-of-need, a proposed distribution plan must be submitted to TASC. Finally, the proponent must develop any user instructions and logistics and maintenance support manuals deemed necessary.

Identification of a Gap

Training gaps may be identified in a training program, weapon system or course of instruction. Identification can be made by individuals, units or various agencies of the active Army, USAR, ARNG or ROTC.

The broad spectrum of identifying sources reflects the fact that problem identification often in the least formal phase in the development of a training device. This is probably because problems or gaps arise without warning anywhere in the Army.

Submission of a TDR Proposal

Once a gap is identified, it is considered in terms of training device requirements. This includes statements of the problem and the proponent's proposed solution. A proposal for a TDR can be submitted in any format that clearly conveys the ideas of the originator. Since any number of individuals or agencies may identify the gap, the original ideas of those most directly experiencing the problem are used to the fullest extent possible in the preparation of the proposal. The completed proposal is then submitted to TRADOC for evaluation.

With identification of a training void, the proponent conducts an examination of all training media that could possibly fill the void: literature, audiovisual aids, or training devices. If a new device is found necessary, the proposal must justify its selection and describe its anticipated use.

At this point it becomes necessary to determine how the device would fit into the total training program by developing a training concept outlining how, where, by whom, and for what purpose the device is to be used. Purpose is particularly important and should be specified according to tasks to be taught and individual standards of performance required on completion of training.

The proposal must include an examination of practical considerations involved in the procurement of a new device such as the complexity of acquisition, costs and distribution. Cost questions are also addressed within the cost and training effectiveness analysis (CTEA). The proposal must also suggest how the device can be procured: 1) through DARCOM in a formal development cycle, or 2) through TRADOC and a simpler, lower per-unit cost method.

Preliminary CTEA

Along with the TDR proposal, the preliminary CTEA must be considered part of the initial concept phase. Conducted in coordination with appropriate headquarters, the CTEA also documents the cost and training effectiveness of training device alternatives within a training program. Although the proponent is responsible for development of the CTEA, the task of development can be contracted out or conducted by a command studies program or TRASANA. When one of these alternatives is chosen, the proponent must schedule the project at least one year in advance so it can be included in the appropriate budget cycle.

While such an analysis should be brief, it should provide an estimate of the potential training effectiveness of the device and a cost ceiling for its acquisition and use. Data collected in the first developmental and operational tests will also be included. Such data is essential to the conduct of additional effectiveness analyses. Comparable data will be used for each effectiveness analysis so that comparisons can be made between various alternatives.

The first update is based on data derived from developmental and operational tests (DT/OT I) done on brassboard models of alternate devices. A brassboard model or configuration constitutes an experimental device or group of devices used to determine feasibility and accumulate technical and operational data. Such a device can be used outside the laboratory; while it may resemble the end product, it is not intended for use as such. While the preliminary CTEA provides an initial projection of costs and effectiveness, succeeding CTEAs carried out on brassboard models provide data that more closely corresponds to actual use and which provides more realistic estimates.

Based on the above analysis, the

various alternative devices tested are accepted or rejected. Maximum effectiveness at a given cost or minimum cost at a given level of effectiveness might be chosen but not both. If a given level of effectiveness is sought, one training device can be chosen for its lower cost among alternative solutions. Because the TDR proposal specifies levels of performance desired, minimization of cost at a given level of effectiveness often serves as the criterion for selecting a training device.

In the CTEA, the proponent must develop the study plan; acquire the necessary data for the training effectiveness analysis; develop and analyze the data; and, if the study is contracted, produce the statement of work, conduct the contract negotiations and provide a technical representative.

The Concepts Formulation Package

Once a training device has been selected, the materiel developer and training developer generate a concepts formulation package (CFP). Tests and evaluation are conducted to estimate potential utility; the likelihood that the learner will apply the lessons learned in a variety of situations; operational effectiveness; operational suitability; supportability, or the ease of deploying the device; and humanistic applicability —or the degree to which the device encourages the development of the learner's potential.

On completion of the CFP, the proponent calls a meeting to determine "where we are" and "where we are going." All those involved in the proponent's efforts should attend. Various decisions are made concerning a requirements document and milestone, a contract award milestone (where appropriate) and various other issues. After the meeting, the proponent informs the development community of the course of action chosen.

Regardless of origin, TDRs are prepared to help resolve any training problems warranting the expense of fielding a separate device. But every TDR must specify the training problems to be overcome through use of the proposed device.

Acquisition or Fabrication

Training aids and devices required locally may be fabricated or procured by the training aids centers (TACs). TRADOC has the responsibility for supervising a TRADOC TAC, and reviewing and evaluating all training aids and devices used worldwide, whether fabricated locally or procured by the TAC.

The TAC is responsible for the design, procurement, or fabrication of all three-dimensional training devices. Devices are categorized by their cost. The estimated cost may be less than $500 or less than $50. In the first instance, costs are not contained in standard authorization documents and no research, development, test and evaluation (RDTE) funds are required although devices fabricated or procured under these provisions must be shown to respond to a bona fide training requirement. Devices costing less than $50 may, on the other hand, be classified as expendable or returnable, and need not meet the same stringent requirements.

For acquisition of low-value training devices, an alternative, abbreviated procedure is available: the TDLR is prepared and authenticated jointly by the combat/training developer (TRADOC) and by the materiel developer (DARCOM). Low-value items are obtainable at low unit cost and involve low risk in development or commercial acquisition. Budget expenditures may be characterized in one or both of the following ways: 1) total RDTE expenditures will not exceed $2 million; 2) Other Programs Army (OPA) costs will not exceed $3 million for any one fiscal year, or $15 million for a five-year program period. Because the procurement entails relatively low cost and development risk, life-cycle management of such a device is abbreviated, normally beginning with engineering development and permitting early fielding of the device.

TRADOC-acquired devices are those that are required for Army-wide distribution to support a proponent service school training program. These devices are either procured commercially or fabricated within TRADOC facilities using operation and maintenance, Army (OMA) funds. TRADOC-acquired devices are simple, no-risk, low-cost items requiring no formal research or development. Development of these devices should parallel materiel acquisition guidelines established by DOD and DA.

A significant factor differentiates TRADOC and DARCOM acquisition of devices. The former involves total TRADOC funding, management, development and coordination, allowing a compressed acquisition cycle. In TRADOC acquisition, devices may be provided through three alternative methods, dictated by considerations of complexity, volume, and cost:

- Under commercial contract, through off-the-shelf procurement or fabrication. (DARCOM channels may be used for contracting.)
- Under fabrication by a Training and Audiovisual Center within the TRADOC TASC system. The US Army Training Device Agency (USATDA) may provide assistance in research, development and device procurement. A subordinate activity of DARCOM, USATDA is located at the Naval Training Equipment Center at Orlando, Florida.
- By using drawings for Army Training Aids (DATA). These include mechanical drawings and related information describing devices that can be fabricated by user units or supporting installation facilities.

INSCOM Guarantee

Soldiers in grade E-6 and below may now reenlist for a guaranteed assignment to the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) under a revised reenlistment option.

Interim Change I08 to AR 601-280–Army Reenlistment Program–authorizes the option named INSCOM and Electronic Warfare/Cryptologic Units and Training Activities Reenlistment Option.

The revised option in turn authorizes: school training in any MOS needed by INSCOM; guaranteed assignment to INSCOM or EW/Crypto activity; a 16-month stabilized tour in all but overseas short tour areas; availability to grades E-6 and below regardless of years of service; reenlistment based on a preliminary security clearance by the local installation security officer.

The last provision is significant because it eliminates the necessity for the final security clearance of the applicant previously required before enlisting in military intelligence MOS' and minimizes the administrative workload for reenlistment NCOs.

Soldiers interested in applying for this reenlistment option may get complete details by visiting their local Re-Up offices.

Professional Reader

Cuba, Order and Revolution, by Jorge I. Dominguez, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1978, 683 pp. No price listed.

Cuba, Order and Revolution shows intensive research and insight of understanding into the ways of a country which is mysterious to the outside observer. Having lived his early life in Cuba, the author held a deep rooted passion for the subject of this book. Because of his personal involvement with his homeland and the lasting impressions this made upon him, Dominguez knew his own biases and confessed them to the reader at the onset:

> Awareness of my ideological framework may be important in judging the information offered ... I agree with the policies of the current Cuban government and others where I disagree ... I am a partisan neither of the Cuban government nor of its opposition; I have never belonged either to an organization seeking to overthrow the government (of Cuba) or to one supporting it.

Once the ideological alignment of the author is understood, **Cuba, Order and Revolution** reads like a masterpiece of political intrigue. Dominguez craftfully divides Cuba's recent history into three major periods. The first period begins with Cuba's independence in 1902 and ends with Gerardo Machado's rule in 1933. The second period lasted from 1934 to 1958 with the rule of Batista. The third period began with the 1959 emergence of Fidel Castro. Each period is portrayed by means of describing the internal political power and forces affected by international affairs as influenced by special interest groups, mass organizations and the military establishment.

This scholarly text is very well-documented with footnotes, extensive bibliography and an excellent indexing system which allows the reader to easily and quickly locate any topic or personality. (i.e., beliefs and values; Central Intelligence Agency ... and assassination plots; Soviet Union; terrorism; US Army; or Ramiro Valdés.) Very little went to chance during the research and ultimate publication of Dominguez's work.

If it concerns Cuba, it's in this book!

Consider **Cuba, Order and Revolution** as one of the most comprehensive, up-to-date studies on Cuba in print and highly recommended reading for any political or social scientist or military affairs enthusiast.

CPT Keith K. Kalman
CI/SIGSEC SPT Bn, INSCOM

Battle of Britain: The Hardest Day by Alfred Price, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1980 232 pages, $14.95

The Battle of Britain was one of the hardest fought air battles of the Second World War. Every day saw men and machines take to the air; many never retured to their bases. Author Alfred Price singles out 18 August 1940 as the hardest day of the Battle of Britain.

On 18 August, both Germany and Britain sustained their largest losses of any given day during the battle. The Germans lost 69 aircraft while the British lost 68 as a result of the German decision to destroy Britain's Fighter Command in order to gain the air superiority necessary to launch the invasion of Britain.

Price begins this book with a listing of "who had what" on each side of the contest. While this section of the book is difficult reading because it concerns itself with numbers of aircraft and the deployment of air units, it is effective in setting the stage for the rest of the book.

The ensuring chapters of **The Battle of Britain: The Hardest Day** read like a novel, aided by Price's use of the human point of view. His liberal use of first-person accounts of what the crews of the individual planes were doing and thinking during the day's fighting is very worthwhile. Price also includes the thoughts of civilians who were in the area of conflict during that time.

This is a refreshing technique for presenting history. By using this style, Price has written a very readable history that will interest the casual reader as much as the air war historian.

With **Battle of Britain: The Hardest Day,** Price reaffirms his place as a leading air war historian.

2LT Robert P. De Coulaz, Jr.
Co G, USAICS

FIRST STRIKE by Douglas Terman. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1979. 368 pages, endpapers. $10.95, hardcover.

This novel is about a Soviet plot to initiate nuclear war with the United States. A complex and intriguing storyline, competent writing, and liberal doses of love interest, violence, and fast action make for a few hours of intense reading. It is what I call an "airplane book"—just right to while away the time on a long flight.

William S. Hanable
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Typhoon and Tempest at War, by Arthur Reed and Roland Beaumont, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, NY, 176 pages, $14.95.

Based on two of the most innovative fighter aircraft produced during World War II, Arthur Reed and Roland Beaumont have combined efforts to tell the tale of the Typhoon and Tempest fighters. Both Reed and Beaumont are well-qualified as authors of this work. Reed was appointed Air Correspondent for *The Times* in 1967, while Beaumont was involved with Typhoon and Tempest fighters as a test and combat pilot.

The authors first deal with the Typhoon fighter as it was introduced at the start of World War II in Europe. Throughout the book are photographs, diagrams and accounts of personal experiences associated with the deployment of the Typhoon fighter which was designed to surpass the capabilities of the then-powerful Hurricane and Spitfire fighters. In the first several chapters, Reed and Beaumont take the reader through the design, manufacturing and testing of the Typhoon fighter. In subsequent chapters, the authors present specific achievements accomplished by the Typhoon squadrons in vivid detail.

The second part of the book deals with the Tempest fighter in a format similar to that of the preceding chapters. At this point, the book becomes

more of a restatement of its first several chapters just as the Tempest was a refinement of the Typhoon.

The authors' interest in the war against the German V-1 rocket bomb is due in part to Beaumont's service during World War II. He shot down 32 V-1s in his Tempest. The authors take pride in recognizing the importance of the Tempest in the war because it was one of the few fighters capable of out-maneuvering the V-1. As such, it was vital to the Allied arsenal.

Typhoon and Tempest at War is a noteworthy effort. It informs the reader of the trials and tribulations of fighter design and deployment during World War II. I recommend the book to all who are interested in World War II and the development of aircraft throughout history. Happy landings.

2LT John Schmidtbauer
Co G, USAICS

A-20 Havoc At War, by William N. Hess, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, NY, 1979, 128 pages, $17.50.

The Douglas A-20 (called both Havoc and Boston) served honorably in all theaters of operation during World War II while its successor, the Douglas A-26 Invader, fought in Korea and both the French and American wars in Southeast Asia. Designed as a light bomber while war clouds gathered over Europe in the late 1930s, the A-20 served a variety of missions besides bombing including reconnaissance, night fighter and intruder. It has few inherent faults and the crews who flew the A-20 grew to love its capabilities.

William N. Hess, a noted aviation writer, has produced this saga of the A-20 and A-26. Largely an illustrated account, the author has contributed a small amount of narrative to draw the story together. The remainder of the written material is a collection of first-person recollections by the men who flew the planes in action.

While the collection of photographs and individual accounts is excellent, it is regrettable that Mr. Hess did not choose to include any coverage of the B-26's role in the counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam. He also provides little developmental history or details about the different duties and positions on board the aircraft.

The **A-20 Havoc At War** is one of several volumes published by Scribner's in their series on aircraft at war. It will be of value primarily to aviation enthusiasts and aircraft modelers.

Captain Don Rightmyer, USAF
Office of Air Force History

IRAN:The Illusion of Power by Robert Graham, St. Martin's Press, New York, 272 pages, $5.95, 1979.

This is an excellent book which provides a quick overview of Iran. The book's publication is timely, especially after the Shah's visit to New York gave Iranian students an alleged excuse for occupying the US Embassy in Teheran.

The book's flavor is indicated by some of its chapter titles: Monarchy and Pahlavi Dynasty; Limits to Oil Wealth; Use and Abuse of Power; Influence of the Military; and Opposition and Revolution. As can be seen, Graham's book covers current and controversial topics.

A chapter discussing Iran's military position and forces is of special interest. Here Graham looks at the 1968 British phase-out of its military role in the Gulf, plus American interest in the area. As an oil producer, Iran is concerned with the Straits of Hormuz because the country lacks overland pipelines. This chapter is especially interesting as it covers such topics as the Kissinger-Nixon strategy; F-14 Tomcat Fighter vs the MIG-25; technical capacity of Iranian military to use complicated arms/equipment, and James Schlesinger's concerns over the large in-country American presence.

The role of SAVAK and the Pahlavi Foundation, both areas of complaint by student occupiers of the US Embassy, are also covered in the book.

A detailed bibliography can be found at the end of each chapter. Graham references a large number of newspaper/magazine articles and personal interviews.

Graham's book is well-balanced. He presents Iranian culture with its ethnic composition and heritage; and the economy both before and after oil. He ties in religion and its ayatollahs. It is must reading for the intelligence professional.

John M. Rooney
MAJ, INF
Resource Analyst

In addition to reviewing books of interest to military intelligence personnel, *Military Intelligence* plans on reviewing, on a continuing basis, articles of intelligence interest from publications worldwide. These articles should be readily available to our readers through post or community libraries.

Retention: The Pressure is On, by Captain James F. Kelly, Jr., U.S. Navy, *United States Naval Institute Proceedings,* April 1980. While Captain Kelly studies the retention problem from the Navy's point of view, his observations are clearly appropriate throughout the United States Armed Forces today. Captain Kelly explores current Navy "tactics" in retention, the myths underlying them and offers suggestions to commanders interested in maintaining both quality and quantity in the ranks.

✶

The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola, by Jiri Valenta, *United States Naval Institute Proceedings,* April 1980. Dr. Valenta considers the Soviet role in Angola to have indicated "a road to Afghanistan" four years ago. Valenta discusses Soviet reasons for intervention in Angola such as the need for another port and for greater proximity to the Cape of Good Hope and increased opportunities to disrupt the flow of oil to the United States and Western Europe. The article is adapted from Valenta's contribution to the book, **World Communism at the Crossroads: Military Ascendancy, Political Economy and Human Welfare,** due to be published in 1980.

✶

What Electronic Warfare does is Add Confusion to the Battlefield, by LuAnne K. Levens and Benjamin F. Schemmer, *Armed Forces Journal International,* February 1980. Dr. Gerald P. Dineen, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, is interviewed regarding the past performance of strategic communications and present-day problems within the communications and intelligence field.

✶

How to Fight Helicopters—Soviet-Style, by CPT Carl E. Daschke, *US Army Aviation Digest,* January 1980. This article, based on doctrine taught by Colonel M. Belov of the Soviet Union, discusses trends in anti-helicopter tactics. How *does* one fight a helicopter? Use another helicopter as an interceptor.

Terrorism: Countering the Threat in USAREUR, by CPT Edwin C. Partridge, *Air Defense Magazine,* October–December 1979. Terrorism is a continuing problem and a timely one for discussion. CPT Partridge explores the history of terrorism, the problems it raises and preventive measures.

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Psychological Warfare, by SSG Richard D. Page, *Air Defense Magazine,* February 1980. What do 300 trumpets and torches have in common with air-dropped leaflets? Both offer examples of psychological warfare. Page's article defines psychological warfare and gives examples of its use in the present day from a historical perspective.

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Sixth Annual Soviet Aerospace Almanac, *Air Force Magazine,* March 1980. Air Force Magazine presents an excellent anthology of articles exploring Soviet foreign policy, strategy and decision-making. Also included is a series of identification pictures featuring Soviet aircraft, missiles and other aerospace weapons.

Computer Security: The Achilles' Heel of the Electronic Air Force by LTC Roger R. Schell, *Air University Review,* January–February 1980. LTC Schell's article is an excellent, in-depth review of security hazards and other problems concerning large computer systems. Also included are methods for improving that security.

✶

Countering the Soviet EW Threat to Field Artillery Communications, by CPT Mark O. Oetken, *Field Artillery Journal,* March–April 1980. While this article does concentrate on field artillery communications, the discussion on Soviet EW doctrine and counter-countermeasures is pertinent to all units with any communications capacity.

✶

Solzhenitsyn on Communism, *Time Magazine,* February 18, 1980. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, the Soviet dissident now living in exile in the United States, reacts to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, projecting possible future moves by the USSR and responses that must be taken by the United States.

Spying from On High, *Time Magazine,* April 7, 1980. This article shows recently declassified photographs which were mostly taken by U-2 aircraft on overflights of the Soviet Union. More interesting than the photographs themselves is the text which tells about the interpretation of the images and the major policy decisions based on those interpretations.

✶

Worldwide Crackdown on Soviet Spies, *US News and World Report,* March 24, 1980. After reading this article, you may indeed feel there is a spy under your bed. "Worldwide Crackdown" shows the efforts of counterintelligence units around the world to counter Soviet espionage.

✶

How Real is the Soviet Threat? based upon testimony before Congress by Richard E. Pipes and George F. Kennan, *US News and World Report,* March 10, 1980. This article debates whether the recent invasion of Afghanistan signals a change in Soviet strategic policy in the world.

2LT Erik Fedde
Co G, USAICS



Doctrinal Literature

FM 100-5, Operations, says that "the US Army must, above all else, prepare to win the first battle of the next war." Our ability to do that depends, to a large extent, on how well we can train our intelligence personnel to collect and analyze information.

The conduct of good training is difficult at best and is complicated by many factors. One is the lack of current doctrinal guidance which clearly communicates sound principles which can be used in the skill development process.

Valid doctrine is critical to providing the kind of intelligence support the tactical commander needs. Consequently, USAICS, the proponent for intelligence doctrinal literature, works very hard to insure that the best possible guidance is included in its field manuals, "how to fight manuals," training circulars and training texts. As the primary means of promulgating doctrine, these publications are based on Department of Army approved concepts and should be used to support all US Army intelligence training.

The intelligence school's effort is primarily devoted to supporting organizations and operations at the tactical level—corps and below. In recent years, military intelligence organizations and operational roles have changed significantly. Organizations are more responsive and consist of resources better able to provide a wider range of intelligence and electronic warfare support. The intelligence provided, based on all-source analysis, is generally of higher quality than ever before.

Intelligence literature was previously produced under literature series 30 and 32. Today, the 34 series incorporates and integrates doctrine for both fields. The primary USAICS effort is in the development of literature to support CEWI organizational and operational requirements at separate brigade/ACR/division and corps levels. Additionally, a group of three FMs are programmed to cover intelligence "operations, analysis and management," and update the information now contained in **FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence.** USAICS is diligently working to fill the doctrinal literature void which presently exists. What follows is an inventory of all intelligence doctrinal literature and the proposed publications for FY 80 and 82.

Current Inventory

Field manuals normally remain in effect until rescinded or superceded. Training circulars, except those covering specific equipment, expire three years after publication. (See **DA Pam 310-3** for requisitioning instructions.)

Number	Title	Pub Date
FM 30-5	Combat Intelligence	Oct 73
FM 30-9	MI Organizations	Oct 73
FM 30-15	Intel Interrogation	Sep 78
FM 30-16	Tech Intel	Aug 72
FM 30-17	CI OPS	Jan 72
(C)FM 30-17A	CI Special OPS	Feb 72
(S) FM 30-18	Intel Collection Operations	Nov 73
FM 30-20	Aerial Surv/Recon, Fld Army	Feb 72
FM 30-31	Stability Operations	Jan 70
FM 30-35	MIBARS	Nov 71
FM 31-3 (J)	Weather Spt to Fld Army Tactical Operations	Dec 69
FM 31-100 (T)	STANO	May 71
TC 30-11	Army Tactical Weather	Apr 77
TC 30-24	Tactical CI	Jun 77
TC 30-25	Tac Surv Off and Ground Surv	Jun 77
TC 30-26	Remote Sensors	Jun 77
TC 30-28	S2 Reference Guide	Jun 77
TC 30-34	CBTI Company (Division)	Aug 77
TC 30-35	IPW Interrogation Training	Oct 77

Proposed for FY 80-82

Number	Title	Pub Date
TC 34-3	Intel Preparation of Battlefield	Unknown
FM 34-60	Counterintelligence Operations	Unknown
TC 34-50	Recon and Surveillance Handbook	Jun 80
*FM 34-10	CEWI Battalion (DIV)	Jun 80
*FM 34-1	Intel & Electronic Warfare Operations	Dec 80
FM(J)34-81	Weather Intelligence in Support	Jan 81
FM 34-2	IEW Management	Dec 81
*FM 34-20	CEWI Gp (Corps)	Jul 81
*FM 34-33	CEWI Support to Artillery	Apr 81
*FM 34-22	Aerial Exploitation Battalion	Jul 81
*FM 34-21	Operations Battalion	Jul 81
*FM 34-11	Gnd Surv Co	Apr 81
FM 34-80	Bn/Bde S2 Handbook	Mar 82
TC 34-91	MAGIIC	Dec 82
*FM 34-14	Svc Spt Co, CEWI Bn (Div)	Jul 82
*FM 34-30	CEWI Co (Sep Bde)	Jan 82
FM 34-53	Tac Surveillance	Apr 82
FM 34-54	Tech Intel	Jul 82
TC 34-96	SOTAS	Oct 82

*How to Fight Manual

Only with your support can we develop a literature program which will realistically meet the training needs of the field, fill doctrinal literature gaps and better prepare intelligence personnel to do their jobs in support of the tactical commander. If you have recommendations for doctrinal literature, send them to USAICS (ATTN: ATSI-TD-LD). The following information is requested:

a. Subject.

b. Scope/Synopsis (Provide as much detail as you can. Please include special instructions.

c. Target Audience (be specific).

d. Justification (why).

Your assistance will be the key to our success.

The USAICS literature program has been carefully developed and fully coordinated with USAISD, the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, and HQ TRADOC, to insure that we offer MI organizations in the field the best possible support available.

Doctrinal literature provides the foundation for our support of the tactical commander. Our effort is to establish, with your help, a solid foundation.

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

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